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Note on spelling and pronunciation 
 
Modern Turkish uses the Latin alphabet, modified to ensure that there is a separate letter for 
each main sound. The spelling thus aims at phonetic consistency. The descriptions given 
below are approximate and non-technical. 
 
c is pronounced as j in John and joy. 
ç is pronounced as ch in church and chair. 
 is silent, but lengthens the preceding vowel. 
ı is pronounced something like the second syllable of rhythm, or the u in radium. 
ö is pronounced as the German ö in öffnen and könig. 
 is pronounced as sh in ship and shut. 
ü is pronounced like ü in the German schützen. 
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Preface 
“Our mass media are a vital element in the way we live our lives and come to know ourselves 
and our world. They contain our memories and our histories; their resources provide for the 
stories people tell each other.” (Street 2001:276) 
 
This thesis is concerned with concentration of ownership in Turkish media. My focus on 
ownership is due to a personal interest in the matter, the ongoing academic and popular debate 
on the issue and the fact that several Turkish journalists and media scholars I have spoken to 
generally believe this is the most interesting field of study regarding contemporary Turkish 
media. I have personally worked as a reporter in three conglomerate owned newspapers in 
Norway. The Norwegian conglomerate Orkla acquired one of them, a local newspaper called 
Østlendingen, when I was a reporter there in the late 1990s. It was the first time I was exposed 
to discussions of the pros and cons of conglomerate media ownership. There was a lot of 
heated debate at the time. Journalists tended to be opposed to the deal, managers and editors 
in favour. I have also worked six years for the major national daily Aftenposten, owned by the 
largest media conglomerate in Norway, Schibsted. 
 
I cannot point to a single incident that shaped my curiosity and concern towards conglomerate 
media ownership. Through my general experiences as a reporter I have come to the 
conclusion that the question of who controls the main channels of information in a given 
society is of immense importance, because it touches upon the basic of human coexistence: 
communication. The people who control our means to communicate on a macro level, are by 
default in a position were they can exert undue influence. I am not implying that all media 
owners have bad intentions. Most of them are in the business out of interest and a desire to 
make money. But there are examples of media owners that have used their power for personal 
political gain, or to influence political decision making in an undemocratic fashion. The 
nature of private media ownership with its limited level of transparency is to me a major 
concern that calls for serious and constant political considerations. The free market is not 
synonymous with pluralism – the relationship is often characterised by antagonism. I believe 
that media outlets – at least those that are not concerned only with entertainment – have a 
special societal value that sets them apart from ordinary consumer items, and that these media 
outlets thus cannot be regulated solely as commodities on equal terms with refrigerators and 
cars. Society, and I use this term in its widest sense, has a special obligation to secure that this 
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special societal value is defended. I am not in any way glorifying the institution of public 
broadcasting. History has shown us that complete state control over the media can be as 
dangerous as unchecked private ownership. My personal vision is a mix of the best of both 
worlds, combined with a high level of transparency and an effective regime of checks and 
balances to curb undue political influence. 
  1 
 
Chapter I: Introduction 
Mehmet T. Sucu is sitting behind a worn-out desk in a cramped and smoky office in the 
Cumhuriyet (Republic) building in Istanbul’s traditional press district, Caalolu.1 For 
centuries this was just a stone’s throw away from the nerve centres of political activity in the 
once mighty Ottoman Empire. Today the Topkapı Sarayı and the Sublime Porte, the buildings 
that used to house the governments of what was once arguably the most powerful state on 
earth, are among Istanbul’s major tourist attractions. The area is filled with activity 24 hours a 
day, 7 days a week. When most other newspapers moved to modern high-rise buildings in the 
outskirts of Istanbul in the 1980s and 1990s, the venerable Cumhuriyet stayed loyal to the 
noisy and cramped streets of sprawling Caalolu. 
 
To emphasize the historic importance of the area Sucu points out the window to the next-door 
building, a ramshackle wooden house: “That used to be the headquarters of the CUP”, he 
says, before he turns around and points to an old desk in the neighbouring room: “and that 
used to be Enver Pasha’s desk.”2 The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), part of the 
Young Turk Movement, ruled the Ottoman Empire during its last tumultuous years, and 
Enver Pasha was one of the party’s strongmen. The old wooden building also housed the first 
editorial offices of Cumhuriyet, launched in 1924 as the standard-bearer of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk's revolution. But what Sucu does not tell us is that an Armenian merchant owned the 
building before the CUP turned it into their headquarters. The house is thus a symbol of three 
overlapping periods in Turkish history: the multiethnic past, the bloody curtain fall of the 
Ottoman Empire when most minority groups were either forced to flee or killed, and the 
implementation of a new and arguably exclusionary Turkish nationalism after World War I.     
 
Sucu began working in Cumhuriyet after his friend and famous Cumhuriyet reporter Uur 
Mumcu was killed by radical Islamists in a car bomb in Ankara on 27 January 1993.3 As 
editor-in-chief the good humoured Sucu likes to have a say in most minor and major decisions 
regarding the making of the paper. During our interview he is often looking at the layout of 
freshly produced pages. He has a three-day beard, the greying hair is somewhat untidy, and he 
                                               
1
 The area is also known as Babıali. 
2
 Mehmet T. Sucu, interview with author, Caalolu, Istanbul 19 July 2005. 
3
 Uur Mumcu had reported extensively on the connections of Turkish Islamic fundamentalists with Iran and 
Saudi Arabia. The murder of Mumcu, who Zürcher (2004:290-291) describes as Turkey’s most famous 
journalist at the time, was instrumental in forming the hardened attitudes against Turkish Islamists that resulted 
in the general wave of suppression of Islamic currents, both moderate and radical, which was initiated in 1997. 
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speaks fast with energetic gestures. In one hand he constantly holds a cigarette, the other 
alternates between a portable phone and a cup of strong Turkish tea. Watching his appearance 
vivid images of the prototype old school editor caricatured in so many Hollywood movies 
springs to mind. And this is an image Sucu is clearly comfortable with. To him something 
went terribly wrong with Turkish journalism after the other newspapers moved from the city 
to the guarded media fortresses in suburban Güneli and Ikitelli. In one of his many anecdotes 
he invites me to understand the reasons for his grievances. In the late 1990s he was offered a 
job as editor in Hürriyet (Freedom). With an average circulation of more than half a million 
copies, the mainstream Hürriyet is almost ten times bigger than the leftist intellectual 
Cumhuriyet. Being part of Turkey's biggest media conglomerate, the Doan Group, Hürriyet 
also has a financial muscle that by far exceeds that of the struggling Cumhuriyet. 
 
“I went to their new high-rise building in Güneli. I entered the building, and had to go 
through a security check. The first I noticed was that you cannot open the windows! When I 
got to the right floor I saw some close friends, and I cried out to them. They told me to keep 
the noise down, and offered me tea. It was Lipton tea! Can you imagine that: Lipton tea”, he 
says, making a short pause just to underline the symbolic point that ordinary Turks don’t 
drink imported “dishwater”, and that this is an example of what he believes is a widening 
social gap between mainstream reporters and the public they claim they serve. 
 
“Then I wanted to smoke”, he continues. “But I had to go to a smoking-room. A smoking-
room! I had already made up my mind. I couldn’t work at that place. But my friends told me 
to go and talk to the editor-in-chief. I talked to him, and told him I wanted to go back to 
Caalolu. There I am free. I felt I was unable to breath in that building. “You are crazy”, he 
said. “We will offer you two or three times the salary you get in Cumhuriyet.” But I had 
already made up my mind. I wanted to work at a place where you are close to the people you 
write about, where you eat at the same cafes as them, and use the same public transport. I 
wanted to be close to the sources.” 
 
The contrast between the worn four-storey office building of Cumhuriyet and the posh high-
rise Hürriyet Medya Towers is by all comparisons glaring. Hürriyet is situated in Güneli, 
close to Istanbul’s busy international airport, the Atatürk Havalımanı. If the traffic on the 
often chaotic Tem Otoyolu (Trans European Motorway) is moderate, it’s about half-an-hours 
drive from central Istanbul. At the entrance to the facilities I am greeted by two armed guards, 
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one equipped with a machine gun. Two limousines are parked in front of the impressive 
marble stairs that leads into the building. Once inside you have to go through an airport-like 
security check before you are let into a big hall decorated with a fountain and statues of 
previous editors. The building has cafes, kiosks and vending machines that provide the 
employees with whatever they need for a day at the office. Few people eat their lunch outside 
in the somewhat ramshackle neighbourhood inhabited by a share of the millions of Turks who 
in the last decades have moved from the Anatolian countryside to a suburb in Istanbul, or 
Gecekondu, as many of them are called in Turkish.4 
 
The news department has a semi-open landscape with lining walls the height of a man to 
separate the working desks. The environment is calm compared to the intense atmosphere in 
Cumhuriyet – more like a mainstream European news department. Editor Arif Dizdarolu 
tells me he misses the atmosphere of Caalolu, where Hürriyet used to be situated, but he 
claims that it was impossible to build a modern news building with parking and printing 
facilities close by in that part of Istanbul. But there is clearly an element of melancholy in the 
jeans dressed middle-aged man’s voice when he talks about the “good old days”. 
 
“We were in the daily life. We were in the streets. We could eat were people ate. We had the 
chance to see people. Now we are outside of the city. We are a thousand people working in 
the same building, but we don’t see each other. We feel that we are isolated from the daily 
life. We don’t use public buses. We don’t use the vapur (public boats). We go with other 
services and cars. We have less contact with the people.”5 
 
Sucu and Dizdarolu in many ways represent the old and the new in the Turkish media sector. 
Cumhuriyet, founded as a mouthpiece for Atatürk's government a year after the Turkish 
Republic was established in 1923, is the oldest existing daily in Turkey today. It still carries 
some of the nation-building and socialist credentials and ideals of the Atatürk era. Hürriyet 
was founded in 1948, and grew to be a major newspaper during the first experiments with 
market liberalism in Turkey in the 1950s. Like most newspapers in Turkey today it is part of a 
major multiactivity conglomerate, while Cumhuriyet struggles to stay independent. A 
foundation controls 51 per cent of the holding company that owns Cumhuriyet, while the 
                                               
4
 Gecekondu literally means, “settled at night”. The word is used to refer to the squatter areas in Turkey’s big 
cities. In the 1980s, over half the population of Turkey’s major cities lived in such “irregular settlements”. In 
Istanbul approximately 70 per cent did so. (Bura 1998:307)  
5
 Arif Dizdarolu, interview with author, Güneli, Istanbul 19 July 2005. 
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remaining 49 per cent are owned by various investors, among them the owners of the two 
largest media conglomerates in Turkey, Aydın Doan and Turgay Ciner.6 Doan, Ciner and 
the other big league businessmen who have taken over Turkish media during the last 25 years, 
play the lead roles in this thesis. 
 
1.1. Two dominant perspectives 
Two dominant perspectives developed to investigate and explain the connections between 
media, political power and democratisation can be identified in the field of Media Studies. 
The first and oldest is defined by its focus on the media as a guardian against abuses by the 
state, and is in essence liberal in approach. The second, variably dubbed the critical political 
economy perspective, emerged in the 1970s as a critique of the dominant liberal media theory. 
Both perspectives were developed mainly by studying media in Britain and the US, and are 
consequently influenced by the broader social developments in these countries.  
 
The principal role of the media according to liberal theory is to act as a check on the state. 
Private ownership in a free market is essential for fulfilling this role as a watchdog, and all 
ties with the state are by default suspect. The dominant critique of this perspective is that it 
doesn’t take into account the exercise of economic authority by shareholders (Curran 
2000:122). It also rejects the notion that the state in given circumstances can play a positive 
role in the development of media institutions. Another objection is that it fails to consider 
collusion between media owners and political elites based on social ties and shared interests. 
In other words: it fails to consider media owners as part of a broader system of power. 
 
The critical political economy approach tends to portray market liberalism and political 
democracy as essentially antagonistic. Under the reign of the free market the control of the 
media has been concentrated in the hands of media owners and advertisers. This has in turn 
limited diversity and largely replaced political content with entertainment. One critique of this 
perspective is that it glosses over the state as a source of threat to media freedom. Lee 
(2000:124-125) argues that this neglect is particularly untenable when it comes to analysing 
authoritarian regimes. In countries with such regimes it gives little meaning to investigate 
private ownership structures if one doesn’t take into account that they are under the tutelage 
of the state. Schudson (2000:178-179) argues that it is dangerous to downplay the repressive 
                                               
6
 Mehmet T. Sucu, interview with author, Caalolu, Istanbul 19 July 2005. 
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potential of a state-centred media system. He claims that the absence of commercial 
organisations, or their total domination by the state, is the worst-case scenario. 
 
What springs to mind if we sum up the critique of the two dominant perspectives is that any 
theoretical master perspective has to conceive of the media as being a check both on public 
and private power. In other words: A synthesis might be a more fruitful strategy than a twin 
burial of the theories. But the most important lesson is that a fresh canvas calls for a fresh 
brush. There are important differences between societies, and these differences need to be 
addressed if we are to develop reasoned understanding of media in a local, national or 
regional setting. My approach is inspired by the critical political economy perspective, but I 
will also focus on the uses and abuses of state power, because I believe that this is essential 
for understanding how the interaction between different societal forces have shaped the 
development of Turkish media. Following Lee’s argument presented above, discussions on 
how the authoritarian character of the Turkish state has influenced the development of issues 
such as pluralism and private ownership in Turkey is a necessary ingredient in my analysis. 
 
1.2. Problem and hypothesis 
Two and a half newspapers are enough in Turkey, former president and premier Turgut Özal 
(1927-1993) argued in 1983 (Nozawa-Dursun 1997:19).7 Concentrated ownership in Turkish 
media gained momentum during Özal's premiership (1983-1989) and presidency (1989-1993). 
Today a handful of multiactivity conglomerates dominate the media market. 
 
The small amount of research on and analyses of media in Turkey is generally concentrated 
on legislation that have restricted freedom of speech,8 an oppressive political environment and 
violence against and incarceration of journalists and academics.9 There has been little 
academic focus on ownership structures. During the fierce fighting between the Turkish 
Armed Forces and the Kurdish separatist guerrilla Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK; 
Kurdistan Workers Party) in the mid 1990s, Turkey was regarded as one of the most 
oppressive countries in the world, regarding freedom of speech. Anyone who published 
articles the regime defined as promoting a separatist agenda, a threat to national security or a 
threat to the secular foundation of the state, risked prosecution and harsh prison sentences. 
                                               
7
 Turgut Özal headed the Anavatan Partisi (ANAP; Motherland Party). He died in 1993 while still president. 
8
 The Turkish Press Council in 1995 identified 152 laws that limited press freedom (Çatalba 2000:143). 
9
 For some examples see: Human Rights Watch (1999); Helsinki Watch Committee (1986); Lawyers Committee 
for Human Rights & Crowley Program in International Human Rights (1999).   
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In connection with Turkey's bid to join the EU, the government has removed or relaxed many 
of the restrictive laws.10 The police still arbitrarily harass reporters, and it can still be 
dangerous to air certain political views,11 but the legal groundwork done by the government 
has definitely expanded political rights and civil liberties.12 
 
However, there is an inherent and troubling paradox to this development: one would assume 
that the relaxation of repressive legislation would at last cause political and ideological 
discussion to flourish in Turkish society. But this has, as a number of scholars and 
organisations have pointed out, not happened.13 The central question for discussion in this 
thesis is thus: why has liberalisation of repressive legislation in Turkey not produced more 
pluralism and diversity in the media?  
 
My hypothesis is that concentration of ownership in Turkish media largely is to blame for the 
limited scope of political and ideological discussion in Turkey today. That ownership 
concentration in media creates dilemmas tied to concepts of pluralism and diversity is not an 
original argument in and of itself. But I claim that the consequences of such concentration are 
more serious and harmful in Turkey than in most Western countries because 1) the concept of 
a free media was not sufficiently ingrained in the political culture prior to the economic 
liberalisation, 2) the military junta that ruled in the early 1980s managed to limit the 
ideological scope of the Turkish political field and civil society to such an extent that the 
Turkish citizenry became virtually depoliticised, 3) effective checks and balances to curb the 
influence of media owners and restrict the ties between owners and government officials are 
not established, 4) the Turkish media market is very small compared with Western markets, 
and it cannot support a wide range of publications, 5) the media business is not self-
sustainable, and most media companies are thus financially dependent upon their mother 
companies to survive. 
                                               
10
 For analyses of the legal changes, see: Çatalba 2005:12-15; Commission of the European Communities 
2004:36-42. 
11
 According to Reporters Without Borders 39 journalists were arrested and 14 physically attacked during 2004. 
In addition five media organisations were censored by the state. Reporters Without Borders (2005): Turkey – 
2005 Annual Report. http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=13450&var_recherche=Turkey  (19.10.2005) 
12
 Turkey has since 2001 steadily improved its political rights and civil liberties standing in various surveys. See: 
Freedom House (2003): Annual Freedom in the World Country Scores, 1972 through 2003. 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/allscore04.xls (26.05.2005); Reporters Without Borders (2005): 
Worldwide Press Freedom Index 2005. http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/CM_2005_Eu_Eng.pdf (05.04.2006)      
13
 For examples, see: Tunç 2004:5; Open Society Institute 2005:1594-1595; Freedom House (2005): Freedom of 
the Press 2005. http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/pressurvey/pfs2005.pdf (26.05.2005) 
  7 
 
 
From these explanations I have derived three arguments from which I will organise my 
analysis. The first one asks what the motivations behind and the desired outcome of the 
liberalising policies were. My hypothesis is that the political elite had no intention of 
jeopardising their control of the flow of information, but instead concluded that a new 
ideological toolbox gave them new opportunities. Consequently they gave certain privileges 
to some media players as a more or less implicit trade-off to guarantee obedience. The second 
argument attempts to explain why otherwise successful businessmen make large investments 
in a sector that has been unprofitable for a long time. What benefits do they derive from their 
media outlets? My hypothesis is that they use them to put pressure on the political leadership 
and to promote their other businesses. The third argument investigates the role of civil society 
in Turkey, with a focus on the role of trade unions in the media sector and human rights 
organisations. My hypothesis is that powerful elements in the political and the economic elites 
have a common interest in imposing serious restraints on civil movements, although their 
motives might diverge. 
 
1.3. The age of conglomerates 
The drive towards concentration of ownership has been strong in most liberal democratic 
societies during the last century. Many scholars claim that this trend shot ahead with the 
ascendance of the New Right,14 whose ideas became influential, especially in Great Britain 
and the US, in the late 1970s (McChesney 2000:296-297; Street 2001:240-241). For the New 
Right theorists the free market is deemed to be the only appropriate mechanism for 
determining media content, and their line of thought has led to deregulation of cross-media 
ownership restrictions and public service obligations. Many studies of media policy in the 
West argue that these policies in practice are irreversible because the giant conglomerates that 
now dominate the media market have become too powerful (McChesney 2000:125-126; 
Bagdikian 2004:257-259; Doyle 2002:105-121). Trans-national companies like News 
Corporation, AOL Time Warner, Disney and Bertelsmann have annual revenues exceeding 
national budgets in small countries,15 and this financial muscle, combined with control over 
important channels of information, have created a situation where the media elites actually 
wield considerable influence over democratic institutions. A textbook example is provided by 
                                               
14
 Often used interchangeably with neoliberalism and economic rationalism. The eponymous terms Thatcherism 
and Reagenism also to some degree apply to the same phenomenon.  
15
 AOL Time Warner, the biggest media conglomerate in the world, earned revenues totalling USD 42,1 billion 
in 2004. Press release from Time Warner: http://ir.timewarner.com/downloads/4Q04earnings.pdf (19.05.2005) 
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Silvio Berlusconi’s rise to power on the back of his television and press empire in the Italian 
elections in 1994 and 2001. Among the scholars referred above there is a growing concern 
that mainstream media, in principal speeches presented as defenders of civil society, 
democracy and pluralism, actually work as conservative and undemocratic forces in many 
parts of the world today. The giant media corporations have a big stake in encouraging and 
preserving a free and globalised market, and have therefore almost by default become 
political players while hiding behind a façade of neutrality and objectivity. 
 
1.4. Effects of ownership concentration 
Following the division between the adherents of the liberal and the critical political economy 
perspective outlined above, we can safely say that there is no universal agreement among 
media scholars on how concentrated ownership affects media diversity. McChesney (2000; 
2004) believes that the negative effects of concentration on pluralism and democracy by far 
outweigh the economic gains created by synergy and scale advantages. Doyle (2002:12) 
agrees with him to a certain extent. Her analysis is developed along two different lines of 
inquiry: diversity of output and diversity of ownership. These are both related to the concept 
of pluralism, but there is no guarantee that diversity of ownership will produce diversity of 
output, although this is more likely than that concentrated ownership will lead to diversity. 
She also argues that the amount of output is not necessarily linked to pluralism because it is 
better to have two channels with different programming than twenty with the same. Doyle 
(2002:20) uses the case of Berlusconi and his media conglomerate to provide “compelling 
evidence of a causal connection between concentrated media ownership and an undesirable 
narrowing in the diversity of political opinions available to the public via the media”. Mara 
Einstein (2004) concludes in her study of television output in the US that concentration of 
ownership has not reduced diversity, but actually to some extent increased it. The problem is 
that this increase has created “fragmented audiences that limits itself to watching only the 
kinds of programs that it likes – not necessarily what would serve a democracy” (2004:4). 
 
Another effect of ownership concentration is the immense growth of commercially driven 
conglomerates and the accompanying financial power of these firms. This has implications 
for media output and diversity when it is more profitable for these conglomerates to reduce or 
streamline output than to invest in diversity. But it can also have wider implications for 
pluralism if owners use their outlets for personal political gain. The most obvious example is 
Berlusconi, but the media mogul Rupert Murdoch, owner of News Corporation, has also been 
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widely accused of using his global media empire to promote a particular political ideology 
and its representatives. But these are as Street (2001:133-139) has shown allegations that are 
difficult to prove, because it attributes a political motive to Murdoch. It suggests that he has a 
reason for influencing his media outlets that may conflict or coincide with his commercial 
interests. If we measure Murdoch by the amount of commercial success he has achieved, it is 
conceivable that his commercial interests override everything else.16 But more important than 
isolated examples of media moguls riding to prominence on the back of their media empires, 
is the long term influence and effect of an ideologically uniform media. If we for the sake of 
the argument assume that media owners have a large say in the editorial policies of their 
outlets, and that they use this power to subtly promote a one-dimensional ideological outlook, 
we have a less transparent and arguably more dangerous situation. 
 
1.5. De-westernising media studies 
Studies of media ownership and media in general have tended to focus on outlets in a handful 
of Western countries. The theoretical framework that has been developed is consequently 
based on media institutions that operate in a liberal environment. With the resent academic 
interest in globalisation this framework has been challenged. Scholars like Downing (1996) 
and Sparks (1998) have both called for “communication theorizing to develop itself 
comparatively” (Downing1996:xi). The rationale behind this approach is that the evidence 
derived from studies of media in societies that are politically relatively homogeneous is not 
representative of the world. This critique combined with increasing interest in developing 
theories to explain the causes and effects of globalisation cleared the ground for studies of the 
role of media in a number of countries. The book “De-westernising Media Studies” (2000), 
with contributions from scholars from a wide range of countries and continents, is but one 
example of this trend. The editors of the book, James Curran and Myung-Jin Park (2000:5), 
believe that contributions from “area studies” are vital for developing comparative studies that 
can shed new light on media theories. They argue that local knowledge is crucial if we are to 
understand how media interacts with local culture and power structures. 
 
1.6. Sources 
This study is concerned with the contemporary situation of conglomerate media in Turkey, 
and the amount of authoritative academic sources available is limited. A few studies on the 
                                               
16
 Street’s argument is not directly applicable to Turkey because most Turkish media outlets run at a loss. 
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subject by Turkish scholars and experts have recently been published in Turkish, but to my 
knowledge there exists no extensive and authoritative study published in English. Initially this 
was an obstacle, but I overcame it by improving my Turkish skills during the process. The 
research in this thesis is still to a large degree based on newspaper and magazine articles, both 
in Turkish and English, reports from various Turkish and international organisations, and 
interviews and informal discussions with Turkish media scholars, editors, reporters and trade 
union leaders. Most of the newspaper and magazine articles are collected from the Internet-
sites of the publications in question, a list of which are presented in the bibliography. To fill 
in the blanks left from scarce material of scholarly work, I have reserved ample space for my 
interviews. They will be duly presented in a suiting context in the following chapters. The 
interviews were conducted during fieldwork in Istanbul in January, June and July 2005. The 
choice of Istanbul as site of my fieldwork is due to the fact that the city is the undisputed 
centre of Turkish media activity, a status it has enjoyed almost uninterrupted since the first 
Turkish newspapers saw the light of day in the early 19th century. 
 
My work draws heavily on authoritative studies on Turkey from various academic disciplines 
such as anthropology, sociology, history, political economy and political science. Due to the 
lack of written sources on corporate Turkish media this was an absolute necessity if I was to 
provide a proper context for my own analysis and findings. The multiactivity nature of the 
conglomerates in question, the various ethnic and religious conflicts that have influenced the 
course of political rights and civil liberties in Turkey, and the history of state-business 
relations in the country are all aspects that are important in my analysis. Drawing on work 
from many disciplines has made it possible to provide some conclusions that may have wider 
societal reach than the ones provided from more discipline-loyal media studies. 
 
1.7. Structure and organisation 
This study consists of seven chapters, loosely organised in two parts separating the 
background material and the analysis. The first part consists of two chapters in addition to the 
introduction, while the second part consists of three chapters and a final conclusion. In 
chapter two I chronicle the rise of the modern Turkish media after World War I. The third 
chapter provides an up-to-date insight into who-owns-what in the Turkish media industry. It 
also provides an insight into how the major conglomerates in general organise their 
businesses and a discussion of the size and wealth of the Turkish economy and media market. 
Part two consists of three chapters based on the three arguments I introduced in paragraph 1.2.
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Chapter II: History of the Turkish media 
Discontinuity due to frequently fluctuating political, judicial and economic circumstances has 
influenced the development of privately owned media in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey 
since the first newspaper, Takvim-i Vakayi (Calendar of Events), was launched in 1831. 
Almost none of the newspapers that were launched in Turkey before World War II have 
survived. Western Europe and the US are characterised by the opposite: almost no major new 
newspaper has been launched successfully after World War I. The Turkish economy has been 
a roller coaster ride where rapid growth and heavy meltdowns have followed in each other’s 
footsteps in a seemingly endless cycle. Inflation has often been in the high double-digit range. 
A number of ineffective minority governments, four military coups (1960, 1971, 1980 and 
1997)1 and a judicial branch that at times has been heavily politicised have created an 
unstable environment for business, investors and consumers alike. In this chapter I will give a 
brief historical background and chronicle the rise of modern media in Turkey. 
 
2.1. From the ruins of an empire 
The defeat in World War I caused the end of the once mighty Ottoman Empire. After ten 
years of almost continuous warfare the areas that now form modern Turkey was 
“depopulated, impoverished and in ruins to a degree almost unparalleled in modern history” 
(Zürcher 2004:163).2 The emigration of Greeks and Armenians, who had constituted the large 
majority of entrepreneurs and managers, left the area almost without highly skilled personnel. 
One of the main objectives of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s regime was consequently to support 
the rise of an indigenous industrial elite that would work in tandem with the government to 
build a strong and state-led economy, and a strong middle class that would engage in 
commerce and support the new economy. As Bura (1994) has shown this was a long-term 
project that demanded commitment from both sides, and it was only partly successful in the 
first decades. It was not until the 1950s that something resembling an independent industrial 
elite and a bourgeoisie were strong enough to take initiative. The central role of the state in 
the development and the fragile and unstable economy did to a large degree make the 
economic elite dependent upon the political elite. This has as Aydın (2005) and Bura (1994) 
have shown left a lasting impression on the relationship between these groups. The economic 
                                               
1
  The bloodless ouster of Necmettin Erbakan’s government in 1997 is popularly dubbed a "post-modern coup". 
2
 According to Zürcher (2004:163), some 2,5 million Anatolian Muslims, between 600 000 and 800 000 
Armenians and up to 300 000 Greeks died during World War I and the War of Liberation (Kurtulu Savaı). The 
population of Anatolia declined by 20 per cent through mortality, a percentage 20 times as high as that of France 
during World War I. 
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elite has seldom taken initiatives on their own behalf, but waited until the state has acted. The 
development of privately owned media has more or less followed the general pattern of 
business development in Turkey. This will be analysed in detail in chapter three.         
 
2.2. History of modern Turkish media 
It was not until the late 19th century that newspapers emerged as vehicles of social debate and 
change that had any real impact on social and political life in the Ottoman Empire. If we 
measure by circulation, the reach of the written word was largely confined to the upper 
classes and the influential urban intelligentsia.3 The emergence of modern journalism in 
Turkey largely coincides with the Young Ottoman Movement, a group of Turkish intellectual 
revolutionaries that disseminated European ideas of pluralism and constitutionalism through 
their writings (Karpat 1964:260-261).4 The disputes played out in the columns were 
concerned with strategies of reform and how to rejuvenate the ailing empire, and these 
political commitments eventually lead to a short-lived constitution and a parliament. After 
sultan Abdülhamit II (1876-1909) dissolved this parliament in 1878, less than a year after its 
inauguration, a period of despotism and suppression followed until the Young Turk revolution 
in 1908. Under the Young Turks the press initially was quite vibrant and free. It expanded 
quickly and became associated with the emerging political parties (Karpat 1964:267-268). But 
the period of free debate was cut short by increasing authoritarianism by the Young Turks 
from 1912 to the Ottoman military defeat in World War I in 1918. 
 
I have organised the period from the end of World War I to the present in three periods: The 
first chronicle the development through the Independence War (1921-1922) and the One-
Party era, the second the period from the first democratic election in Turkey in 1946 until the 
military intervention in 1980, and the third from the 1980 coup until the present. 
 
2.2.1. 1918-1946: Rise and decline of the Republican Press 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), the father of modern Turkey, knew the importance of 
the press and the value of publicity. He is reported to have said that: “Indoctrination and 
information was very important, as important as the question of the army, and even more 
important than the army” (Karpat 1964:270). When he studied at the War College (1899-
                                               
3
 According to Karpat (1964:262), the average circulation of newspapers was a few thousand. The total number 
of Turkish newspapers and periodicals published in 1872 was 9, while foreign language journals numbered 30.  
4
 The best known of these intellectuals is the prose writer and poet Namık Kemal (1840-1888).   
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1902) and the Staff College (1902-1904) in Istanbul he and some friends wrote and published 
a handwritten newspaper that was clearly political and subversive in outlook. It consisted of 
criticism of what they saw as the shortcomings in the administration and the policies of the 
Ottoman state (Mango 2002:51-52). Atatürk took up journalism again in 1918, when he wrote 
editorials for and helped finance the newspaper Minber (The Pulpit). In conjunction with the 
Sivas Congress in 1919 he helped publish the newspaper Irade’i Milliye (National Will).5 
This paper, under the subsequent titles of Hakimiyet-i Milliye (National Sovereignty) and 
Ulus (Nation), for years remained the mouthpiece of the government and the Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi (CHP; Republican People’s Party), founded by Atatürk on 9 September 1923. 
 
Atatürk had made a name for himself as a brave military officer during World War I, and his 
political ambitions made him seek publicity, first as a way to win public support, then as a 
means to indoctrinate the public in his vision of a modern and westernised society. The 
existing press in Istanbul was hostile towards Atatürk's new republican government in 
Ankara. During the Independence War against Greece there was a sharp distinction between 
newspapers that sided with Atatürk's government and the ones that sided with the Ottoman 
Sultan in Istanbul (Mango 2002:398-408). When Atatürk led the Turkish forces to victory 
over the Greeks, his status increased accordingly. He now had the power to abolish the 
Sultanate, and the last Ottoman ruler, Abdülmecit II, was reduced to a mere religious 
figurehead until the Caliphate also was abolished in 1924. With power firmly consolidated in 
Ankara, but with sporadic rebellions in Anatolia, most notably the Kurdish-Islamic uprising in 
1925 led by the Kurdish notable Sheikh Said, Atatürk hardened his attitude towards the press. 
With the Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu (Law on Maintenance of Order) in 1925 the government had 
the legal means to close publications that criticised it, a power it used extensively. 
 
Atatürk was also responsible for establishing the first Turkish news agency, Anadolu Ajansi 
(The Anatolian Agency), on 6 April 1920, and a general directorate of press and information 
on 7 June the same year (Nozawa-Dursun 1997:11). During the Independence War Atatürk's 
aim was to inform the public of domestic and international news. After he had consolidated 
his power and started his sweeping modernising reforms, his information strategies gradually 
                                               
5
 The Sivas Congress took place from 4 to 11 September 1919. A representative committee that functioned as the 
national executive of the resistance movement was elected, and Mustafa Kemal became its president. The 
resistance movement was formed by Ottoman officers that stood in opposition to the Ottoman government in 
Istanbul, and its main function was to defend Anatolia against encroachments on the armistice lines after World 
War I. Greece had occupied Izmir in May 1919, and other nations had also made claims on parts of Anatolia. 
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became more influenced by his political objectives: the public was to be educated and 
indoctrinated. Voices that were deemed critical of the reforms and the regime were silenced, 
with conformity as the end result. It was Atatürk's belief that Turkey was not yet ready for 
press freedom, and journalists and editors enjoyed little or no protection from the whims of 
government administrators and high-ranking bureaucrats. Instead the government demanded 
closer cooperation from the press. This repressive climate caused a decrease in the number of 
papers published, and consequently to a decrease in the overall circulation (Karpat 1964:272). 
But state-suppression is not the whole story. “Until 1946, a large portion of the Turkish press 
wholeheartedly supported the ruling ideology, Kemalism,6 and perceived itself responsible for 
the preservation of it”, according to Çatalba (2005:5). She argues that many journalists 
actually supported censorship when it was deemed necessary to deter challenges to the ruling 
ideology. She also shows that it could be rewarding to support the official line: between 1920 
and 1938 more than 40 of the deputies in the Turkish parliament had their professional 
background in journalism (2005:6). 
 
Although the number of newspapers were limited and their circulation were low, the press 
together with radio were the driving forces of a significant development in Turkish society, 
namely that new ideas for the first time were filtered down to the lower classes.7 This 
rendered them conscious of their relation to the government and to the upper classes, and to 
the fact that what separated them from the elite was a disparity in social status and economic 
privilege, not political consciousness. In this manner the media helped to catalyse the 
opposition towards the ruling elite that resulted in the ousting of CHP from power in 1950. 
 
2.2.2. 1946-1980: Challenges to state control 
The single party era in Turkey ended with the first general elections in 1946. The rise to 
political prominence of the opposition Demokrat Parti (DP; Democratic Party) in the 1950 
elections marked the definitive end of the hegemony of Atatürk's CHP. The press developed 
rapidly in the years following World War II, and the first politically independent mass 
newspapers appeared in this period (Karpat 1964:277). Campaigns for press freedom 
supported by the opposition parties, especially the DP, gained momentum. As a consequence 
                                               
6
 Kemalism is also known as the “Six Arrows”. They refer to the principles of republicanism, statism, secularism 
(laicism), populism, nationalism and reformism that defined the nature of the Turkish Republic during its 
formative years. The “Six Arrows” is still used as the symbol of Atatürk's old party, CHP.  
7
 The first radio broadcasting station in Turkey was put into operation in 1927 in Istanbul by a private firm under 
government supervision. Karpat (1964:275) notes that the introduction of the radio made the concept of direct 
mass communication more clearly defined in the political leaders’ minds. 
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the majority of the press began to support the DP, which was an important factor for the 
party’s success at the polls in 1950 (Nozawa-Dursun 1997:13). The press in many ways was 
instrumental for the first change of government in Turkey through free elections. 
 
A liberal press environment characterised the first years of DP rule, and the number of dailies 
and periodicals increased rapidly.8 Newspapers without party affiliation became popular and 
influential. Circulation actually dropped immediately if they became associated with a party 
(Karpat 1964:280). Hürriyet and Milliyet (Nationality) established themselves as major 
newspapers in this period.9 The DP government also adopted the first law that recognized and 
protected the labour rights of professional journalists, despite protests by newspaper owners 
(Çatalba 2005:7). The initial period of cosy relations between the press and the new 
government came to a halt when the country started to experience severe economic 
difficulties in the mid 1950s. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes (1899-1961) disliked direct 
critique just as much as his predecessors had done, and a period of closures of newspapers 
and imprisonment of journalists followed. Menderes also concluded that the carrot could 
work as well as the stick to mould the press into loyalty. Allocation of newsprint and 
distribution of public announcements and advertisements proved to be effective measures to 
stifle criticism. The papers that accepted these generous financial resources were scornfully 
named besleme basın (“foster-child-press”) (Çatalba 2005:7). This use of public resources to 
reward loyal media outlets echoes the more systematised regime of trade-off instigated by 
Turgut Özal in the 1980s, a phenomenon that will be analysed in chapter four.  
  
Menderes’ government was overthrown by the military in May 1960,10 and the new 
constitution in 1961 marked a positive step towards further democratisation and liberalisation 
of oppressive press laws. Article 22 of the constitution affirmed that the press was free and 
not subject to censorship. Of major importance was two laws passed by the military junta the 
same year. The first established the Basın Ilan Kurumu (Press Advertising Corporation) in 
order to prevent discriminatory allocation of public advertisement, the second, law No. 212, 
involved protective clauses on the rights of professional journalists. Again newspaper owners 
protested, and nine major newspapers went out of print for three days (Çatalba 2005:8). 
                                               
8
 From 1950 to 1952 the number of dailies increased from 131 to 333. The number of periodicals increased from 
346 to 650. (Karpat 1964:279) 
9
 The Doan Group now controls both, and they are still among the best selling papers in Turkey. 
10
 Adnan Menderes was sentenced to death by an army-controlled court, and sent to the gallows 17 September 
1961. Foreign Minister Fatih Rütü Zorlu and Finance Minister Hasan Polatkan were also executed. 
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A relatively liberal environment endured throughout most of the 1960s. Turkey’s leftist press 
developed rapidly, and the quality of newspapers also improved, with increased focus on 
ideas, views and commentary (Nozawa-Dursun 1997:15). There also was a brief experiment 
with a self-regulatory authority, the Basın eref Divanı (Press Honour Council), which 
operated until 1967, although ineffectively, according to Çatalba (2005:8). Circulation 
increased with the advent of offset techniques, colour prints and photos. But the late 1960s 
was a period of increasing tensions between leftist and rightist groups. Violent clashes in 
some big Turkish cities were the excuse needed by the army to intervene in 1971. This 
resulted in a period of repression of writers and intellectuals, especially leftists. Papers were 
closed, and journalists imprisoned and tortured. In the late 1970s the conflict between leftists 
and rightists escalated into a quasi civil war, and people were killed in violent clashes and by 
terrorist acts every day. This paved the way for yet another military intervention in 1980. 
 
2.2.3. 1980-2006: Conglomeration and sensationalism 
The early 1980s marks a turning point in the history of the Turkish Republic. The new 
constitution drawn up by the junta that ruled from 1980 to 1983 reversed the democratic gains 
made in the preceding decades and limited the freedom of the press. A deliberate policy of 
depoliticisation, exemplified by the total prohibition of all public discussion of political 
matters in June 1981, was carried out to cure what was seen as the political ills of the 1970s. 
The junta instigated a continuous series of closures of newspapers and arrests of journalists 
and editors (Zürcher 2004:279). The press accordingly started to practice self-censorship due 
to fear of confiscation, closedown or imprisonment (Nozawa-Dursun 1997:17). The result 
was a toothless and anaemic media that focused on sex scandals, nude photos and crime. 
 
Historically, the owners of Turkish newspapers have worked as journalists and columnists in 
their own publications. They were devoted to the profession and their income came from 
journalism (Tunç 2004:311). The liberal economic policies of Turgut Özal's government, 
which won power when the army withdrew to its barracks in 1983, accelerated the trend 
towards a new corporate mentality in the media. The new media owners had made their 
fortunes in other business sectors, and were largely strangers to the profession. The 
capitalization of a number of newspapers began through financial support from the 
government, handed out to businessmen loyal to the regime, and through relationships with 
banks. Özal’s effort to bring the newspaper owners to his side also significantly changed the 
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nature of the relationship between the political power holders and the press. Criticism of the 
government had previously been one of the prerequisites for high circulation. With the 
depoliticisation of the citizenry this was no longer deemed a necessary business strategy. 
Criticism of the political powers would only mean legal trouble and loss of financial 
goodwill. In the words of Navaro-Yashin (2002:6): “…the political was turned into a 
consumer item”, and thus trivialised. 
 
Another development of importance in this period is the deregulation of the Turkish 
broadcasting system. With the launch of the first Turkish private channel, Star, on 1 March 
1990, the 60-year-old state monopoly abruptly came to an end. To bypass Turkish legislation 
that protected the state monopoly, the owners of Star beamed their signal from Germany. 
Soon after a number of other companies followed suit, and absolute state control over the 
airwaves was replaced by total anarchy. It is interesting to note that the company that set all 
this in motion, Star’s parent company Magic Box Inc., was partly owned by Turgut Özal's 
son, Ahmet Özal. Turkey today has 14 national, 13 regional and 203 local television channels, 
and 33 national, 89 regional and 873 local radio stations, according to Open Society Institute 
(2005:1543). In addition, the public broadcaster, the Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu 
(TRT; Turkish Radio and Television Corporation), has four national, one regional and two 
international television channels. The enormous amount of satellite dishes covering rooftops, 
walls and balconies all over Istanbul is clear evidence of the impact the new broadcasting 
regime has had in Turkey. Even many of the most ramshackle buildings in central Istanbul are 
now decorated with a satellite dish. To the observant eye they have become as big a part of 
the urban scenery as the yellow Tofa cabs that colour the streets of Turkey’s biggest city. 
  
Turkish corporate media has experienced a lot of legal and political turbulence during the last 
six years. The state has taken over the eight television and radio stations and the two 
newspapers of the Uzan family. The case of Dinç Bilgin’s Sabah Group is another interesting 
example.11 Until April 2001 The Sabah Group and The Doan Group dominated 80 per cent 
of the Turkish media sector (Tunç 2004:312). Bilgin was arrested on fraud charges that April, 
accused of siphoning off millions of dollar from his Etibank. These and other related cases 
will be subject of discussion in the upcoming analysis.
                                               
11
 This group is often referred to as the Merkez Group or the Bilgin Group. I will use the name Sabah Group in 
this thesis. 
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Chapter III: Ownership in Turkish media 
This chapter will provide an up-to-date insight into who-owns-what in the Turkish media 
industry, with focus on the biggest players. It will also provide an insight into how the major 
conglomerates in Turkey in general have organised their businesses. The Doan Group, the 
undisputable market leader in the media sector, is chosen as a case to illustrate this. The 
chapter will also provide brief accounts of other major and midsize players, and show the 
relative strength between them. But to get a notion of the bigger picture, I will first discuss a 
crucial determinant to understand the development of media in all capitalist societies: the size 
and the wealth of the economy and market.       
 
3.1. Market size 
The resources available for consumption of media are constrained by the size and the wealth 
of a given economy. This logic seems inescapable in any free market, regardless of the 
sources of funding involved (Doyle 2002:15). To illustrate the size of the Turkish media 
market I will compare it with the size of markets in other countries, more or less randomly 
chosen. One can argue that there are many known and unknown variables that shape some of 
these figures, and that they consequently are ill suited for comparison. My point is that the 
Turkish media market is small, has a long way to go before it reaches the level of Western 
media markets, and that the size of the market is an important determinant for diversity of 
media output because the purchasing power of the population in a free market economy 
decides how many outlets that will survive. I believe the following figures prove my point. 
Table 1 compares Turkey’s economy to some selected countries. 
Average circulation of newspapers is a key marker for measuring the size of a media market. 
The four dailies with the largest average circulation in Turkey at the time of writing are the 
Table 1: Population and GDP (in USD). 
Country Population GDP GDP per capita 
United States of America 295 734 134 11 750 billion 40 100 
Japan 127 417 244 3 745 billion 29 400 
Turkey 69 660 559 509 billion 7 400 
France 60 656 178 1 737 billion 28 700 
Poland 38 635 144 463 billion 12 000 
Norway 4 593 041 183 billion 40 000 
Source: CIA World Factbook: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html  
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mainstream secular Posta (Mail), Hürriyet and Sabah (Morning), and the moderate Islamic 
Zaman (Time). The rank and circulation of the ten best selling papers have varied quite a lot 
in the last decades. Total circulation for the 35 leading national newspapers from 17 January 
to 23 January 2005 was 4 626 267 copies.1 According to these figures the four largest papers 
controlled in excess of 40 per cent of the market. Total average circulation for all the 81 
national and regional daily newspapers in 2004 was 4 948 000, up 11% from 2003 (WAN 
2005:20). Circulation of Turkish newspapers is very low in comparison with Central and 
North European countries and Japan measured by population size. 65,7% of all adult 
Norwegians in average buys one newspaper each day. The same number for Japan is 64,4%, 
the US 23,3%, France 16%, Poland 13,5% and Turkey 9,6% (WAN 2005:52).  
 
Another key marker for measuring the media market in a given country is the amount of 
revenues earned from advertising. For Turkish dailies these revenues amounted to USD 421 
million in 2004 (WAN 2005:57). US newspapers made more than 100 times this amount. The 
numbers for Turkey over the past five years clearly indicates that the economy has been 
unstable, as is shown in table 3. The severe economic crisis that hit the country in November 
2000 and February 2001 is the most important cause. 
                                               
1
 Statistics taken from a weekly report compiled of sales figures from the marketing and distribution companies 
Yaysat and Merkez Daıtım Pazarlama (MDP). Given to the author by program coordinator Baar Baarır of 
CNN Türk, kitelli, Istanbul, 25 January 2005. 
2
 Both paid for and free newspapers are included. Free papers constitute a marginal share in all these countries. 
 Table 2: Average circulation of daily newspapers 2000-2004 (in thousands).2 
Country  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Japan 71 896 71 694 70 815 70 339 70 364 
United States of America 55 773 55 578 55 186 55 185 54 626 
France 8 423 8 429 8 151 8 037 7 934 
Turkey 4 047 3 281 3 306 4 433 4 948 
Poland 2 820 4 001 3 854 3 934 4 333 
Norway 2 578 2 527 2 524 2 450 2 405 
Source: World Association of Newspapers (2005): 50 
  20 
 
 
33,3% of the advertising revenues in Turkey in 2004 went to newspapers, 53,4% to television 
(WAN 2005:3). The percentage share of revenues from advertising between print media and 
broadcasting are fairly similar in Japan and the US compared with Turkey, while newspapers 
get the biggest chunk of the advertising pie in Norway. In Poland 54,2% of the revenues goes 
to television, while the share to newspapers is 14,8% (Ibid). 
 
To get the whole picture we also need to see how big the contribution of advertising is to the 










All these figures clearly indicate that the Turkish media market is very small. Combined 
revenues from advertising and sales in newspapers in 2004 were USD 735 million, compared 
                                               
3
 High inflation rates and an unstable currency make these numbers a bit misleading. If we apply constant 2002 
prices, the revenues from advertising in 2000 actually were higher than the revenues in 2004 (WAN 2005:647). 
This corresponds well with the meltdown that dealt a hard blow to the advertising industry in 2000 and 2001. 
Numbers from Reklamcılar dernei (Turkish Association of Advertising Agencies) show that the advertising 
market fell from 1 055 million USD in 2000 to 540 million USD in 2001. http://www.rd.org.tr/ (23.06.2005)  
4
 I have not found any authoritative figures for Poland. 
Table 3: Advertising revenues for daily newspapers 2000-2004 (in USD millions). 
Country  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
United States of America 48 670 44 305 44 102 44 939 46 703 
Japan 11 075 11 091 10 995 10 908 - 
France 2 811 1 864 2 616 2 589 2 723 
Norway 1 088 1 088 1 017 990 1 045 
Poland 253 272 272 393 502 
Turkey3 153 175 255 306 421 
Source: World Association of Newspapers (2005): 57 
 
Table 4: Contribution to newspapers’ revenues (%). 
Country4 Year Advertising Sales 
United States of America 2003 86,6 13,4 
Japan 2003 62,6 37,4 
France 2002 39,5 60,5 
Turkey 2004 57,3 42,7 
Norway 2004 51,4 48,6 
Source: World Association of Newspapers (2005): 4 
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with USD 17,4 billion in Japan, and more than USD 50 billion in the US. The difference in 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita only partly explains this imbalance. Turks spend a 
smaller percentage of their money on media consumption and advertising than Japanese, 
Norwegian, French and US citizens. Consequently the economy supports fewer media outlets, 
a fact that indicates that the amount of pluralism in a given society at least to some extent is 
dependent upon the wealth and size of the market. It is important to note that these numbers 
have no explanatory power concerning quality and only some in explaining diversity. 
 
3.2. The Turkish holding company 
The political elite embodied in the state has been the dominant player in Turkey’s 
development. Turkey is a late-industrialising country, and capitalization is hence a quite 
recent phenomenon. Bura (1994:22-23) compares Turkey’s modern development with other 
late-industrialising countries like South Korea and Taiwan. Her conclusion is that these Asian 
countries’ economic success largely can be explained by the political elite’s commitment to a 
coherent, long-term industrial strategy that reduced uncertainty in the economy. This inspired 
entrepreneurs to develop an industrial outlook rather than a rent-seeking speculative one. Her 
assessment is that this has not been the case in Turkey, where state intervention has been a 
major source of uncertainty undermining the development of a long-term industrial approach. 
The uncertainty stems from unclear boundaries of legitimate state intervention and frequent 
changes in the direction of the economic policy that has caused ensuing instability of basic 
macroeconomic indicators. 
 
The unstable economic and political situation to a large degree explains the special way 
Turkish entrepreneurs have organised their businesses. Because you never know which sector 
the various governments from time to time will support, or which sectors that will be hit 
hardest in the next meltdown, you have a better chance of surviving if you spread the risk on 
many sectors. This has proved to be the best strategy of survival in such an uncertain business 
climate. According to the author and economist Mustafa Sönmez the mentality that guide the 
dispositions of Turkish businessmen is more that of the trader than that of the industrialist.  
 
“The private sector as we know it in the modern context is only about 50 years old in Turkey, 
so Turkish businessmen are still in their baby period. They do not have visions and 
experience. They try all sectors. If they see an opportunity, for example connected to 
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privatisation of public assets, they buy it even if they have no experience with that line of 
business. To concentrate only on some sectors is a new vision for them.”5 
 
Sakıp Sabancı (1933-2004), one of Turkey’s most prominent and successful businessmen,6 in 
his autobiography identifies two important factors that shaped his business outlook. The first 
is the overwhelming impact of state-induced uncertainty in business life. He suggests that the 
success of the Sabancı Group stems from the fact that they have accepted this difficulty as a 
constant. They have consequently gone ahead with viable projects taking, at the same time, 
the necessary precautions to prevent the ruining of the enterprise by an unexpected policy 
change.7 In other words: If you are not able to learn to live with the uncertainty, you will not 
succeed. The other important factor is that a businessman in such an uncertain business 
environment must rely on the support of his family. Multiactivity firms organised in the form 
of family owned holding companies consequently constitute the typical big business unit in 
Turkey. These two themes reoccur as central components in all the autobiographies by 
prominent Turkish entrepreneurs Bura (1994:96) has examined in her study. To get a clearer 
notion of how Turkish entrepreneurs organise their businesses, I will continue with an 
analysis of one of the leading Turkish conglomerates today, The Doan Group. 
 
3.3. Profile of the Doan Group 
Aydın Doan was born in the provincial town of Kelkit in eastern Turkey in 1936. His father 
was a left-wing mayor in the town, but young Aydın decided to enter business life by setting 
up a car dealership in 1958 while he was still a student at the Istanbul Economy and 
Commerce Academy. By his early 20s he had made a small fortune as a distributor of Ford 
trucks. His entry into the media world was largely accidental. In 1979 the daily newspaper 
Milliyet was offered to him over dinner by its owner, Ercument Karacan, for USD 30 million.8 
 
The self-made businessman now controls a business empire with revenues in 2004 totalling 
more than USD 5,7 billion.9 He is currently number 620 on the prestigious Forbes’ list of the 
world’s richest people, and was one of eight dollar billionaires in Turkey in 2004, according 
                                               
5
 Mustafa Sönmez, interview with author, Kabata, Istanbul 19 July 2005. 
6
 With a personal fortune estimated at around USD 3.2 billion, Sakıp Sabancı was Turkey's richest man when he 
died in 2004. Sabancı Holding, the conglomerate he headed, ranks about 85th among the world's largest family-
owned businesses. http://www.guardian.co.uk/turkey/story/0,12700,1193172,00.html (19.10.2005) 
7
 Sabancı and Koç are the biggest conglomerates in Turkey. They are not heavily involved in the media business. 
8
 The Economist (2002): Face Value: A Turkish Rupert Murdoch. 362 (8260). 70. 
9
 Press release, Doan Holding: http://www.doganholding.com.tr/investment/index.asp?dilid=2 (31.10.2005) 
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to the same magazine.10 His business empire is built by buying and setting up companies in 
banking, insurance, energy, media, tourism, industry and trade. All these various activities are 
organised under the umbrella of Doan Holding, 65.52% of which is controlled by the Doan 
family, and 34,29% traded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (Doan Holding 2004:147). Table 
5 shows a somewhat simplified version of the Doan Group’s non-media companies.11 
 
Doan Holding is in fact formed by two separate holding companies: Doan Sirketler Grubu 
Holding, which the group itself refers to simply as Doan Holding, and Doan Yayın 
Holding. The Doan family controls both holdings, and both are by the group itself referred to 
as part of the overall Doan Group. They also have the same CEO, currently Tufan Darbaz, 
and the same chairman, Aydın Doan himself. The non-media activities are organised under 
the former holding, while Doan Yayın Holding was established in 1996 to merge all the 
media related activities under one umbrella. These are shown in table 6. 
                                               
10
 http://www.forbes.com/2005/03/09/bill05land.html (18.05.2005) 
11
 Many of these companies also have daughter companies. For a more detailed analysis of these somewhat 
complicated company structures, see Mustafa Sönmez (2004:137-164). 
12
 The Benelux based banking and insurance company Fortis bought Dıbank from the Doan family 4 July 
2005. Radikal (2005): ”Doan bankacılık sektöründen çıktı” (Doan leaves the banking sector) 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=157761 (21.10.2005) 
Table 5: Doan Holding 
Banking & insurance Energy Tourism Industry & trade 
• Dıbank12 
• Dıbank Malta 
Limited 
• Dı Yatırım 
• Dı Factoring 
• Dı Portföy 
• Dı Leasing 
• Ray Sigorta 
• Doan Emeklilik 
• Petrol Ofisi 
• Erk Oil 
Investments 




• Milta Turizm: 
Milta Bodrum 
Marina 
Majesty Club Kemer 
Beach Holiday 
Village 
Club Milta Holiday 
Village 
Iıl Tur 
• Doan Air 
 
• Çelik Halat 
• Dita 
• Doan Otomobilcilik 
• Milpa 
• Hürriyet Pazarlama 
• Doan Organic 
Products 
 
Sources: Doan Holding 2004:4; Sönmez 2004:139 
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Although Aydın Doan today probably is best known as Turkey’s biggest media mogul, the 
trade from the group’s media outlets in fact constitute a small amount of its total sales. In 
2000 the Doan Group together with the bank I Bankası bought 51% of the leading oil 
distribution company in Turkey, Petrol Ofisi, from the state.13 Since then the energy sector 










                                               
13
 Zaman (2002): “Petrol Ofisi, -Doan’la birlemeye hazırlanıyor”(Petrol Ofisi ready to get united with I 
(Bankası) and Doan). http://www.zaman.com.tr/2002/10/02/ekonomi/h8.htm (21.10.2005) 
14
 A revenue breakdown by sectors shows that energy constitutes 62 %, media 19 % and finance 15 % of the 
Doan Group’s total revenues in 2004 (Kilickiran & Erda 2005:8). 
15
 I have not found authoritative numbers for the categories media, energy and other for 1999. 
Table 6: Doan Yayın Holding 
Newspapers 
Hürriyet, Milliyet, Radikal, Posta, Fanatik, Fanatik 
Basket, Gözcü, Referans, Turkish Daily News 
Broadcasting & 
Production 
Television Channels:  Kanal D, CNN TÜRK, Euro D 
Cable TV Channels: Bravo TV, Super Channel 
Radio Stations: Radyo D, Hür FM, Radyo Foreks 
Production: ANS Production 
Digital Media Doan Online, Ultra Cable TV, Hürriyet Internet 
Magazines & Books 
Doan Burda Rizzoli, Doan Books, Doan Egmont 
Publishing, DPP 
Distribution & Retailing Yaysat/Doan Daıtım, D&R 
Printing Doan Printing Centers, Doan Ofset 
Support services Doan News Agency, Doan Factoring 
Presence in Europe DYH International 
Music Doan Music Company 
Sources: Doan Holding 2004:5; Sönmez 2004:139 
Table 7: Share of revenues in Doan Holding (in USD millions).14 
Year Media Energy Finance Other Total 
199915 - - 987 - 1 746 
2000 642 858 852 193 2 545 
2001 430 1836 753 79 3 098 
2002 462 2 232 693 64 3 451 
2003 665 2 844 845 107 4 462 
Sources: Annual Reports from Doan Holding. 
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As previously mentioned, the media sector in Turkey has on the whole not been profitable 
during the last decades. The big conglomerates in the media sector have made their profits 
elsewhere. As table 8 shows, this is to a large degree also the case with the Doan Group, 
although this group arguably is the most professionally run media group in Turkey.18 
According to Mango, Doan is the only Turkish media owner who see newspapers as a 
“commercial enterprise” (2004:201). The implications of this statement will be analysed in 
detail in chapter five. 
The Doan Group is a typical representative of the big Turkish multiactivity conglomerate. 
Aydın Doan’s success to a large degree stems from his ability to make investments at the 
right moment when opportunities arise. He has profited from the privatisation boom that 
started in the early 1980s by buying state assets in the energy and tourism sector, and he has 
been quite successful in his dealings in the troubled Turkish financial sector. A reading of 
annual reports over a period of four years shows a great deal of changes in the group’s 
portfolio. Many companies have been bought and many sold. A clear strategy of reducing the 
amount of activities to focus on one or a few core sectors is not clearly visible. On the other 
hand, one can argue that the group has been consistent in its commitment to the media sector, 
where it has been the most successful player. This is interesting when we take into account 
the weak performance in this sector. Before I move on to discuss other players in Turkish 
media, I will briefly discuss the future prospects of profitability in the media sector in general 
to see if this can shed some light on Aydın Doan’s unfaltering commitment. 
                                               
16
 On 22 February 2001, due to the turmoil in the Turkish financial sector, the Turkish government adapted a 
free-floating exchange rate. As a consequence, the Turkish lira depreciated in excess of 85% compared to the 
exchange rates that prevailed 31 December 2000. 
17
 I have not found authoritative numbers for the categories media, energy and other for 1999. 
18
 According to Mustafa Sönmez, there is a culture for taking money from profitable sectors and injecting them 
into less profitable ones. The official figures will not display this discrepancy. Mustafa Sönmez, interview with 
author, Kabata, Istanbul 19 July 2005. 
Table 8: Share of operating profit in Doan Holding (in USD millions).16 
Year Media Energy Finance Other Total Total net income 
199917 - - 246 - 306 74 
2000 25 39 161 -24 201 61 
2001 -15 52 66 -35 69 -147 
2002 19 43 107 -44 125 58 
2003 5 70 231 -66 240 275 
Sources: Annual Reports from Doan Holding. 
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3.3.1. Prospects for profitability 
As shown earlier (table 4) advertisement contributed almost 60% of the total revenues of 
Turkish newspapers in 2004. Commercial television is even more dependent upon such 
revenues. This clearly indicates that players in the media sector is vulnerable to changes in the 
overall spending on advertisement. One of the lessons of the economic meltdown in 2000 and 
2001 in Turkey was that sectors dependent upon advertising revenues are among the first to 
get hit severely. This corresponds well with the general wisdom from extensive studies of the 
relationship between overall economic performance and the performance of the advertising 
sector. “Advertising tends to gallop ahead more quickly than the economy in boom periods, 
but then slumps more quickly in recession”, according to Doyle (2002b:49). She identifies 
two primary forces which appear to determine the growth or decline of advertising 
expenditure: the first is the overall expenditure of consumers, the second is company profits. 
In other words: “Advertising expenditure expands along with consumer expenditure, but is 
reined back when company profits are under pressure” (Ibid).       
 
Between the first quarters of 2002 and 2004 the economic growth in Turkey reached 7,1% 
annually, marking a substantial recovery (Commission of the European Communities 
2004:60). The main source of this growth was exports of goods and services. Private 
consumption only increased on average by 0,4%, reflecting weak growth in real wages and 
increasing unemployment. So while company profits in some sectors increased, domestic 
consumer expenditure did not increase accordingly. Although only one of the primary forces 
identified by Doyle is heading in the right direction, various analysts still predict that the 
advertising sector will experience substantial growth in the years to come. According to the 
corporate finance advisory agency CA IB the advertising market grew by more than 30% in 
2004 (Kilickiran & Erda 2005:24). Expected growth for 2005 is 20%. One of the main 
reasons why CA IB identifies the Doan Group as an attractive investment opportunity for 
foreign investors is the expectation of “at least 18% annual growth on ad spending over the 
next 10 years” (Ibid:1). This forecast is largely based on the growth in the ad market in 
Eastern European countries over the last 10 years, and is closely tied to these countries 
integration into the EU. The parameter used in analysing these trends is ad spending 
compared in % with GDP. In Poland ad spending has increased from 0,43% to 1,39% of GDP 
between 1994 and 2003 (Ibid:23). The same trend is visible in the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Bulgaria. In Turkey ad spending has increased marginally from 0,37% to 0,43% of GDP 
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in the same period. CA IB’s prediction is consequently tied to the prospects of Turkish EU 
membership. If the membership talks that started 3 October 2005 ends with a Turkish-
European marriage, it is likely that spending on advertising will increase as it has done in the 
Eastern European countries, according to CA IB’s analysis. More money from advertising 
will in turn bring more money to the media companies, and the profit rates will increase. 
 
There are however good reasons to keep the best wine in the cooler for now. Firstly, it is 
highly uncertain that the membership talks will end in a happy marriage. Secondly, severe 
recessions have been a recurrent feature in Turkey, and it is far to early to conclude that this 
chronic disease is cured once and for all. Thirdly, many of the underlying ideological, ethnic 
and religious causes behind the violence and upheavals that has plagued the young republic 
has not been sufficiently dealt with. Fourthly, the future of neighbouring countries such as 
Iraq, Syria and Iran are unclear, and conflicts in or between these countries are likely to 
produce negative consequences for Turkey. Until these ills are cured, at least the ones that the 
Turks have the remedy to cure themselves, Sakıp Sabancı’s mantra may still be the best 
business strategy in Turkey: if you are not able to live with uncertainty, you will not succeed. 
And the way to live with uncertainty is to spread the financial risk on many different sectors, 
like most of the survivors on the top shelf of Turkish business life have done.  
 
3.4. Other major players 
Recurring cases of ownership changes, bankruptcy and criminal indictments against media 
owners make the media sector in Turkey a complex field of study. The overview I present 
here is based on research done in 2005 and early 2006, and consequently portrays the 
situation at that time. Major changes sometimes occur out of the blue, at least it appears so to 
the bystander, and the map may look very different in a couple of years. The fact that the 
Doan Group is the only long lasting major media conglomerate that has not been entangled 
with the Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu (TMSF; Savings Deposits Insurance Fund)19 or state 
prosecutors lately, speaks for itself. The Doan Group is by far the largest player in the 
Turkish media sector. But there are a number of other important players as well. I will divide 
them in a three-tier system according to size, and focus on the first two tiers. The first consists 
of three major multi-activity conglomerates: the Doan Group, the Ciner Group20 and the 
                                               
19
 TMSF is a government institution responsible for restructuring and managing ailing or bankrupt banks. It also 
has the power to take over other belongings of bankrupt and/or criminally indicted business owners. 
20
 The Ciner Group was named after its owner 1 January 2005. Until then it was called the Park Group. 
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Çukurova Group. These three groups control somewhere between 70 and 80 per cent of the 
total media market.21 Some areas of the market are totally dominated by one or more of these 
groups. One example is distribution of printed media: Doan’s Yaysat controls 60 per cent of 
this market, while Ciner’s Merkez Daıtım Pazarlama (MDP) controls the remaining 40 per 
cent (Open Society Institute 2005:1579). 
 
3.4.l . The Ciner Group 
The self-made multimillionaire Turgay Ciner controls the Ciner Group.22 He started his 
business career in the automotive industry in 1978. Today the group bearing his name is 
involved in energy, mining, media, tourism, aviation, commerce and services. Ciner got 
heavily involved in the media business in 2002, when he acquired the rights to run the media 
outlets of the Sabah Group. The Sabah Group had as mentioned earlier been a prominent 
player in the Turkish media sector since the newspaper Sabah commenced publication in 
1985. The group’s founder, Dinç Bilgin, was arrested in April 2001, charged for siphoning off 
millions of dollars from his own Etibank. After his arrest the TMSF took control over most of 
Bilgin’s belongings. In 2002 Turgay Ciner was allowed a tenant position of Bilgin’s media 
outlets under a 15-year lease contract for USD 10 million a year,23 the most important of 
which was the major dailies Sabah, Takvim (Calendar) and the sports daily Fotomaç 
(Fotomatch), and the major TV-channel ATV. Recently Ciner bought both Sabah and ATV 
from TMSF for 435 million USD.24 The Ciner Group also controls Turkey’s largest regional 
daily, the Izmir based Yeni Asır (New Era), a number of magazines and some smaller TV 
stations. In a matter of years Ciner has become Aydın Doan’s chief rival on the media scene. 
 
3.4.2. The Çukurova Group 
The Çukurova Group, headed by Mehmet Emin Karamehmet (b. 1944), traces its beginnings 
to a yarn and thread factory in Tarsus in southern Turkey. Together with another family the 
Karamehmets owned thousands of acres of farmland in the Çukurova Valley, one of Turkey's 
                                               
21
 The Uzan Group is often included in the first tier. I argue that this group belongs to the second tier, as I will 
demonstrate in tables 9, 10 and 11.  
22
 Turgay Ciner paid a short visit to the Forbes’ list of dollar billionaires in 2002. He was ranked as number 445. 
http://www.forbes.com/finance/lists/10/2002/LIR.jhtml?passListId=10&passYear=2002&passListType=Person
&uniqueId=04PT&datatype=Person (25.10.2005) In July 2005 the Ciner Group bought the publication rights of 
Forbes Magazine in Turkey. http://www.cinergroup.com.tr/en/gnews047.htm (25.10.2005) 
23
 Turkish Daily News (2005): “Ciner's Merkez Group acquires ATV and Sabah” 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=12436 (07.02.2006) 
24
 Radikal (2005): “Sabah ve atv Turgay Ciner'e” (Sabah and ATV (sold) to Turgay Ciner) 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=151650 (25.10.2005) 
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most fertile areas. The name of the valley was later adopted for their industrial enterprises. 
Mehmet Emin Karamehmet joined the family business in 1966, and after assuming control he 
spearheaded the group’s entry into banking by buying the banks Pamukbank in 1974 and Yapı 
Kredi in 1980. The group really rose to prominence in the late 1980s and early 1990s when it 
spearheaded the introduction of mobile telephone technology in Turkey with the company 
Turkcell, which is now the undisputed market leader in this sector.25 In 1998 Çukurova 
bought the major daily Akam (Evening) from another prominent media mogul at the time, 
Erol Aksoy. The group also controls the dailies Güne (Sun) and Tercüman (Interpreter), 
Turkey’s largest terrestrial TV channel Show, a couple of cable and satellite TV channels and 
the radio station Alem FM. Çukurova, rated as Turkey’s third largest business group with 
publicly listed firms in 2003 (Yurtoglu 2003:22), has recently experienced serious financial 
troubles. The TMSF took control of Pamukbank in 2002, and the group’s biggest asset, 
Turkcell, is reportedly about to be sold.26 Çukurova according to some estimates owes TMSF 
a total of five billion USD because of money the group has borrowed from its own two banks 
and not been able to pay back.27   
 
3.5. Midsize groups 
The second tier consists of the Uzan, hlas, Dou, Samanyolu and Aksoy groups. Both the 
Uzan Group and the Aksoy Group have recently been completely taken over by the TMSF, 
but they are included here because it still is unclear what will happen to their belongings. 
There are also cases of Turkish businessmen that have made a comeback after years of 
financial and legal trouble, and we cannot rule out this possibility for the Uzans or Aksoy.  
 
3.5.1. The Uzan Group 
The troubles of Çukurova are small potatoes compared with the mess the Uzan Group is 
entangled in. Kemal Uzan built a construction empire in the 1970s and 1980s, according to 
some sources benefiting from close ties with Turgut Özal.28 Kemal’s son, Cem Uzan, headed 
the family’s entry into the media business when he launched Turkey’s first private TV 
                                               
25
 At the height of the dot.com boom Turkcell was valued to USD 17 billion. On 11 July 2000 the company 
became the first in Turkey to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange. 
26
 Milliyet (2005): ”Karamehmet, Ruslarla anlatı, sveçliler uyardı” (Karamehmet has reached an agreement 
with the Russians (and) warned the Swedes). http://www.milliyet.com/2005/06/23/ekonomi/aeko.html 
(27.10.2005) 
27
 Onaran, Yalman (2005): “Turkcell's Karamehmet Frets as $10 Billion Becomes $500 Million”. 
http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=nifea&&sid=aJ8sjsQeCPP4 (26.10.2005) 
28
 Purvis, Andrew (2003): ”Not just business as usual”. In Time Europe Magazine. 162 (5). 
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channel, Star, together with Özal’s son, Ahmet. A daily newspaper by the same name was 
launched later. The group has in addition built Turkey’s second largest mobile-phone carrier, 
Telsim. But as they have grown in size, their troubles have also multiplied. During the 
telecom boom of the late 1990s, Motorola and Nokia lent USD 2 billion and USD 700 
million, respectively, to Telsim. The Uzans never paid them back. In 2002, the two firms filed 
racketeering charges against the family in a US Federal Court, accusing them of perpetrating 
an elaborate scam. The court awarded Motorola and Nokia USD 5 billion in damages, 
compensation and interest.29 Things got even worse in July 2003, when the Bankacılık 
Denetleme ve Düzenleme Kurulu (BDDK; Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency) 
revoked the banking license of the Uzan bank mar Bankası, and transferred the bank’s 
management to the TMSF. In February 2004 hundreds of Uzan companies, including their 
media interests, were also transferred to the TMSF. According to some estimates, the Uzans 
owe the Turkish state USD 6 billion, an amount that comes on top of the USD 5 billion they 
owe Motorola and Nokia.30 In 2005 and early 2006 many of the Uzan family's companies and 
properties have been auctioned in tenders arranged by TMSF, and more auctions will follow. 
In September 2005 Iıl Televizyon, which is controlled by the Doan Group, bought Star TV 
for USD 306,5 million.31 In January 2006 the daily Star was bought by the businessman Ali 
Özmen Safa from Northern Cyprus for USD 5,15 million.32 With this chain of events it looks 
like the Uzan Group is out as a major player in the media business, at least for now, and the 
Doan Group has strengthened its position as the undisputable market leader even further. 
 
3.5.2. The hlas Group 
The hlas Group traces it beginnings to 1970, when Enver Ören decided to leave his academic 
career to launch the newspaper Türkiye (Turkey) with some friends. The Ören family still 
controls the group. As opposed to the majority of the other major conglomerates operating in 
the media sector, the hlas Group started out as a media company. The success of the 
moderate Islamic-oriented Türkiye laid the foundation for the groups further expansions, 
providing “a strong engine of growth for other hlas businesses” (hlas Holding 2005:1). The 
hlas Group is now active in an array of sectors including media, marketing, construction, 
                                               
29




 Radikal (2005): ” Star TV, 306.5 milyon dolar” (Star TV (sold for) USD 306,5 million). 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=165194 (27.10.2005) 
32
 Çakır, Necip (2006): “Star Gazetesi 5,15 milyon dolara KKTC’li iadamının” (Star (sold) for $5.15 Million to 
businessman from Northern Cyprus). http://www.zaman.com.tr/?bl=ekonomi&alt=&trh=20060126&hn=250580 
(03.02.2006) 
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health, insurance, education and real estate investment. The various arms of the group are 
organised under hlas Holding. The group has been recognized as one of a growing number of 
Islamic business houses in Turkey (Yuce 2003; Yavuz & Esposito 2003:xxvi). In 2003 hlas 
established hlas Yayın Holding to cater for the group’s growing number of media interests. In 
addition to the daily newspaper Türkiye, hlas controls Turkey’s fifth largest television 
channel, TGRT, along with TGRT radio channel, the news agency hlas Haber Ajansı and 
twelve magazines. Recently it has been reported that hlas is about to sell its controlling stake 
in the TGRT television channel because of financial difficulties.33 This is not the first time 
hlas has been in financial trouble. In 2001 their financial arm, the hlas Finance Company, 
was partly transferred to the TMSF after reports that its owners had siphoned of USD 1 billion 
of depositors’ funds to shore up their other ailing businesses.34 
 
3.5.3. The Dou Group    
Ayhan ahenk (1929-2001) laid the foundation of the Dou Group when he invested in a 
construction company in 1951. The group is still controlled by the ahenk family, and is with 
an annual turnover in 2004 of almost USD 6 billion one of the biggest conglomerates in 
Turkey (Dou Group 2005:6). It is active in banking and finance, insurance, construction, 
media, energy, tourism and automotive retailing. The group got involved in media when it 
acquired the television channel NTV in 1999. Its media operations today include the terrestrial 
television channel NTV, the cable and satellite channels CNBC-e, Discovery Channel, 
National Geographic Türkiye and NBATV, the radio stations NTV Radyo and Radyo Eksen, 
and six magazines. Most of the group’s media outlets are segment or elite oriented, and they 
thus have moderate viewer ship and circulation ratios. But some of their outlets, especially 
NTV, are important because its viewers tend to be highly educated and well-off people. 
 
3.5.4. The Samanyolu Group 
The Samanyolu Group is controlled by one of Turkey’s most prominent socio-religious 
movements: The Fethullah Gülen Movement. The movement blossomed during the 1980s 
when the government and the army decided to relax its strong-handed treatment of Islamic 
groups as a means to counter the leftists they claimed was responsible for the violence and 
turmoil of the preceding decade. In response to this opportunity “the movement stressed the 
                                               
33
 Radikal (2005): ”TGRT satıı sona yakın” (TGRT-sale close to an end). 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=165898 (29.10.2005) 
34
 The Economist (2005): “Turkish corruption: Still for sale” 374 (8434). 24. 
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significance of the media and market economy and tried to become more professional by 
establishing new broadcasting companies, publishing presses, and cultural foundations” 
(Yavuz 2003:36). Today the group controls a nationwide media empire that includes the 
major daily newspaper Zaman, the television channel STV, the radio station Burç FM, the 
news agency Cihan Haber Ajansı, the weekly magazine Aksiyon (Action) and several other 
periodicals.35 It also controls the finance house Asya Finans,36 and is linked to a number of 
business groups and rich entrepreneurs who help fund many of its educational operations. 
 
3.5.5. The Aksoy Group 
The businessman Erol Aksoy founded the television channel Show in 1992. He also controlled 
the daily newspapers Akam, Güne and Tercüman. Due to financial difficulties these assets 
were all sold to the Çukurova Group in the last half of the 1990s. In 2001 his bank Iktisat 
Bankası was seized by the BDDK. Aksoy managed to hold on to his other media assets until 
the TMSF in May 2004 confiscated 38 of his companies, including the terrestrial television 
channels Cine5 and Fantasy, the cable and satellite channels Maxi, Supersport Gala and Viva, 
and the radio stations Show Radyo, Radio5 and Radyo Viva, reportedly because Aksoy had 
not been able to pay back the USD 1,6 billion he owed the Turkish state.37 
 
3.6. Relative strength 
The Doan Group has established itself firmly as the major media conglomerate in Turkey, 
with the Ciner Group as its main rival. The troubled Çukurova Group still controls the largest 
TV channel, but is losing ground to its two first-tier rivals. Of the second-tier groups only the 
Dou Group and the Samanyolu Group is currently reported to be in good financial health. 
There are also some important private first-tier publishers. Baımsız Gazeteciler Yayıncılık, a 
group headed by former editor-in-chief of Sabah, Zafer Mutlu, publishes Vatan (Fatherland). 
The Islamist intellectual Yeni afak (New Dawn) is controlled by the Albayrak Group, a 
conglomerate with its core businesses in food production, marketing and trade of agricultural 
products. In addition the public broadcaster TRT, although it has lost millions of viewers to 
private television, is still important. Most of the other first-tier media organisations are 
increasingly loosing ground to the major conglomerates. It is also interesting to note that the 
state controlled TMSF has become a major player in the media sector at a time when the 
                                               
35
 Feza Publications, a subsidiary of the Samanyolu Group, owns Zaman, Aksiyon and Cihan News Agency. 
36
 Asya Finans, established in 1996, works in accordance with the (Islamic) principles of interest-free banking. 
37
 Hürriyet (2004): ”TMSF'den Aksoy'a sert yanıt” (Harsh response from TMSF to Aksoy) 
http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/haber/0,,sid~1@w~4@tarih~2004-05-27-m@nvid~418419,00.asp (31.10.2005) 
  33 
 
government has speeded up its massive privatisation program. When the TMSF seized the 
Uzan family’s media companies, opposition voices claimed that the outlets now would 
become mouthpieces of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP; Justice and Development 
Party).38 But the sale of ATV and Sabah to the Ciner Group and Star to the Doan Group 
indicates that the AKP government, which has an absolute majority in parliament, wants to 
sell off all the seized companies. It is a necessity if the TMSF is to recoup the USD 42.7 
billion that it reportedly has poured in to rehabilitate the mess the 23 private banks it has 
taken over has created in the banking sector. 
 
The eight groups presented in this chapter confirm the overall picture of the traditional way to 
organise big business in Turkey. All are multiactivity conglomerates, and members of the 
founding family control seven of them. The last, the Samanyolu Group, is organised around 
confessional rather than kinship relations, and thus fits the picture as well. To sum up I will 
provide tables to illustrate the Turkish media sector. Tables 9, 10 and 12 show the relative 
strength between the groups,39 table 11 shows the audience shares of the main television 













Dogan Cukurova Ciner Uzan Ihlas Samanyolu Other
Table 9: Broadcasting market (%)
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 Turkish Daily News (2003): “CHP's Koc: Star becoming AK Party's mouthpiece” 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/archives.php?id=35400 (06.02.2006) 
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 These figures are collected from a variety of sources: Doan Holding 2001-2004; Doan Yayın Holding 2004-
2005; Open Society Institute 2005; WAN 2005; Kilickiran & Erda 2005 and Sönmez 2004 are the most 
important. Although there are some minor divergences, the relative strenght between the groups are the same in 
all the sources. Doan’s recent takover of Star TV is not included in table 9, since the deal is not yet finalized. 
The Doan Group will control 27 per cent of the broadcasting market as a result of this acquisition. 


















Dogan Cukurova Ciner Uzan Ihlas Samanyolu Other
Table 10: Circulation newspapers (%)
 
Table 11: Audience shares of main channels (%) 2002-2004 
Rank Channel Owner 2004 2003 2002 
1 Show Çukurova 17,0 14,4 13,5 
2 Kanal D Doan 15,1 15,0 14,5 
3 ATV Ciner 11,4 13,6 15,2 
4 Star Uzan (Doan) 9,2 5,1 12,0 
5 TGRT hlas 8,0 8,1 7,2 
6 Kanal 7 Yeni Dünya letiim 5,7 5,1 5,1 
7 TRT 1 Public broadcaster 5,4 7,0 7,5 
8 STV Samanyolu 5,4 - - 
9 Flash Göktu Elektronik 3,2 3,1 2,0 
10 TRT 2 Public Broadcaster 1,3 1,8 1,2 
Sources: RTÜK: http://www.rtuk.org.tr/ekabloatv.htm (10.02.2006); AGB Anadolu, IP International Marketing 
Committee, Television 2004. International Key Facts, October 2004: 445; Numbers given to the author by 
marketing director Teoman Gürmen of AGB Nielsen Media Research Turkey (AGB Anadolu), Istanbul, 12 July 
2005. AGB Nielsen has been the designated TV audience researcher in Turkey since 1992. Data does not 
represent the actual performance of Star. Star quit the panel for audience measurement in April 2003 and joined 
again in March 2004. The actual performance of Star for the target group (individuals age 5+) was as follows: 
January 2003: 13 per cent, February 2003: 14 per cent, and March 2003: 12.8 per cent. 












Dogan Cukurova Ciner Uzan Ihlas O ther
Table 12: Advertising shares (%)
 











1 Posta Doan 582 833 542 000 1 
2 Hürriyet Doan 490 439 494 000 2 
3 Zaman Samanyolu 475 041 437 000 3 
4 Sabah Ciner 428 613 417 000 4 
5 Milliyet Doan 307 647 279 000 6 
6 Vatan Baımsız  273 351 207 000 8 
7 Takvim Ciner 264 903 284 000 5 
8 Fanatik Doan 205 548 230 000 7 
9 Akam Çukurova 202 733 207 000 9 
10 Türkiye hlas 195 023 - - 
11 Fotomaç Ciner 174 439 177 000 10 
12 Güne Çukurova 132 582 - - 
13 Gözcü Doan 128 387 - - 
14 Yeni afak Albayrak 120 730 - - 
15 Star Uzan (Safa) 94 529 - - 
16 Tercüman Çukurova 91 528 - - 
Sources: WAN 2005:647 and a weekly report compiled of sales figures from the marketing and distribution 
companies Yaysat and Merkez Daıtım Pazarlama (MDP) given to the author by program coordinator Baar 
Baarır of CNN Türk, kitelli, Istanbul, 25 January 2005. 
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Chapter IV: Trade-off 
“It (Turkey) has begun to integrate itself into the world economy through an export-oriented 
liberal policy. What should have been done at the beginning of the westernizing reforms has 
been done at the end, with an enormous loss of time. I wonder whether the late discovery of 
the secret of the West was an unavoidable mistake inherent in the modernizing process of 
undeveloped countries which by a wrong reflex choose to implement in the first instance 
cultural and political reforms.” (Özal 1991:308) 
 
The late Turgut Özal is a controversial figure in Turkey.1 Some hail him as Turkey’s second 
great moderniser after Atatürk. They claim he managed to unite the Turks after a decade of 
political violence, and that he brought the country on the right path by empowering private 
business interests through laissez-faire economic policies. Others claim he reinforced and 
even systematised a culture of corruption and clientelism that has plagued the country ever 
since, that he opened the doors to a re-islamisation of the country, and that his economic 
policies created widening social gaps. Whatever one thinks of the former premier and 
president it is clear from his own writings and doings that his interest in liberalism first and 
foremost was tied to economic policies. Özal greatly admired his contemporaries in office 
Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, and according to Zürcher (2004:286) he believed in 
an “unrestricted capitalist free-for-all” approach. For him cultural and political reforms came 
second, if at all. It is also clear that the decade he presided over in many ways represents a 
turning point for the Turkish Republic, and that the changes introduced to a large extent was a 
consequence of the new neo-liberal economic environment. A deeper understanding of the 
nature of these changes is vital to grasp the Özal era’s impact on the Turkish media scene.  
 
The Turkish Republic is built on a revolution that defined the state as the main engine in 
society, and the media in Turkey has historically not had the power to challenge the role of 
the state. Why then did Özal and his cohorts open the door to a concentration of ownership 
that has left most of the Turkish media in the hands of a few wealthy businessmen? Didn’t the 
political elite fear that concentration of ownership might tip the balance of power in favour of 
big business? In this chapter I argue that the political elite had no intention of jeopardising 
their control on the flow of information, but instead concluded that a new ideological toolbox 
provided new opportunities for political control. Consequently, they gave certain privileges to 
                                               
1
 Özal was a self-made businessman, hailing from the provincial town of Malatya. He had been a successful 
manager in private industry in the 1970s and was well connected in big business circles. (Zürcher 2004:283) 
 37 
some media players as a more or less implicit trade-off to guarantee obedience from the 
media. This policy was motivated by a desire to control the main avenues of communication 
through a system of clientelism, where the number of players would be limited to a handful. 
 
4.1. Trade-off in theory 
Trade-off of this kind has many faces, and is not particular to Turkey. In Britain a select 
group of journalists are given privileged access to government information. The reporters get 
exclusive copy, and the politically powerful get a chance to give a particular spin to the 
coverage (Street: 2001:112-113). In the US political reporting is organised around “beats”, 
which correspond to locations in the government that are regarded as likely arenas of political 
action. These arenas are controlled by official sources that by default have the means to set 
the political agenda. Bennett (2000:209-211) argues that: “relatively little independent check 
is provided by the press on the good judgement or the representative quality of official views 
and actions”. Closed and semi-closed lobbies like this are ordinary features in many 
democratic societies, but the degree of transparency and outright corruption varies. 
 
Many scholars have argued that there are ways to forge more fundamental clientelist-based 
alliances between political and business elites under the umbrella of neo-liberalism (Hallin 
2000; Park, Kim & Sohn 2000; Lee 2000; Nain 2000). In late-developing and authoritarian 
states where economic reforms have predated political reforms this is particularly 
conspicuous. A common feature in these countries is that many of the forces applied in 
developed capitalist societies which moderate and regulate the effects of private ownership 
are absent. In relation to the media sector these forces include limits on ownership 
concentration, a tradition of public broadcasting, regulatory agencies answerable to a 
pluralistic political system, and journalistic professionalism. Without these forces there are no 
clear rules to regulate the game, and the most powerful interests, often groups aligned with 
the state, have many strategies at their disposal to control the media. The trade-off-argument 
in other words claims that the study of patron-client relations between political and economic 
elites in Turkey is essential for a broader understanding of how ownership concentration 
allegedly have reduced pluralism in a society where most other markers indicate an opposite 
development. To fully grasp this concept of trade-off we have to keep two interrelated 
developments in mind: the complete restructuring of the Turkish political field after the 
military coup in 1980, and the corporate takeover of the media sector in the 1980s and 1990s. 
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4.2. The legacy of the 1980 coup 
When the army took control 12 September 1980 they immediately carried out a complete 
purging and uprooting of the political system. Parliament was dissolved, the cabinet deposed, 
all political parties and two trade union confederations suspended, and all mayors and 
municipal councils dismissed (Zürcher 2004:279). In June 1981 all public discussion of 
political matters was prohibited. The army justified this radical restructuring by pointing to 
the factional strife and violence that contributed to thousands of deaths and political and 
economic chaos in the late 1970s. The new constitution produced by a committee appointed 
by the army-controlled Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (MGK; National Security Council) concentrated 
power in the hands of executive, the president and the MGK. It also limited the freedom of the 
press, the freedom of association and the rights and liberties of the individual. So in all 
fairness to Özal it must be remembered that he inherited a citizenry that by force of law was 
depoliticised when he took office in 1983, and that the generals closely monitored his actions.  
 
Both the generals and the new government under Özal saw the introduction of free market 
policies along the lines of the neo-liberalist project of Reagan and Thatcher as a path towards 
stability and prosperity for Turkey. It is consequently no coincidence that capital owners 
started to buy up the Turkish press in the early 1980s. It was to a large extent encouraged by 
the political leadership. The traditional structure where families or organisations that had been 
in journalism for generations owned newspapers was quickly eroded. The new owners were 
businessmen who had accumulated their wealth in other sectors and had little or no prior 
experience with the profession. “This radical shift in terms of organisational power resulted in 
the owners’ total control over editorial policies, resource allocation, employee salaries, 
promotion and dismissal of staff, and especially appointment of the editor-in-chief and other 
editors”, argues Tunç (2004:5). The trend towards conglomerate ownership of the Turkish 
media sector was further cemented when the broadcasting system was liberalised in the early 
1990s. But the political elite has not lost its tight grip on power as a result of this, a peculiarity 
that is largely a result of contradictions inherent in Turkey’s experiment with economic 
liberalism, a phenomenon Bura has called “the paradox of Turkish liberalism” (1994:120). 
 
4.3. Economic liberalism the Turkish way 
“The attitude of the political class throughout the 1980s and the 1990s have been quite 
paradoxical in that, while it has preached the virtues of liberalism and a free market 
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economy, it has also been using state power and state resources to strengthen its dominance” 
(Aydın 2005:100-101). 
 
Liberalism in the Turkish context diverges from the traditional notions of liberalism in a 
number of ways. The state plays such a big part in all aspects of life to render descriptions 
based on the classic liberal tradition inspired by the likes of Locke, Smith and Bentham 
almost meaningless. The notion that state intervention is necessary to curb the influence of the 
strong as we know it from the social liberalism of John Stuart Mill and others could at first 
glance be a fitting frame for analysis, but the liberalism of Özal and his cohorts did not benefit 
the have-nots in Turkey. Rather we have seen a rapid widening of the gap between rich and 
poor. To make sense of liberalism the Turkish way we have to analyse it in the frame of free 
market policies introduced and controlled by an authoritarian state.2 This means that it is 
highly questionable how free the market really is, a point that the EU has stressed on 
numerous occasions in reports on Turkey’s progress towards an eventual membership 
(Commission of the European Communities 2002; 2003; 2004). 
 
Despite the liberal rhetoric of Özal and his cohorts, the Turkish state didn’t get any smaller in 
the 1980s. The share of public investment in total investment actually increased until 1988, 
mainly because of increased public investment in infrastructure (Bura 1994:144). In 1979 
the relative shares of the public and private sectors in total fixed investment were 49,7 and 
50,3 per cent respectively. Comparable numbers for 1987 were 53,5 and 46,7 per cent 
respectively (Bura 1994:144). But more important than the actual size of the state is the fact 
that there was a general lack of clearly defined legal principles for state intervention and lack 
of transparency in the economic manoeuvring of the government. This is a rather complex 
issue involving frequent changes in the legislation that regulates the tax system, the foreign 
trade regime and the relationship between the state and the private sector, combined with 
sudden turnarounds in the economic policies.3 In connection with my analysis it is interesting 
to note that there was a substantial increase in the power of the executive during this period. 
According to Bura (1994:145) a number of key agencies responsible for strategic decision-
making and policy implementation were created within the office of the Prime Minister. This 
expansion of centralized power was made at the expense of the judiciary and the parliament. 
                                               
2
 Lee (2000), Park, Kim & Sohn (2000) and Nain (2000) have followed the same approach in studies of media in 
other authoritarian neo-liberal societies like Taiwan, South Korea and Malaysia. 
3
 See Krueger & Aktan (1992), Bura (1994) and Aydın (2005) for analyses of this complex web of changes. 
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The so-called “extra-budgetary funds” can serve as example of how this expansion of power 
was realised. These funds – or “shadow budgets” – were created through the diversion of tax 
resources from the parliament-controlled budget by introducing specific levies imposed as a 
surcharge on different activities and items (Zürcher 2004:311). The government thus had 
large funds at its disposal, estimated to range between USD 3,5 and 5,7 billion in 1987-1988 
(Bura 1994:145), which the parliament had no control over. According to Bura (1994:145), 
this was in “perfect conformity with the MP’s strictly pragmatic approach which involved a 
clear disregard for the rule of law whenever there was even the slightest conflict between 
legal provisions and the requirements of goal directed action”. The general lack of clearly 
defined legal principles for the use of these funds created a complex environment for 
investors and businessmen. The presence of the state in the economy was felt more than 
anywhere else in this type of “discretionary meddling introducing an overwhelming degree of 
uncertainty in the business environment” (Bura 1994:146). The extra-budgetary funds and 
the general lack of transparency in the use of public finances has been a main grievance of the 
EU Commission in its annual evaluations on Turkey’s progress towards accession 
(Commission of the European Communities 2002; 2003; 2004). And it is easy to understand 
why. Although money from these funds has been hard to trace, there are documented cases of 
such money being channelled towards government-friendly business interests, among them 
the conglomerates that control the mainstream media. Bura (1994:153) argues that the 
resources accumulated in the largest of these funds – the Konut Fonu (Housing Fund) – were 
mainly channelled towards a few firms. This fund was fed from import duties on luxury items 
and a USD 100 charge levied on all Turkish citizens travelling abroad (Zürcher 2004:311). 
 
4.4. Cases 
“… the anxieties that gripped the Istanbul rich of my childhood were not unfounded, their 
discretion not unwise. The state bureaucracy maintained a greedy interest in all aspects of 
production, and because it was impossible to become seriously wealthy without entering into 
deals with politicians, everyone assumed that even the “well-meaning” rich had tainted 
pasts.” (Pamuk 2005:171-172) 
 
Orhan Pamuk’s description of the Istanbul of his youth has no direct link with the workings of 
the modern media moguls in Turkey. But Pamuk paints a vivid picture of the seemingly 
interminable tentacles of the Turkish state, and people’s constant fear of falling into the ruling 
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elites disfavour. As the next paragraphs will show it has paid off to have cordial relations with 
the strong men – and one woman – that have governed the country.   
 
4.4.1. Subsidies 
When Dinç Bilgin launched the daily Sabah in 1985 he was hailed as a hero for the exposure 
of financial scandals engulfing Turgut Özal, and his newspaper quickly became a bestseller. 
However, the investigations into the shady dealings of the Premier were stifled when Özal 
“shovelled out some $ 3 billion-worth of subsidies to newspapers in a Faustian deal”,4 the 
lion’s share going to Bilgin’s Sabah Group and the Doan Group. Both groups invested in 
new high-tech printing plants. “Such was the sudden opulence at Sabah that an ex-employee 
recalls ‘relieving myself in imported Italian porcelain’.”5 Özal himself boasted of using the 
economic power of state advertising for personal political advantage (Pope 2004:212). 
 
Press subsidies are a common feature in many countries. They can be given as cash grants or 
as tax exemption or reduction. In Norway press subsidies are institutionalised to give media 
outlets a degree of financial predictability. The system was introduced to preserve media 
diversity, and smaller outlets and outlets that support minority views are given first priority. 
The subsidies are included in the national budgets, and are thus subject to the same 
transparency criteria and budgetary control mechanisms as other public expenditures. The 
kind of subsidies Özal handed out to newspapers in the 1980s does not fit this pattern of 
predictability and transparency. Neither was the money given to support struggling minority 
outlets, but rather to the major players. In many ways this represent a kind of converse press 
subsidy, and the same pattern is visible in subsidies shovelled out in the 1990s. Between 1991 
and 1993, Tansu Çiller, then Minister of State in charge of economics in the coalition 
government of Süleyman Demirel,6 offered a total of 3,2 trillion Turkish Lira (TRL) to the 
media, according to Nozawa-Dursun (1997:89-90).7 The figure included a 100 per cent 
exemption from VAT and customs for imported goods, and credits with a 30 per cent interest 
rate against the 115 per cent inflation rate of the market. Large outlets like Hürriyet, Milliyet, 
                                               
4




 Süleyman Demirel (b. 1924) has served as Prime Minister in Turkey five times, the first from 1965 to 1969, the 
last from 1991 to 1993, when he became Turkey’s 9th President. Ahmet Necdet Sezer succeeded him in 2000. 
7
 Due to the chronic instability of the TRL I have not been able to find the exact amount in USD at the time. The 
closest I have come is that TRL 3,2 trillion on 1 January 1994 was approx. USD 215 million. That it at the time 
of writing amount to USD 2,4 million needs no further comment. As of 1 January 2005 Turkey has slashed six 
zeroes of its currency and introduced the New Turkish Lira (TRY). At the time of writing TRY 1 was USD 0,75. 
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Sabah and Türkiye received the major share of these funds. “No leftist or intellectual paper 
was included in this ‘encouragement’ from the government” (Nozawa-Dursun 1997:90).  
 
What is also interesting to note is that subsidies like these conspicuously often have been 
handed out prior to elections. The government of Tansu Çiller, who became prime minister in 
1993, channelled at least USD 1 million worth of state bank ads to the media in the six 
months preceding the election in 1995. 60 per cent of this money went to the leading 
publishing groups at the time, the Sabah Group and the Doan Group.8 Media outlets critical 
of Çiller’s government received a very small part of these funds, while certain small dailies 
supportive of her, such as Gölge Adam (Shadow Man), received a sizable slice of the pie. 
 
As an example of the power various governments have wielded over the media due to 
financial subsidies, Nozawa-Dursun (1997:90) points to Tansu Çiller’s appearance on close to 
all television stations simultaneously on 19 January 1995. The Premier’s announcement was a 
response to a question of the Turkish Employer’s Association: an important announcement for 
those concerned, but hardly important enough to attract the attention of every broadcaster at 
the same time. Nozawa-Dursun (1997:90) claims that Çiller was able to pull this off because 
of the aforementioned credits the broadcasters’ parent companies had obtained from the 
government. The government in other words had considerable leverage over the media 
companies through money handed out as credits, subsidies and public advertising, money the 
Premier personally could distribute through the extra-budgetary funds. Various premiers have 
also been prone to take advantage of the subsidies on newsprint for personal political gain. 
Turgut Özal is reported to have told an Anavatan Partisi (ANAP; Motherland Party) congress: 
“I know when to put up the price of newsprint” (Pope 2004:212), indicating that he was 
willing to go a long way to stifle and punish media outlets that criticised his policies. 
 
4.4.2. Preferred reporters 
“Journalists where going to visits, business trips, to different countries, on the same plane. Of 
course they were writing about it, in their columns etc. And they still do. But that tradition 
started with Özal. Özal encouraged them, basically the ones that supported him. And he 
refused the ones that didn’t support him. That’s sad. There was a quotation from him: “I like 
rich men.” That means he encouraged all the bribery. Another quote from him says: “My 
                                               
8
 Balci, Kemal (1997): “Four state banks showered ads on the media prior to the election.”  
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=05_13_97&fn=dom.htm (29.11.2005) 
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citizens know how to get around.” That means: Unless you’re not caught, you can go ahead 
and do anything you want: Bribery etc. That’s crazy coming from a prime minister. It 
explains the mentality.”9 
 
Preferential treatment of media outlets and reporters is a fact of life almost everywhere. But in 
Turkey there are no institutionalised checks and balances to control or curb such activity. 
Most Western governments have certain legally binding obligations and duties to disclose 
information in a non-partisan manner. It is quite clear from Özal’s way of handing out 
information to certain hand-picked reporters that such obligations had little relevance in 
Turkey.10 The most obvious example is that he used to telephone favoured reporters to give 
them exclusive news. This practice is confirmed by the fact that these reporters used to brag 
about these phone calls in their stories or columns. Özal’s practice was so commonly known 
that it even acquired its own name in its specific Turkish context: “telephone journalism” 
(Demirkent 1995:97). The Premier did nothing to conceal his bias, and denied exclusive 
information to news organisations he regarded as more critical towards his government. This 
left them in a competitive disadvantage compared with the Premiers preferred cohorts. 
 
The fact that Turkey is a democracy where governments come and go means that the various 
deals and understandings between the political and the economic elite have to be renegotiated 
from time to time. Not all Turkish prime ministers that have served since the army returned 
Turkey to civilian rule in 1983 have been in a position to attract and control the most 
powerful media conglomerates and prominent columnists. The most notable example is 
Necmettin Erbakan, prime minister in a coalition government with Tansu Çiller from 1996 to 
1997. Erbakan, who was Turkey’s first Islamist prime minister, declared war on what he 
called the country’s media cartel.11 In addition to full support from his party’s mouthpiece 
Milli Gazete (National Newspaper), he received favourable coverage in other Islamist-friendly 
newspapers like Türkiye and Yeni afak.12 But the response from the secular mainstream 
media he was targeting was swift and merciless. Although Turkey’s anti-Islamism generals 
played the main role in ejecting Erbakan from office, they were given plenty of help from 
Doan and Bilgin controlled media in turning public opinion against the new government. 
                                               
9
 Aslı Tunç, interview with author, Kadıköy, Istanbul 18 July 2005. 
10
 On 9 October 2003 the Law 4982 on the Right to Obtain Information, which allowed citizens to demand 
information from the state institutions, was approved (Çatalba 2005:14). 
11
 The Economist (2002): Face Value: A Turkish Rupert Murdoch. 362 (8260). 70. 
12
 The moderate Islamist Fethullah Gülen Movement, which controls the influential daily Zaman, has 
emphatically supported the secular state. Their relations with the RP have been strained. (Zürcher 2004:291) 
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The media campaign against Erbakan and his Refah Partisi (RP; Welfare Party) started in 
earnest when the party won the municipal elections in Istanbul, Ankara and many other 
Turkish cities on 27 March 1994. The campaign went so far that the state minister in 
Erbakan’s short-lived government, Abdullah Gül, argued that the media was “acting like a 
political party”.13 There are many examples of ethically dubious campaign journalism on part 
of the secular media. The hysteria that followed the sentencing of 41 Turks to death in Saudi 
Arabia in August 1995 on charges of drug smuggling is one. The first report announced that 
the sentenced Turks probably would be beheaded. Implicit in the hundreds of reports in the 
secular media was a message to Turkish voters that this kind of barbarism would befall them 
to if the RP came to power. “TV screens were flooded with images of decapitation: men 
kneeling down with arms tightly tied back and covered, submitting bared necks to the cut of 
the sword” (Navaro-Yashin 2002:51). The fact that the secular political elite in Turkey – 
including the army – was highly sceptical of Erbakan’s government goes a long way in 
explaining why the secular media dared to attack the RP with such force. To fully understand 
the new dynamics created by the Islamists’ rise to political power, we must investigate the 
case of the present Islamist oriented government led by Recep Tayyip Erdoan.   
 
4.4.3. Erdoan and the AKP 
The same Abdullah Gül who was quoted in the preceding paragraph is currently Foreign 
Minister in the moderate Islamist Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP; Justice and Development 
Party) government. Both Erdoan and Gül took a lot of beating in the secular mainstream 
media in the 1990s and the first years of the new millennium. After AKP took office in 2002, 
the barrage has died down. Both men have instead been cheered in their effort to move 
Turkey closer to membership in the EU. The seemingly insurmountable ideological barriers 
of yesterday are almost forgotten. How can this be? 
 
“Because they are very real-political. The say: ‘now he is elected. At least for four years he 
will hold the power. So instead of struggle, let’s make peace and benefit as much as we can.’ 
It’s real-political, no principal behaviour. Most of the media owners take the position 
according to the conjuncture.”14  
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Mustafa Sönmez has no illusions regarding the motives of the media moguls. According to 
him the “conjuncture” was not in Erbakan’s favour in the late 1990s. The generals didn’t 
disguise the fact that they didn’t support his government. With Erdoan’s AKP government 
it’s a different game. The generals have not rattled their sabres in the way they did in 1997. 
 
The economist and author Mustafa Sönmez has been a staunch critic of the neo-liberal 
economic policies for decades. He has his office on the top floor of a five-storey apartment 
block in Kabata, with panoramic view over the Bosphorus to the Asian side of Istanbul. On 
the afternoon at the day of our interview he was going to a televised debate on the 
privatisation plans of a very attractive piece of seaside land at Haydarpaa, close to the 
popular shopping district of Kadıköy on the Asian side. Sönmez believes that the privatisation 
of public property in Istanbul only serves the rich. And as long as the AKP government and 
the AKP controlled municipalities continue the privatisation policies instigated in the 1980s, 
the business elite will be satisfied. One can also argue that the generals' tacit accept of the 
AKP have enhanced the status of the party and made the moderate Islamists a more accepted 
part of the Turkish political field. It is thus a somewhat bigger gamble for the mainstream 
media to launch an all out attack on the present government than it was to criticise Erbakan’s 
government. The fact that the charismatic and down-to-earth Erdoan has become an 
increasingly popular person, is also a fact of matter in this case.  
 
Aslı Tunç agrees that the media’s attitude towards politicians change according to the stature 
and position of the politicians.  
 
“They have to be in good relations with the political establishment to get some subsidies etc. 
These bosses don’t challenge the political establishment. For example, they are all in favour 
of Tayyip now. He was the mayor of Istanbul and most of the mainstream newspapers were 
criticising that man. But after he became prime minister everything changed. They are 
spineless. They don’t know any concrete ideology or any worldview. They don’t have any 
concerns about real journalism. That’s the sad part. I teach at a media department. I try to 
educate students to go into this sector, and I know the realities of this sector. So those kids are 
criticising and know what’s going on, and they don’t want to be a part of this system.”15 
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 Aslı Tunç, interview with author, Kadıköy, Istanbul 18 July 2005. 
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Aslı Tunç is assistant professor at the Media and Communication Systems Department at 
Istanbul Bilgi University. She is an outspoken critic of the Turkish corporate press, and she 
believes that the outright bribery and more subtle favouritism that has characterised the 
relationship between media owners and various Turkish governments the last few decades are 
one of the worst effects of the concentration of ownership in Turkish media. Tunç wrote her 
PhD at Temple University in Philadelphia on the functions of political cartoonists in the 
Turkish democratisation process. She returned to Turkey on 11 September 2001 to start her 
new job in Istanbul. “I was one of the last people who left the States that day,” she says 
during our interview at a pleasant teahouse in Kadıköy. She thinks it’s ironic that she was 
inspired to sharpen her critical attitude towards corporate media in the years preceding the 
terrorist attack that in many ways reversed the critical attitude of the US media. 
 
There is another point to be made about the role of political Islam in Turkey. The 
aforementioned Erbakan has been a mainstay of the religious wing of Turkish politics since 
the 1970s. He has been the leader of a series of political parties that have risen to prominence 
only to be banned by the country’s secular authorities.16 In the 1990s a new generation of 
Islamist oriented politicians began to take centre stage, and the charismatic Erdoan became 
the movement’s spearhead.17 After the soft coup in June 1997, when Erbakan was forced to 
step down, and the subsequent banning of his moderate Islamist RP in January 1998, the 
Turkish Islamist movement entered a period of instability that in the end resulted in a split in 
the party’s ranks. The gelenekçiler (traditionalists) wanted to remain true to the movement’s 
more traditional religious leanings, while the yenilikçiler (renewalists), led by Erdoan, 
wanted to let go of the religious rhetoric and instead adopt itself fully to a secular democratic 
system. The yenilikçiler formed the AKP, while the gelenekçiler formed the Saadet Partisi 
(SP; Felicity Party). AKP won a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections on 3 
November 2002, while SP did not manage to pass the 10 per cent threshold. The split in the 
Islamist movement, and the performance of the yenilikçiler during the three years they have 
been at the helm, have led to a gradual decrease in the scepticism towards this younger 
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generation of Islamist politicians. It is important to understand this development if one is to 
make sense of the fact that the AKP has received far less criticism from the mainstream media 
than its predecessor RP. But some still believe that the democratic rhetoric of Erdoan and his 
yenilikçiler is a smokescreen to hide the fact that they are gradually islamising the bureacracy, 
the judiciary and the educational system.18 One of them is Editor-in-chief Mehmet T. Sucu of 
Cumhuriyet. Asked about whom he perceives as his paper's worst enemy, the media moguls 
personified by Aydın Doan, or the AKP personified by Erdoan, he answers both. 
 
“Vocationally it is Aydın Doan. Ideologically it’s Erdoan. Both of them are dangerous for 
us. Doan is going to make a monopoly. He brings new rules to journalism. He is killing the 
newspapers. Erdoan, even though he doesn’t admit it, has a religious mentality. He is 
against social democrats.19 We are fighting against two enemies at the same time, and they 
are intertwined. Because the big capital wants to be close to the government, they are also 
attacking us. But everything is not bad. Before Erdoan we sold fewer newspapers than we do 
today. Before him it was about 40 000. Today it is nearly 60 000.”20 
 
The good-humoured editor is full of anecdotes. His personal favourite is the lawsuit brought 
against Cumhuriyet by Erdoan after the newspaper’s political cartoonist Musa Kart drew the 
Prime Minister as a cat entangled in a ball of wool in February 2005. A court in Ankara fined 
the cartoonist 5000 New Turkish Liras (USD 3700) for “publicly humiliating the Prime 
Minister”.21 The case caused a lot of criticism in Turkey, and Cumhuriyet got support from 
many of its conglomerate rivals, including the Doan owned Radikal22 and Hürriyet23. They 
also got a lot of financial support from various sources, according to Sucu.24 He claims that 
Cumhuriyet actually ended up getting more money from sympathisers than they had to pay in 
fines. In addition they got a lot of publicity. “It was free advertisement”, chuckles Suncu. 
Every time I mention that they made money on their arch rival, he seems pleasantly amused. 
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It seems clear that trade-off of the kind I outline in this chapter is dependent upon the position 
and status of the factions of the political elite that rule the country at any given time. The 
example of Erbakan indicates that the most important variable in this relationship is the 
attitude of the generals. If the generals have grievances towards a government, it becomes less 
likely that this government can instigate an effective trade-off regime to curb media criticism. 
When the generals kept quiet after AKP’s landslide victory in 2002, the mainstream media 
almost overnight dropped their critical attitude against the party. 
 
4.4.4. Direct links 
The most obvious link between a prime minister and the media in Turkey after 1980 is the 
case of the television channel Star, owned by Cem Uzan and Turgut Özal’s son, Ahmet. As 
mentioned earlier Star became the first private channel in Turkey when it was launched 1 
March 1990.25 Turgut Özal indirectly sanctioned the launching of Star by claiming in an 
interview in 1990 that the broadcasting legislation in Turkey did not outlaw satellite channels 
(Çatalba 2000:127). The fact that effective legislation to regulate the new private television 
market was not implemented until 1993 shows that this was highly contested. But an effect of 
Özal’s statement was that electronic media overnight became a highly promising field of 
investment, something that benefited his son.26 According to Nicole and Hugh Pope 
(2004:206), “Star Television turned out to be an ice-breaker for an information revolution in 
Turkey, but it was also a thoroughly political move”. They relate this to the fact that Özal’s 
popularity was waning at the time, and that the launching of Star by a trusted member of the 
family was part of a public relations scheme to enhance his status. 
 
There are many other more or less well-documented cases of direct links between the political 
elite and media conglomerates. They range from the cosy personal relations between Aydın 
Doan and former premier and deputy premier Mesut Yılmaz,27 presently on trial for rigging 
the privatisation of the state owned Türkbank in favour of a businessman with alleged ties to 
the Turkish Mafia, to more subtle connections. When Yılmaz became prime minister in 1997, 
a Doan owned company was awarded a lucrative energy contract, according to lnur Çevik 
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because Yılmaz wanted to reward Doan for his support.28 The contract was cancelled by the 
Supreme Court in 1999 because it violated a law that said that any person or company who 
owns more than 10 per cent of a TV-station is not eligible to enter such contracts with the 
state. This was the first time the Supreme Court had descended on this widespread illegal 
practice. The Yılmaz government “was fully aware that these media barons owned more than 
10 per cent shares in radio and TV stations and under Turkish law could not participate in any 
state contracts”. 29 After the contract had been awarded, the government opted to change the 
law, but parliament refused. Nevertheless, two years later the ban was lifted. 
 
4.4.5. Government tenders 
The Turkish Parliament’s decision in 2001 to lift the ban on media bosses participating in 
state tenders and stock exchange transactions was controversial. In addition to strong 
objections from the opposition, a deputy from one of then Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit’s 
own Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party), Uluc Gurkan, submitted two separate 
proposals arguing for the continuation of the ban. Gurkan, a former journalist, argued that the 
lifting of the ban “would lead to monopolization in the media, a tarnishing of politics-media 
relations and the end to a multi-voice democracy”.30 Aslı Tunç agrees that the lifting of the 
ban have made the relations between politicians and media bosses even more shady. 
 
“Now those people can bid on state tenders. That’s something very dangerous. You cannot 
keep your distance if your boss is biding on a state tender. And there are so many things 
going on in those state tenders. I mean, how can you criticise anything, or report anything on 
those issues. I mean, it's absurd. 31 
 
The outspoken scholar believes that the lack of transparency in the dealings between the 
politicians and the economic elite is one of the major weaknesses of the Turkish democracy. 
“It’s about people having a right to know, as citizens. We have a right to know what’s going 
on behind closed doors and in the state. Basically it’s harming the citizens. Many of the 
citizens are clueless. There are no brave journalists, and I cannot blame them.”32 
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The fact that the state plays such a large part in the Turkish economy makes this situation 
even graver. Big money is in circulation in these tenders, and without a satisfying degree of 
transparency and objective reporting the public cannot know what lies behind a decision to 
award a contract to a conglomerate with interests in the media sector. “If the owner of the 
channel wanted to win a privatisation tender, pro-Government discourse would flood the 
news and current affairs programs, while investigative news teams would unearth material 
against their rivals”, according to Open Society Institute (2005:1575). 
 
4.5. Journalistic professionalism 
Journalism has gradually become institutionalised as a distinct profession and an academic 
discipline. This is a fact of life in most Western countries, and many universities in Turkey 
also offer courses and degrees in Journalism. The development towards a distinct journalistic 
identity has given birth to what may be termed journalistic professionalism. If follows from 
this that there now exists a large body of books and studies on journalism, and that there has 
been a development towards a more uniform professional ethic, and more universally agreed 
journalistic methods. The amount of legislation and written professional codes that regulate 
journalistic practice varies from country to country. In Turkey there has been a large body of 
law that have regulated what reporters can and cannot write, and what editors can and cannot 
publish. In most Western countries this kind of legislation is now limited to a few areas 
concerning issues like national security and libel. Both US and EU legislation clearly states 
that there should be weighty reasons to limit the media’s freedom of expression. Self-enforced 
professional codes of ethics and public regulatory agencies like ombudsman and competition 
authorities have taken the place of restrictive press laws in the West. This means that there 
exists something resembling a social contract between the media, the state and the public, 
where the privately owned media is expected to create institutions that enforce these self-
administered codes and punish violators. As argued earlier in this chapter, many of the forces 
applied in developed capitalist societies that regulate the effects of private ownership are often 
absent in late-industrialising societies, many of which are characterised by authoritarian state 
structures. In Turkey this is also the case, and it creates a vacuum where powerful players can 
control the agenda and make informal agreements and trade-offs. As a consequence, the 
system is less transparent, less codified and less egalitarian. This is an important argument, 
because it helps explain why ownership concentration in the media is a more serious threat to 
diversity and pluralism in Turkey than in the West at present. 
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It is important to note that the system of self-regulation adopted in the West is controversial. 
Critics argue that as long as self-enforcement carries no punishment other than mere criticism, 
it does not have the necessary deterrent effect. They also argue that the system is more 
beneficial for the media than the public because the media now has a freer hand in running 
their business without interference from public authorities. But one cannot escape the 
conclusion that the media owners by accepting such a system implicitly declares that they 
have a responsibility that goes beyond lining their own pockets. The existence of a 
professional code of ethics means that there are some boundaries that cannot be crossed if the 
media establishment wants to avoid criticism that can damage its standing, and thus be 
detrimental to commercial goals. It also means that the media business is closely monitored, 
and that there is an open and dynamic debate about infringements. 
 
Aslı Tunç is a staunch believer in a more codified system in Turkey. She believes that the lack 
of written rules is imbedded in the Turkish culture.“We Turks don’t like to write things down. 
We don’t like anything that is structured. So everything is in the air. We are defenders of oral 
culture”, she claims.33 That is why she hopes that Turkey someday will gain entrance to the 
inner sanctum of the EU. “There will be codes, and there will be an ombudsman to watch 
over certain things. So everything will be monitored. That will be something very good for 
this country. Otherwise, nobody cares.” 
 
Some might rightly argue that the picture I have painted here is a bit too colourless. And to be 
fair there are many people who work to make improvements, among them the various 
journalist unions in Turkey. They have jointly produced a 32-page pocket-sized booklet called 
Türkiye Gazetecileri Hak ve Sorumluluk Bildirgesi (Turkish Journalists’ Declaration of Rights 
and Responsibilities) that is handed out to all union members. The booklet is both an 
introduction to the general ethics of the profession, and an introduction to the workings of 
liberal press freedom. The authors have deemed it necessary to underline that “the 
responsibility of the journalist to the public supersedes all other responsibilities, including to 
employer and public authorities”, and that “information, news and free thought are of a social 
nature that separates them from all other commercial commodities and services” (Türkiye 
Gazetecileri Cemiyeti 1998:13).34 This might sound like a matter of course, but according to 
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president Ercan S. Ipekçi of the Türkiye Gazeteciler Sendekası (TGS; Union of Turkish 
Journalists) it is not. 
 
“Turkish journalists are not free to do their work. The government is limiting freedom, and 
the relationship between the media bosses and the public authorities are restraining the 
movement of the journalists. Because of the pressure on journalists to comply with the wishes 
of the bosses we have changed the statutes of the union. Whoever becomes a member of a 
journalist union will have to accept these new codes.”35  
 
Only about 29 per cent of Turkish journalists are members of the union, and only a small part 
of these, some 4000, are active members. Because most of the major media owners deny their 
employees to join a union, the TGS actually have more members than they do declare. “Being 
in a union is related to a persons awareness of his rights. Many journalists are aware of this, 
and they come to join. But if their boss learns of it, they will have a problem. Therefore we 
protect them by not declaring their names”, Ipekçi explains.36 
 
Encouraging journalistic professionalism in an environment where the employers can dictate 
the terms of employment, and legal protection for employees is almost non-existent, is not 
easy. According to Ipekçi, the government sides with the media bosses when there are 
conflicts of interest between employers and employees. “We get no support from the AKP-
government. The government doesn’t want to lose its good relationship with the media.”37 
 
To be fair with the politicians it has to be mentioned that many parliamentarians have voiced 
complaints about the state of the corporate owned media. In 2002 the Turkish parliament 
adopted a motion to investigate the problems of the press, and a parliamentary committee 
consisting of 13 members was established to do the work.38 The monopolisation of the press 
and the ethics of journalism were the two main areas of investigation. Some suggested that the 
press should establish its own ethical values, something the journalist organisations already 
had done, while others suggested laws restricting media owners from owning companies in 
other business sectors. The public’s right to neutral and objective information was also raised. 
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The committee’s work did not result in any significant changes, but it is interesting to note 
that Doan controlled outlets in the aftermath of the inquiry published their own code of 
ethics. The group also has its own ethics board, and the ethical codes its media outlets have to 
adhere to is quit strict, at least on paper.39  
 
4.6. Concluding remarks 
The troubles facing the Turkish journalist unions will be analysed in chapter six. Here it is 
important to stress that the fate of the unions is closely tied to the fact that the decision makers 
in Turkish society, a handful of major political and economic players, have no interest in 
losing their grip on power and their means to set the agenda. This fits the pattern of a system 
of trade-off outlined in this chapter. An effective trade-off regime that benefits both the 
political and the economic elite is dependent upon reducing the amount of powerful players. 
Otherwise the playing field will appear overcrowded and too complex and the direct lines of 
communication between the two parties will become blurred. Letting more players onto the 
field will presuppose clear guidelines and rules to control the game, a development that will 
be detrimental to the major players in contemporary Turkey. A powerful elite in other words 
has a clear interest in nursing the trade-off-arrangement, and resisting attempts to level the 
playing field by introducing more transparency and more democratic rules. A clear example 
of this was the major media campaign against Necmettin Erbakan’s Islamist government in 
1996 and 1997, after he declared war on what he called the country’s “media cartel”.40 Most 
of the criticism against Erbakan’s government was articulated as fear of an Islamist takeover 
of the democratic institutions of Turkey. This fear might have been more or less real, but the 
fact that the media campaign was launched immediately after Erbakan declared his “war”, 
pretty much speaks for itself. The major media owners felt that Erbakan threatened their 
position, and they used the means at their disposal to fight his government. This was in clear 
understanding with the generals and other powerful people in the secular political and 
economic establishment at the time.  
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Chapter V: Political weapon 
“Turkey belongs to the Turks!” “We don’t need you, IMF!”1 The slogans of far-right media 
tycoon Cem Uzan’s Genç Parti (Youth Party) in the campaign leading up to the Turkish 
elections in November 2002 reek of populism and unabashed nationalism. The 7,2 per cent of 
the vote the party received chiefly came from poor and disillusioned young Turks – the 
electorate the wealthy and successful Uzan was targeting with his massive campaign (Özel 
2003:163-164). Two years earlier the same Uzan had bought a multi-million-pound house in 
London. To get access to the higher echelons of British society he employed a public-
relations firm. A donation of GBD 400 000 to one of Prince Charles’ charities was enough to 
get him invited to dinners at Buckingham Palace and Highgrove, the prince’s country estate, 
where Uzan’s wife Alara allegedly sat next to the prince himself.2 Investing in seven 
apartments in Manhattan’s luxurious Trump Tower and several yachts and aircrafts in the late 
1990s was another move to boost his image as a successful citizen of the world.3 Uzan’s life 
back then was about as far from the deprived conditions of his future voters as possible.  
 
There is a world of difference between the Uzan family’s standing in 2000 and 2002. The 
meltdowns in 2000 and 2001 is part of the explanation, irregularities another. The family’s 
mobile phone carrier Telsim started to default on loans to the mobile phone giants Nokia and 
Motorola in June 2001, and by January 2002 charges were filed in New York.4 That was the 
beginning of the end of the Uzans’ business empire. When petitions to appear in court arrived 
from various countries, Cem Uzan took up politics. In an attempt to be elected to parliament, 
and thus gain parliamentary immunity, Uzan practically “hijacked” the Genç Parti, founded 
by Hasan Celal Güzel.5 The image as a liberal citizen of the world who dined with European 
royalty was toned down. Uzan instead staked his bets on travelling the country, delivering 
simple and populist speeches, distributing free lunch to the poor, and staging big shows to 
boost his party. In his speeches he tapped into the anti-western and anti-establishment feelings 
of the deprived in Turkish society, feelings that had gained in strength in tandem with the 
crisis that hit the country’s wage earners and unemployed hard. Many saw Uzan’s reluctance 
to appear in Western courts as a brave stance against Western economic imperialism. 
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The case of Cem Uzan is the most extreme example in Turkey of a media owner that has used 
media outlets to further personal political ambitions. Uzan consistently declined interviews to 
news outlets he did not own, and turned his own outlets into mere propaganda machines. 
According to Aslı Tunç, Uzan was “a bad imitation of Berlusconi”.6 Even the lucrative 
commercial breaks during the UEFA Champions League broadcasts, to which Star TV held 
the rights, were used solely for the Genç Parti’s political broadcasts (Open Society Institute 
2005:1576). According to lnur Çevik, “they used their media empire to spread false 
information and also insult everyone opposed to them…”.7 With its 7,2 per cent of the vote 
the Genç Parti did not manage to pass the 10 per cent threshold, but it still was an impressive 
achievement for a three months old party lacking a grassroots organisation and electoral base. 
Uzan’s use of his own media empire undoubtedly explains why so many Turks voted for him. 
 
Although Cem Uzan himself on various occasions has denied that he interferes with editorial 
decisions,8 many editors and reporters of the Uzan owned daily Star resigned in August 2003 
when Uzan in a speech to staff criticised them for not standing firm enough against the 
allegations against himself and his family. Editor-in-chief Fatih Çekirge was among the 
people who quit because of Uzan’s continuing interference in editorial matters.9 Uzan’s 
speech to his staff was made following a controversy over a public speech he had made in 
Bursa in June the same year, where he accused premier Recep Tayyip Erdoan of attacking 
the Uzans' business interests in order to harm Cem Uzan politically. The controversial 
businessman and politician accused Erdoan of “treachery” and of being “Godless”. The 
speech was printed in Star at the owner’s request.10 The newspaper in November had to pay 
Erdoan TRL 25 billion (USD 18 250) in compensation for “deliberately having demeaned 
his personality”.11 The Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu (RTÜK; Supreme Board of Radio and 
Television) also halted the broadcasts of Star TV, Kanal 6, Star Max, Star 6 and Star 8, 
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owned by the Uzans, for one month each, claiming that Cem Uzan used the broadcasts in 
favour of unjust benefits for its owner.12 The TV stations were continuously broadcasting 
Cem Uzan's Bursa speech. When the critical voices in Uzan’s media ventures resigned, he 
was left with employees who went to great lengths to support their boss. When most of the 
belongings of the Uzan Group were transferred to the TMSF in February 2004, a number of 
staff members began a hunger strike live on television. Updates about the strikes were 
broadcast daily, and the newscasts were filled with Cem Uzan’s speeches at party meetings 
criticising the Government (Open Society Institute 2005:1576). The hunger strike and the 
Uzan party line were dropped when the takeover was complete. Uzan and his supporters have 
ever since contended that the government’s action against the Uzan business empire was a 
political move aimed at destroying a political rival. Although riding high in the poles in 2003, 
the Genç Parti won less than 3 per cent of the vote in the March 2004 local elections.13 
 
5.1. Content control 
Most of my interviewees believe the most plausible explanation to why businessmen invest in 
a non-profitable business like the media is that they want a tool to promote their own political 
visions and a weapon to threaten competitors and politicians. The case of Uzan is as 
mentioned the most extreme example. Other examples include cases of subtle manoeuvring to 
put pressure on the political establishment. This can take the form of a long-term ideological 
strategy to make society more business friendly, pressure from case to case in specific policy 
matters, or promotion of a specific political party. In all cases the desired outcomes are 
policies that are favourable to the business interests of the media owner. Yet other examples 
show that media outlets have been used to put a spanner in the works of competitors. 
 
In the vernacular of Media Studies, this explanation in other words seeks to shed light on why 
and how media owners in Turkey indirectly or directly control and/or restrict media output. 
To fully understand the underlying motives behind this kind of manoeuvring it is important to 
keep in mind the multiactivity aspect of big Turkish conglomerates. The media owners make 
their fortunes in other businesses than the media, and many of these businesses are time and 
again involved in dealings with the state, either in the form of lucrative government contracts, 
or in the form of subsidies. Owning an outlet where you can communicate with and put 
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pressure on the political establishment is by many investors seen as an important part of 
business in Turkey. The political weapon explanation consequently suggests that the media 
owners directly or indirectly have great leverage over the editorial content of their outlets. 
This reduces the free decision-making role of editors and reporters. 
 
A method used in many countries to secure the independent role of editors is to separate 
ownership from control. Some countries have adopted editorial agreements that seek to 
prevent proprietors from influencing editorial content. In Norway such a policy has been in 
effect since 1953,14 and according to Doyle (2002:152) it appears to have met with success in 
securing the independence of editors. The issue of dismissal and replacement of editors and 
other key personnel is also essential. If an owner has the power to threaten dismissal and 
select new editors who share his political and ideological outlook, he can reshape the editorial 
policy without interfering directly with the content. The best defence against these kinds of 
influences is in my opinion to encourage the growth of a strong civil society where trade 
organisations have the means to stand up against undue interference from owners, while other 
professional groups closely monitor the performance of the media. But even if this is 
achieved, which I in the previous chapter argued is not the case in Turkey, determined media 
proprietors still have a range of strategies at their disposal to exert influence over the content. 
It is consequently impossible for any editorial agreement to fully guarantee the independence 
of editors and journalists. But it is better than having none.  
 
5.1.1. Case: Aydın Doan’s involvement in politics 
“Few people who have crossed swords with Mr Doan have survived unscathed”, the 
Economist concluded in a portrait of Aydın Doan in 2002.15 The powerful and controversial 
Turkish media baron has more than once been suspected of having a political agenda which 
he has used his media outlets to front. The campaign against Necmettin Erbakan’s Islamist 
government in the late 1990s and his connections with secular politicians such as Mesut 
Yılmaz, both cases discussed in the previous chapter, are two examples. Mustafa Sönmez 
argues that Doan has even been directly involved in setting up a political party to further his 
ambitions. According to Sönmez Doan was one of the architects behind the Yeni Türkiye 
Partisi (YTP; New Turkey Party), founded in 2002 following a leadership crisis in the then 
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ruling social democratic Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP; Democratic Left Party) of Bülent 
Ecevit. The most pro-liberal wing in this party formed the YTP. Their vision was to create a 
modern pro-business social democratic party along the lines of Tony Blair’s New Labour. 
Prominent people like Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, who became the party leader, and 
Minister of Economic Affairs Kemal Dervi, broke ranks with Prime Minister Ecevit, and the 
new party was initially received warmly by the public opinion. Cem and Dervi were dubbed 
Turkey’s new “Dream Team”,16 and the party got a lot of publicity in the secular mainstream 
media. When Dervi decided to leave the project because he recognized that it was a “head 
without a body” (Zürcher 2004:305), the party fell rapidly in the polls.17 YTP performed 
poorly, receiving only 1,2 per cent of the eligible votes cast in the November 2002 election. 
Commentators have argued that the forming of YTP actually worked to the detriment of the 
secular parties, because it made the voters more confused about which of the many centre-left 
or centre-right parties that would be the best alternative to the Islamist oriented AKP.18 The 
vote was thus split among the many parties, and only one, Atatürk’s old CHP, managed to 
pass the 10 per cent threshold along with the AKP. 
 
How involved Doan was in the process of setting up the party is disputed. According to 
Sönmez there is no doubt that the party was “a product of the Doan Group” and “Aydın 
Doan’s idea”.19 He argues that Doan’s chief motivation was to set up a party to fight the 
AKP. Few other sources mention Doan as a main player, but it is clear that many prominent 
businessmen supported the party. Sönmez is one of the best informed researchers on media 
ownership in Turkey, and his words thus carry weight. Another point that strengthens his 
claim is the amount of coverage the party got prior to the election in Doan controlled media. 
 
Sönmez argues that the fate of the YTP indicates that there are limits to how much the media 
moguls actually can influence people’s choices. He attributes this to the fact that the Turkish 
mainstream media has very little credibility, a claim that was substantiated by a major report 
on corruption published by the independent Turkish think-tank Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal 
Etüdler Vakfi (TESEV; Turkish Economic and Social Research Foundation). The report 
concluded that journalism is at the bottom of the list of professions, ahead only of politics in 
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terms of credibility and respectability.20 The same argument has been voiced by prominent 
people inside the corporate media itself. Nuri M. Çolakolu, chairman of the TV Broadcasters 
Association of Turkey and CEO of a production company owned by the Doan Group,21 
argues that all the criticism levelled against the AKP in the mainstream media prior to the 
November 2002 elections probably fuelled the party’s electoral success. “As seen in that 
example media doesn’t really have strong muscles in Turkey”, Çolakolu argues.22 
 
5.1.1.1. Çiller vs Doan 
“Çiller feels the newspapers and TV stations owned by the media barons are out to get her. It 
is rather ironic that those media barons got huge state funds to put up those media empires 
through state assistance, soft loans and special incentives provided to them by Çiller herself 
in the good old days when the lady was their guardian angel.”23 
 
Doru Yol Partisi (DYP; True Path Party) leader Tansu Çiller collided head on with media 
tycoon Aydın Doan on a talkshow on NTV two weeks prior to the elections in April 1999. 
Çiller made accusations of news manipulation against the Doan owned daily Milliyet. She 
accused a certain group she referred to as the countries “media cartel” of conspiring against 
her following a speech she had made in Erzurum where she stated that “I am the guardian of 
your religion and devoutness”.24 According to Çiller, reporters from Milliyet tipped off the 
authorities that she had made use of religion in a political speech, an act that constitutes a 
crime in Turkey. The journalists then reported that the public prosecutor in Erzurum had 
started an investigation based on her statement. According to Çiller the reporters practically 
made up the news themselves. NTV’s editorial office managed to get Aydın Doan on phone 
to reply to Çiller’s accusations on air. “Accusations and counter accusations as well as insults 
flew in the air”,25 editor lnur Çevik of Turkish Daily News remarked. Later Doan appeared 
on the same channel in person, stating that if Çiller could back up her allegations with 
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substantial evidence, he himself would proclaim Milliyet, his own newspaper, a defamer. The 
media boss went on to say that “I would hang myself in Taksim square (if Çiller could back 
up her claims)”. 26 The dispute continued with a massive frontal attack on Çiller in Doan 
controlled media that ended with an article in Hürriyet that concluded that Çiller was a liar.27 
However, the official report endorsed by the public prosecutor in Erzurum clearly indicates 
that the legal proceedings were initiated based on oral allegations by the Milliyet reporters, 
considered to be an accusation of criminal misconduct. According to Fehmi Koru, the “action 
defined as a "criminal accusation" by the state prosecutor, is not accepted as a "defamatory 
accusation of a criminal act" by Doan, who initially declared: "I will accept being the owner 
of a newspaper that is involved in tip-offs."28 
 
Any way you slice it is clear that the media owner had the upper hand regarding the means to 
get his message through. Doan was a friend of Anavatan Partisi (ANAP; Motherland Party) 
leader Mesut Yılmaz, Çiller’s centre-right rival. Many sources mention the bad blood between 
the two party leaders. According to Nicole and Hugh Pope (2004:313), Yılmaz had an 
“almost allergic dislike of Tansu Çiller”. Another interesting point is that Çiller was supported 
by another media conglomerate, the Akam Group.29 This group had fought a costly war with 
the Doan Group a few years earlier.30 The picture that emerges is a rather complex web of 
allegiances where personal ties between media owners and pro-business centre-right 
politicians for years determined the fault lines in Turkish politics. Fehmi Koru paints a rather 
bleak portrait of the Turkish media landscape: “Our media would not hesitate a minute to use 
the truth to support its wrongs. It would be very difficult to find any other country in which 
what the media wants and what the people want are so incongruous with one another.”31 lnur 
Çevik is also quite tired of this state of affairs: “It is sad to hear media barons claiming they 
have never tried to manipulate politicians when we all witnessed personally how they forced 
their journalists in Parliament to lobby for their business interests...”32 
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But it’s not only the media owners who get their peace of somebody’s mind. Çiller and ANAP 
leader Mesut Yılmaz are also criticised for letting the situation get out of hand by allowing the 
media conglomerates to grow unchecked, and even doing them favours. According to Çevik: 
 
“All this show the ugly face of the state of affairs in Turkey, where politicians, media bosses, 
businessmen and state officials have been entangled in a rather complicated relationship that 
has fanned corruption and irregularities. (…) You feed the media barons, and then the 
monster you created tries to swallow you up. This is what Çiller is confronted with today. 
Both Çiller and Yılmaz have given businessmen and some media barons the golden 
opportunity to manipulate themselves, and this is where we have ended up.”33 
 
However, a few days later Çevik concluded with the following statement: “The actions of the 
prosecutors against political parties and the negative attitudes of some media barons all help 
the victims.”34 Çevik argues that Çiller’s political campaign had gained ground after she took 
on Doan. The war of words between the two had according to Çevik hurt the media boss 
more than the party leader. “Dogan has created the image that he is too much involved in 
politics, and unfortunately, Hürriyet and Milliyet, as well as his Kanal D TV, are being used 
for political campaign purposes...”35 Çevik is here echoing Mustafa Sönmez’ argument, 
presented in the preceding paragraph, that there seems to be limits to how much the media 
barons can influence people’s choices, and that they suffer from an acute lack of credibility.  
 
The critical attitude against Doan in Turkish Daily News also deserves attention. Less than a 
year after these stories were printed, Doan bought the newspaper. I am not suggesting that he 
did this to silence opponents. But it is interesting to note that he has received far less critical 
coverage after he became owner of the leading English daily in Turkey. Then editor lnur 
Çevik apparently felt the need to explain the papers policies to its readers after the sale: 
 
“…at the time of the merger we were accused of compromising on the liberal policies of the 
paper by joining a group that some people claimed was conservative and would not allow the 
paper to continue on its reformist, constructive and innovative course. Time has proven them 
wrong. The Turkish Daily News continues to be run by the Çevik family with massive moral 









support from the Doan family. On the contrary, the liberal and democratic policies of the 
Turkish Daily News have been encouraged by Aydın Doan...”36 
 
5.1.1.2. Tantan vs Doan 
There have been many accusations voiced against Aydın Doan, and most are hard to 
substantiate. That may be because he has been careful to avoid direct involvement in politics 
or in irregularities, or that he has been a master in clearing his tracks. It may also be that the 
people who make the allegations have dishonest motives of some kind. But there are a couple 
of cases that are more trustworthy than others. The war of words between Doan and Tansu 
Çiller is well documented. Another case is Doan’s role in the downfall of Sadettin Tantan. 
 
Tantan was interior minister in Bülent Ecevit’s coalition government from 1999 until he was 
replaced in June 2001. The former police chief led an anti-corruption campaign that exposed 
irregularities in the Ministry of Energy and in the state pipeline corporation, BOTA. The 
campaign also reached high into the bureaucracy and administrations of failed banks, and it 
looked as though a major corruption scandal engulfing even the deputy prime minister Mesut 
Yılmaz, an acquaintance of Aydın Doan, was about to unfold. But it was allegations aired by 
Tantan on a talk show on CNN Türk in March 2001 that led to a direct confrontation between 
the minister and the media tycoon. On the talk show 32. Gün (The 32nd Day), hosted by the 
prominent reporter and author Mehmet Ali Birand, Tantan said that the Doan owned 
Dıbank was one of the banks that were under investigation for irregularities.37 After the 
allegations were made CNN Türk, which is a joint venture between Doan and Time Warner, 
managed to reach their boss by telephone, and a quarrel erupted on air between Tantan and 
Doan. Many people were astonished by the direct accusations against Dıbank, a venture 
that had been earning substantial profits. Although Tantan was hugely popular among most 
ordinary Turks for his anti-corruption campaign, many voices raised sympathy for Doan.38 
At a time when many private Turkish banks were struggling with enormous debt, and many 
were taken over by the TMSF, Dıbank managed to stay floating. In June Tantan was demoted 
from interior minister to state minister responsible for customs. His response was to resign 
immediately, both from the government and the ANAP. “No matter how popular a figure he 
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became in the public eye, his treading on the toes of certain circles running the country led to 
his demise”, concluded Mehmet Ali Birand.39 The official story was that Tantan was forced 
from office because of feuding with the party leadership, including party leader Mesut 
Yılmaz. But many people suspect that leading businessmen, including Doan, helped Yılmaz 
to clear the ground for Tantan’s fall.40 The coverage of the interior minister in many Doan 
controlled outlets after Tantan’s allegations against Dıbank was certainly not favourable. 
 
5.1.1.3. Ilıcak vs Doan 
“Ilıcak is a very modern lady who drinks wine and has nothing to do with fundamentalism. 
Yet, she is now labelled as the champion of the fundamentalists.”41 
 
The banning of parliamentarian Nazlı Ilıcak of the moderate Islamist Fazilet Partisi (FP; 
Virtue Party) from politics came as a shock to many Turks.42 The outspoken reporter turned 
politician was one of the main opposition voices in parliament, and by most commentators 
she was seen as a reformists within the Islamist political grouping. Ilıcak’s political career 
ended when The Constitutional Court in June 2001 decided to ban FP on charges that it was a 
“hub of fundamentalist activity”.43 But the only two parliamentarians who lost their seat, 
Ilıcak and Bekir Sobacı, were regarded as moderate reformers within the Islamist political 
movement.44 This suggest that there were other motives behind the barring of the two from 
political life for five years. lnur Çevik argues that both had angered too many powerful 
people by voicing criticism against elements in the business elite and the military.45 It is 
known that Ilıcak “wanted to probe claims that Aydın Doan was exploiting his muscle to 
bully governments into extending him commercial favours”.46 It is also a fact that a number of 
Doan owned media outlets wrote extensively about the charges that Ilıcak was promoting 
anti-secularism. This is linked to her support of FP deputy Merve Kavakçi who entered the 
parliament chamber wearing a head scarf in 1999. Kavakçi was forced out of parliament and 
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her citizenship withdrawn,47 allegedly because she had acquired US nationality without the 
prior agreement of the Turkish authorities. Ilıcak’s support of Kavakçi, and her allegations 
about the ties between media bosses and politicians, earned her some very powerful enemies. 
 
Ilıcak had also gone straight at the throat of the powerful military. In her column in the daily 
Yeni afak she claimed that the General Staff in 1998 instigated a smear campaign against 
certain prominent journalists, intellectuals and political parties to discredit them.48 Ilıcak later 
at a press conference claimed that a memorandum called “A Powerful Plan of Action”, 
published as a facsimile in her column, had been prepared by leading generals after they had 
captured the deputy leader of the outlawed PKK, Semdin Sakik. In an alleged testimony of the 
PKK-leader many prominent people were named as PKK-collaborators, and these names were 
leaked to the press. The first victim of the smear campaign was Akın Birdal, then chairman of 
the nsan Hakları Dernei (HD; Human Rights Association). Shortly after he had been 
accused of aiding the PKK Birdal was gunned down on 12 May 1998 by two attackers.49 Only 
immediate attention of a doctor on the HD staff saved his life.50 In the aftermath of the 
shooting then prime minister Mesut Yılmaz was quoted as saying: "It is understood that it was 
an internal settling of accounts. Like a misunderstanding between those in the same camp... It 
is clear they (the HD) were connected to the PKK.”51 If Yılmaz knew of the alleged smear 
campaign when he made the statement, remains unknown. Inquiries shortly afterwards led 
investigators to a nationalist group. 16 alleged members or supporters of this group, including 
a retired army major, a serving gendarmerie officer and the two men thought to have carried 
out the shooting, were arrested. The group is widely believed to have had links with the Milli 
stihbarat Tekilatı (MT; National Intelligence Organisation) in the past.52 
 
Journalists and authors Mehmet Ali Birand, Cengiz Çandar, Mahir Kavnak, Yalçın Küçük and 
Mahir Savin were also singled out in the press leaks as collaborators with the PKK. All of 
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them suffered as a consequence of the extensive media coverage. Birand and Çandar were 
forced to suspend their columns in the daily Sabah, and because of the so-called “gentleman’s 
agreement” between the newspaper barons at the time not to employ people who resign or are 
fired from each other’s publications, they were left out in the cold.53 The pro-Kurdish political 
party Demokratik Halk Partisi (DEHAP; Democratic People’s Party) and Ilıcak’s own FP 
were also singled out in the press leaks as collaborators with the PKK. The General Staff in 
the end reluctantly admitted that a memorandum had been written, but stated that it was only 
a memorandum, and that it was not acted upon.54 Both the shooting of Birdal and the banning 
of Fazilet Partisi and the two parliamentarians Ilıcak and Sobacı caused an uproar in Europe. 
Ilıcak made sure that it wasn’t forgotten by appealing her political ban to the European Court 
of Human Rights.55 Other former deputies from the FP, including Kavakçi, did the same. The 
case started in October 2005. At the time of writing judgment had not been delivered. 
 
5.1.1.4. Doan’s agenda 
So how do we assess the role of Aydın Doan in Turkish politics? Does he have a clear 
political agenda? Is he just defending his economic interests? I argue that an analysis of his 
influence must follow lines of inquiry both into the economic and the political sphere. Doan 
as an individual must also to some degree be separated from his many media outlets, as it is 
impossible for him to control all the day to day decisions made by his editors. In some cases, 
like the allocation of government tenders, the economic and political spheres are connected. It 
is a fact that he has gained material wealth in the form of government contracts and subsidies 
from his ties with politicians. It is also a fact that he repeatedly has confronted politicians, and 
that his media outlets have tended to be critical of the politicians he has had an argument with. 
Doan owned media outlets also rarely criticise their owner or other Doan companies. But it 
is also a fact that his media outlets on many issues carry a lively debate. The Doan owned 
daily Radikal is one of few newspapers that systematically exposes human-rights abuses by 
the security forces and the police and corruption among politicians. It is also a fact that heavy 
weight trans nationals like Time Warner is so pleased with his professionalism that they dear 
venture into joint operations like CNN Türk. Doan himself also fiercely denies all claims 
levelled on him that he interferes with his editors decisions. “I am sometimes outraged by the 
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stories my papers print”, he is reported saying.56 According to Fehmi Koru, it is more a matter 
of an unprofessional journalistic mentality and an urge to participate in leading the country on 
the right path, a path that is seen as leading westwards. Koru relates the case of the fabricated 
story of Washington Post journalist Janet Cook, which brought her a Pulitzer,57 to Doan’s tv-
appearance on NTV defending his newspaper Milliyet against allegations from Tansu Çiller. 
 
“Despite being a journalist by trade, no one heard Katherine Graham, the owner of the Post, 
getting defensive and making comments such as, "I will declare my newspaper a defamer," 
simply because it is not the duty of newspaper owners to defend the news and the 
commentaries published in their newspapers.”58 
 
Koru’s arguments are interesting because they tells us something about the way Doan relates 
to his media belongings and his editors. It would have been more natural for Milliyet’s editor 
to defend the accusations against the newspaper. The following campaign against Çiller in 
Doan controlled news outlets also tells us something of the bonds between these media 
institutions, and the convergence of interest and ideological outlook between them. Doan 
controls the appointment of editors and their salaries. In addition many prominent editors 
have been members of the board in Doan Yayın Holding, which owns the media related 
enterprises, and in the mother company, Doan Holding. All this means that Doan does not 
need to exercise control over his editors on a daily basis, something that would have been 
practically impossible anyway. They know where he stands, and he knows where they stand. 
 
Koru’s second argument, that Doan has a political mission, is harder to substantiate. In the 
following I will shed light on this argument by analysing what I have called the “taboos” in 
Turkish public debate. “Agenda control” is a related term describing the same phenomenon. 
 
5.2. Agenda control 
The fact that media owners and media outlets are directly involved in politics is not a new 
phenomenon. Many European newspapers were initially launched by a political group of 
some kind. Although most of these papers now are independent, I argue that such political 
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involvement is not questionable if it is out in the open, and there is a vibrant and diverse 
press. In a situation where the news media are owned by a handful of big industrial 
conglomerates with major vested interests in a certain political ideology and development, 
and the media products are aggressively promoted as neutral and objective, it certainly 
becomes worrying. That is probably why people like Cem Uzan and Aydın Doan 
vehemently deny any claim that they influence the content of their outlets in a way that 
promote a certain worldview. They know that they must nourish their image as deliverers of 
objective and neutral reporting to keep their part of the social contract. But one must bear in 
mind that businessmen and investors will support the system that feeds them, namely the 
capitalist mode of production and the – at least on paper – free market. That is why I argue 
that it is imperative that we have transparent and efficient forces in place to moderate and 
regulate the effects of private ownership, such as regulatory agencies answerable to a 
pluralistic political system, limits on media concentration and editorial agreements to name a 
few. Such forces are especially important in cases where the political agenda of the people 
who control the content of the media are disguised behind a veil of objectivity and neutrality. 
 
To illustrate this point I will analyse certain taboos in the public debate in Turkey. I will show 
that the themes that are regarded as taboos have changed during the last few decades, and that 
the power to define what constitutes a taboo to some extent has been privatised. The first part 
consists of a discussion of what I have called “old taboos”. These have been studied quite 
extensively, and the discussion has been linked to the ongoing scrutiny of the Turkish 
commitment to international human rights standards. The second part consists of a discussion 
of what I have called “new taboos”, which I define as criticism of the prevailing pro-capitalist 
and pro-market discourse. Although some media scholars, politicians and NGOs have started 
to take these issues more seriously, there exists no authoritative account of them, and they 
have not been linked to the fashionable discourse on Human Rights. 
   
5.2.1. Old taboos 
“Everybody thinks we are so democratic now. We can talk and write about anything. Yeah 
Right. Everybody knows his or her limits. There are so many topics off-limits. There are 
delicate issues, not taboos maybe, taboo is a big word. But every smart reporter and 
journalist knows his or her limits. At what point he can loose the job, or can be sent to jail. So 
everybody knows. But these are invisible obstacles, invisible limits. If you can play by the 
rules, be part of the system, you’ll be fine. But other than that, tough. Everything is 
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mainstream. Everything is moderate. Everything is supporting the status quo. It’s not diverse. 
Nobody is challenging the limits.”59 
 
Turkish citizens enjoyed fairly high levels of political rights and civil liberties in the second 
half of the 1970s. According to Freedom House, Turkey was considered a free society.60 After 
the 1980 coup the country slid down the rank, and has since been labelled “partial free” by the 
same organisation. There have been ups and downs during this period, with the late 1980s 
marking a slow movement in the right direction. During the mid 1990s, when the open 
conflict between the Turkish Armed Forces and the Kurdish PKK was at its peak, the situation 
deteriorated again.61 The amount of political rights and civil liberties has despite recent 
reforms still not reached the levels of the late 1970s. The findings of Freedom House are 
supported by other international organisations; among them Human Rights Watch (1999:1):  
 
“The press in Turkey—in the vernacular of psychiatry—suffers from multiple personality 
disorder. When reporting on the vast majority of issues, such as domestic party politics or the 
economy, the media today is lively and unrestricted—indeed often sensational. (…) Alongside 
the arena of free discussion there is a danger zone where many who criticise accepted state 
policy face possible state persecution. Risky areas include the role of Islam in politics and 
society, Turkey’s ethnic Kurdish minority and the conflict in south-eastern Turkey, the nature 
of the state, and the proper role of the military.” 
 
This pretty much sums up what I have chosen to call the “old taboos” in Turkey. They have 
existed since the birth of the Turkish Republic in 1923, and are in many ways a by-product of 
the nationalist and secular policies and reforms introduced by the Atatürk regime. The 
politically, ethnically and religiously motivated upheavals of the last 30 years, combined with 
increasing international and domestic focus on human rights and civil liberties, have made 
them an increasingly contested area. Although many of the “old taboos” arguably are less 
sensitive today, there are still cases that might seem shocking to a Western observer. The 
                                               
59
 Aslı Tunç, interview with author, Kadıköy, Istanbul 18 July 2005. 
60
 For a survey of annual country scores, see: Freedom House (2003): Annual Freedom in the World Country 
Scores, 1972 through 2003. http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/allscore04.xls (9.11.2005) 
61
 The definition of this conflict has been the subject of controversy. Terms like “civil war”, “armed conflict” 
and “war” have been used. The Turkish Government claims that since both the US and the EU have declared the 
PKK as a terrorist organisation, the struggle should not be portrayed as an armed conflict, but as a “fight against 
terrorism”. This is highly debatable, but I have anyway chosen to use the neutral term “open conflict”.    
 69 
most profiled example recently is the case brought against Turkey’s most famous living 
author, Orhan Pamuk, by a public prosecutor in Istanbul last August.62 
 
It started when Pamuk during a discussion on the curbs on freedom of expression in Turkey 
told the Swiss newspaper Tages Anzeiger (Daily Reviewer) in February that “a million 
Armenians and 30,000 Kurds were killed in this country and I'm the only one who dares to 
talk about it”.63 These are highly sensitive issues in Turkey, and the day after the interview 
appeared parts of the Turkish press launched a fierce attack on Pamuk, branding him a traitor. 
Following several death threats, the author went into hiding abroad. The case against Pamuk, 
which caused condemnations from organisations and politicians from around the world, was 
originally set to start 16 December 2005. If found guilty of “publicly denigrating” Turkish 
identity, the author would face up to three years in prison.64 The Turkish foreign minister 
Abdullah Gül did however in a thinly disguised criticism of the overzealous prosecutor say 
that Pamuk must and will win the case.65 The legal action and threats against Pamuk is surely 
not helping the image of Turkey at a time when discussions in European countries on 
Turkey’s future relationship with the EU are heated. The foreign minister and a number of 
Turkish reporters and intellectuals know that a high profiled case like this only amplifies the 
authoritarian and illiberal image of Turkey.66 At the time of writing it looks like Pamuk is left 
off the hook. In January 2006 the court announced that it would drop the case against the 
novelist, but the damage to Turkey’s image had already been done.67 
 
There is another point to be made about these old taboos, namely the capricious arbitrariness 
that has characterised the enforcement of the restrictive press laws. This makes it virtually 
impossible for people to know when they will get into trouble and for what. An interesting 
case that illustrates this is the interview that the reporter and columnist Oral Çalilar did with 
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the leader of PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, and the head of the Partiya Sosyalist a Kurdistan (PSK; 
Socialist Party of Kurdistan), Kemal Burkay, in early 1993.68 The interview ran for 18 days as 
a series of full-page articles in Cumhuriyet, but no prosecution followed. When the series of 
interviews was published as a book some months later, the State Security Court in Istanbul 
banned the publication under Article 28 of the constitution, deeming it to be “separatist 
propaganda” (Human Rights Watch 1999:57-58). Shortly thereafter the author and the book’s 
publisher, Muzaffer Erdoan, were charged. In October 1994 both men were found guilty. 
Çalilar was given a two-year sentence, while Erdoan was given six months. If we view this 
in light of the ongoing open conflict in Turkey at the time, we see that the interview series in 
Cumhuriyet appeared during a cease-fire that held for nearly two months. When the book 
appeared in September the same year a major escalation of the conflict was on its way. 
 
The social status of the so-called violator also seems to be of importance. “Newspaper 
columnists in the mainstream press – many of whom enjoy near superstar status – have the 
most freedom to write as they please” (Ibid:54-55). Reporters and columnists writing for the 
Kurdish nationalist newspapers and for left-wing publications find themselves in trouble with 
the authorities more often. This has a lot to do with the fact that these publications represent 
the minority views in Turkey, and as such this phenomenon can also be explained by an 
analysis of what I have called the “new taboos” in Turkey. 
 
5.2.2. New taboos 
The media in Turkey experienced a relatively liberal environment in the early 1950s, and then 
again in the 1960s. But it is still fair to say that the concept and workings of a free media was 
not deeply ingrained in Turkish culture when the army withdrew to its barracks in 1983. 
Under Turgut Özal – and consequent governments in the 1990s – Turkey experienced a 
situation where the environment for investment and trade was liberalised, almost without any 
mechanism to curb, control or balance the growth of government friendly business empires, 
while the environment for political discussion was severely restricted. The businessmen who 
benefited from this state of affairs, among them most of the owners of the conglomerates 
discussed in this thesis, had no interest in letting their media outlets criticise a development 
that benefited companies in their portfolio, and that could get them into trouble with the 
authorities. This created a development where the privatisation of public businesses and assets 
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and the liberalisation of the foreign trade regime went along almost without any public dissent 
or criticism. If you on top of this add the aforementioned restrictions on discussion of the “old 
taboos”, we are looking at an environment where debate and discussion are restricted on 
nearly all sides. It is of course harder to measure the extent and impact of these “new taboos”, 
since they are not subject to legal restrictions. It is safe to say that we lack adequate 
parameters to analyse them. I argue that the most effective avenue of inquiry is to investigate 
the media outlets’ relationship with big capital, and the big league businessmen’s relationship 
with each other and with political authorities. Self-censorship is the word most often applied 
to describe avoidance of certain topics on grounds of common interests among societal elites. 
I argue that there is a regime of self-censorship in place in the conglomerate owned media 
today that is a hindrance to critique of the laissez-faire capitalist system that has allowed 
almost unchecked growth of media conglomerates. This is also the line of inquiry Mustafa 
Sönmez has followed in his studies of Turkish media. 
 
“Before the 1980s many views could be expressed. But for the time being it’s not easy to find 
a place if you for example are against privatisation, or liberal politics in general. You cannot 
find a place in a newspaper or on a TV channel, because the owners see to it that his 
newspapers or TV stations support privatisation.”69 
 
This not only benefits the media barons, but also other big business players and the various 
governments since 1983: in other words all the groups that have had an interest in the 
extensive privatisation programmes. These programmes and the way they have been handled 
have been and still are controversial among many intellectuals in Turkey. Sönmez is certain 
that it would have been controversial among a much larger segment of the population if there 
had been more discussion about it in the mainstream media and more critical reporting on the 
many shady deals that have been conducted between big league businessmen and top 
politicians. Sönmez paints a picture of a highly integrated big business sector in Turkey, 
where financial and organic links like intermarriage and common representation in the 
prominent NGO Türk Sanayicileri ve Iadamları Dernei (Tüsiad; Turkish Industrialists and 
Businessmen’s Association) govern the relationships rather than competition.70 
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“It’s almost collective ownership because the others, although they are not physically owners, 
give their support through advertisement etc. They all believe that the liberal economy is the 
right one, globalisation is the right way and making agreements with the IMF is the right 
preference. They have a consensus about these macro principles. This is in politics too, not 
only in economics. They are secular, and they have a pro-EU view.” 
 
Editor-in-chief Mehmet T. Sucu of Cumhuriyet also claims that the mainstream media in 
Turkey are pro-capitalist, and that only a handful of small outlets question the workings of 
market liberalism and big capital. He paints a picture of a polarised media environment.  
 
“There are two types of newspapers in Turkey: Opinion newspapers and mainstream like 
Hürriyet and Sabah. Opinion newspapers constitute approximately 10 per cent of the market. 
Cumhuriyet, Özgür Gündem (Free Agenda) and maybe Vakit (Time). Sometimes the 
mainstream papers also make investigative journalism. They also try to change people’s 
minds. They try to bring them to the capitalist side.”71 
 
Dilruba Çatalba claims that it is the commercial logic of the mainstream media outlets that 
seemingly by default narrows the scope of pluralism. She argues that a system where the main 
criteria for choice of programming are ratings, day-to-day sales and the preferences of 
advertisers, cannot produce enough space for controversial opinions.  
 
“You don’t have to exert daily direct influence as an owner to keep these people out of your 
paper or channel. The nature of your operation itself is guarantee enough for these people to 
be left outside. What you have is a commercial operation, and everybody there knows that. 
You have people hired to make sure that things are done in a commercially viable way as 
possible.”72 
 
The picture that emerges if we sum up these arguments is that there has been a convergence of 
interests between the political and the economic elites in Turkey since the early 1980s. When 
somebody tries to upset this balance, like Erbakan did in 1996 and Tantan and Ilıcak did in 
2001, they are bound to get into trouble. But many Turks, including commentators quoted in 
this chapter, are indeed tired of this state of affairs. But in a sense they are powerless. The 
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unchecked growth of a handful of government-friendly conglomerates has created an 
environment where a small portion of the business interests in the country now controls a very 
large slice of the Turkish economy. But as long as much of their wealth stems from lucrative 
personal ties with government officials, and the economic policies of the government 
continue to safeguard their economic welfare, it is not in the interest of these businessmen to 
confront or challenge these policies, although the policies clearly have created increasing 
social gaps in the country. Consequently the mainstream media in Turkey does not function as 
a check on neither public nor private power abuse. This argument is to some extent 
simplified. The convergence seems to be stronger in the overall political outlook than in the 
actual shaping and practical appliance of the economic policies. It is quite usual to see critical 
comments in the mainstream media on how the government applies free market principles, 
but it is quite unusual to see criticism of the free market ideology in general in these outlets. 
The biggest paradox is perhaps that both the powerful players and the people who try to fight 
them are eager to join the EU. The business elite sees lucrative European markets opening up, 
while their critics welcome the implementation of rules and regulations that can end 
corruption and work as a check on the powerful businessmen. 
 
5.3. Fighting each other 
Arguments between media outlets are a common feature in many countries. It is a natural part 
of any dynamic and free society, and it bears witness of healthy competition. But when 
arguments are fought with sword rather than pen, it ceases to be part of a healthy public 
dialogue. It gets even worse if the relative strength of the combatants is clearly uneven, and 
rules to regulate the game are either lacking or easy to circumvent. Many unscrupulous battles 
have been fought between media outlets, media conglomerates and media owners in Turkey. 
Here I will elaborate on one of them.73 
 
In 1996 paperboys could be seen and heard in the streets of big Turkish cities selling copies of 
the daily Akam. After the advent of home delivery and news kiosks this had been an 
uncommon sight in Turkey, being an expensive and ineffective way of distribution. Although 
many viewed the phenomenon as slightly romantic, the publishers of Akam did not. They had 
fallen foul of the biggest players in the newspaper game, the Bilgin Group and the Doan 
Group. These two groups had a virtual monopoly of the distribution of mainstream media in 
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Turkey through their joint company Bir-Yay, and they decided to increase the distribution fees 
for the Akam Group’s papers by 90 per cent, thus in practice annulling the distribution 
contract. The reason for doing so was allegedly that they wanted to protect readers from 
“unscrupulous promotion campaigns”.74 Akam in turn claimed that the refusal was not aimed 
at protecting readers, but the market share of the newspapers of Bilgin and Doan. The 
publisher of Akam, Mehmet Ali Ilıcak,75 had formed an alliance with the Uzan Group to 
challenge Bilgin’s and Doan’s hold on the newspaper market. Large investments had been 
made in printing presses and other equipment, and plans were floated to distribute journals 
across 13 provinces. This was a clear challenge to the big players. But instead of facing this 
challenge by fair means, they decided to settle their differences and merge their distribution 
networks to combat their junior rivals. It is also reported that Bilgin and Doan threatened 
journalists who joined an Akam Group paper that they would never work for either of the 
other groups’ papers again.76 It is a fact that Akam established itself on the Turkish media 
market by an aggressive promotion campaign consisting of coupons in the paper with which 
the buyer could win everything from computers to Italian furniture. It is also a fact that Ilıcak 
later was charged with irregularities in these promotion campaigns, and had to serve a short 
stint in Bayrampaa prison in Istanbul. Such promotion campaigns were conducted by most 
mainstream newspapers at the time. 
 
What was called the “latest battle in the press wars” drew widespread condemnation.77 The 
chairman of the Turkish Press Council, Oktay Eksi, said that the monopolisation of media 
distribution is a development as dangerous as the monopolisation of the media itself, while 
the Türkiye Gazeteciler Cemiyeti (TGC; Turkish Journalists Association) stated that “unfair 
competition and competition without rules would eventually harm the whole press as an 
institution”.78 Demands for antitrust laws were raised, but the government remained passive.79 
Mehmet Ali Ilıcak was bound to lose to his much more powerful rivals in the long run, and in 
the end he sold Akam. The media owners’ use of their outlets to tarnish the reputation of 
competitors runs like a thread through all the battles in the various “press wars” in Turkey.  
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5.4. Fighting together 
The “press wars” have regularly been interrupted by cease-fires. This usually happens when 
the media faces a common enemy, as witnessed in the secular outlets’ campaign against the 
moderate Islamist RP government in 1996 and 1997, and the lobbying to amend the 
Broadcasting Law after the Supreme Court descended on the widespread illegal practice of 
allowing the major media owners to participate in government tenders. To understand why 
this caused the media tycoons to settle their differences for a short while, a brief overview of 
the Turkish broadcasting legislation is necessary.  
 
When Cem Uzan and Ahmet Özal set up the first Turkish private television channel in 1990, 
the state monopoly on radio and television transmissions came to an abrupt end. There was no 
legislation to regulate the new electronic media landscape, and the private Turkish 
broadcasting market thus developed in a legal limbo until a new broadcasting law was passed 
on 13 April 1994. The new law established the RTÜK, with extensive powers to assert a tight 
control over the broadcasting market. The Broadcasting Law was a heavy-handed reaction to 
the previous anarchy. When the state’s broadcasting monopoly was falling apart with the 
advent of Star and other private channels that followed suit, the focus of public concern with 
the respect to ownership of the new private broadcasters “was not concentration, but rather the 
abuse of media power” (Open Society Institute 2005:1573). The law introduced the 
imposition of a 20 per cent ceiling on all aspects of ownership in broadcasting. In addition, 
shareholders’ next of kin were forbidden to own any shares in the same enterprise, and 
foreign investors were only allowed to invest in one broadcasting enterprise. Finally, any one 
with more than 10 per cent of the shares in a broadcasting enterprise was barred from 
government tenders or businesses. But the law did not prevent media outlets from serving 
their owner’s interests as intended. “In practice, it turned out that the law actually encouraged 
a veiled structure that was wide open to abuse” (Open Society Institute 2005:1573-1574). 
Although ownership structures on paper for the most part were in conformity with the law, all 
the major broadcasters were part of a media group, and some had several television and radio 
channels. Everyone also knew that almost every channel had one boss. In the ownership 
forms submitted to the RTÜK, the list of shareholders could contain the “names of a driver or 
doorman, or a company lawyer” (Open Society Institute 2005:1575). Corporate structures 
were made confusingly complicated in order to distance broadcasting interests from 
newspaper interests, although all were in most cases literally under the same roof. 
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As shown in this chapter the concerns about abuse of media power turned out to be amply 
justified. Even more disturbing was the fact that the government of Mesut Yılmaz turned a 
blind eye, allowing media owners to participate in state tenders. “In fact, except for a few of 
the largest conglomerates, all those who could bid had media interests, as this was a necessity 
of the times for entrepreneurs who wanted a “slice of the pie in the privatizations and other 
tenders” (Ibid). The law thus “encouraged the very tendencies that it set out to prevent” (Ibid). 
 
When the Supreme Court in 1999 suspended a lucrative energy contract a Doan owned 
company had been awarded, pointing to the restrictions on cross-ownership set down in the 
Broadcasting Law, it led lnur Çevik to applaud the decision by claiming that “the supreme 
court has proven there are clean judges in Turkey who uphold the laws rather than the 
interests of a handful of press barons”.80 But his happiness was short-lived. The media bosses 
immediately and in concert started lobbying for amendments to the law, and their media 
outlets for the most part followed suit. The amendment proposals met with stiff popular 
opposition, and were even vetoed by President Ahmed Necdet Sezer. But on 15 May 2002 the 
parliament approved the amendments for a second time, making it impossible for the 
president to veto them again. Sezer, arguing that the new law gave the RTÜK powers that he 
deemed harmful to the freedom of the press and the media bosses a chance to monopolise the 
sector even further, forwarded the law to the Constitutional Court. On 12 June 2002, this court 
ruled for the annulment of five provisions and some paragraphs of the law, but the rest was 
left standing (Çatalba 2005:12). The Economist in a portrait of Aydın Doan concludes that: 
“It is a measure of his influence that Turkey’s parliament approved the new media law…”81 
 
The amended Broadcasting Law sets no limits on ownership. Instead, it employs a somewhat 
complicated annual average audience ratio threshold. This threshold is set at 20 per cent, 
which is currently above what any channel achieves. If a radio or television channel exceeds 
this threshold, the RTÜK requests the majority owner – whether an individual or a group – to 
reduce its share of ownership to below 50 per cent. If the audience threshold has been 
exceeded due to the ownership of shares in more than one radio and television channel, again, 
an appropriate number of shares, sufficient to reduce the total ownership share to below 50 
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per cent, needs to be sold. In the case of a breach, RTÜK can revoke the broadcaster’s license. 
Two crucial sub-paragraphs setting the audience threshold were among the provisions and 
paragraphs that were annulled by the Constitutional Court. The result is that the Turkish 
media is yet again operating in a legal limbo. Some technical issues regarding the measuring 
of the audience threshold are not settled either. The RTÜK is thus left virtually powerless in 
regards to ownership issues, and this have enabled the Doan Group to increase its share in 
the broadcasting market to 27 per cent by buying Star TV. It is also important to notice that 
the newspaper market is not affected by the restrictions in the Broadcasting Law. Mustafa 
Sönmez has now lost all faith in the parliament’s efforts to control media ownership: 
 
“Theoretically one person can own the whole market. But certain people do not want that to 
happen. It seems to me as if the Ciner group is unofficially supported by the military or some 
other powerful group just to have a balance. So, there is no official limit, but unofficially such 
a balance is preferred”, he claims.82 
 
5.5. Concluding remarks 
Cem Uzan set a new standard of propaganda engineering in Turkey when he exploited his 
media outlets ruthlessly to promote his own political party. Uzan’s intentions were so obvious 
that few failed to see his objective, and nobody has so far tried to outdo him. The case of 
Aydın Doan is less conspicuous, and therefore arguably more worrying. Politicians who 
have criticised and challenged his position have seen their careers cut short, while others who 
have befriended him has received favourable coverage and in turn rewarded him with 
lucrative government contracts. Through his media outlets he has also been active in fighting 
legislation that threatens his position as Turkey’s undisputable media baron, while he has 
promoted legal changes that could benefit him. This might be viewed as a healthy survival 
instinct of a successful businessman, and thus be rendered harmless. But when a pattern 
emerges that reveals that he frequently gets what he wants, although it is often clearly 
contrary to the public interest, it is far from harmless. Aydın Doan is one of Turkey’s richest 
men, he controls a major part of the Turkish media market as well as a range of other 
businesses, and he has a vested interest in a given political development. It is thus quite 
troubling when he is able to influence and even threaten democratically elected politicians to 
such an extent that he in sum emerges as a very powerful player on the political arena. 
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Chapter VI: Restraints on Civil Society 
You rarely see Mustafa Kemal Atatürk smile on photos, at least those taken of him before he 
became president in 1923. But his stern look does not convey anger or sadness, rather 
ambition, determination and self-confidence. It was an abundance of these qualities that made 
him a national rallying point that inspired the tired populace of war-torn Anatolia to stand up 
against the invading Greeks. It was these qualities Atatürk wanted to invest every Turk with 
after he had succeeded in saving the Turkish heartlands. One of his most famous sayings, “ne 
mutlu Türküm diyene” (”happy is the one who can call himself a Turk”), by many considered 
a national motto, is a perfect example of Atatürk's quest for Turkish self-confidence and pride 
– both for the country as a whole and for every individual.1 
 
Judging by the troubles his institution is facing, it would take a large dose of Atatürk’s 
determination and confidence for president Ercan S. Ipekçi of the Türkiye Gazeteciler 
Sendekası (TGS; Union of Turkish Journalists) to keep his spirits up. Maybe that’s why he 
keeps a mansized poster of a stern-looking Atatürk next to his office door. Ipekçi has in any 
case no intention to resign yet. And he needs all the determination and self-confidence he can 
muster to fight the powerful elite of the media establishment, many of whom as skeptical 
towards involvment from unions as Atatürk was in his authoritarian days. The following 
statement from Erturul Özkök, editor-in-chief of Hürriyet and vice-chairman of the Doan 
Yayın Holding executive committee, is a good indication of what he is up against: “We hate 
article 212 and we do not like the union” (International Federation of Journalists 2002:9).2 
 
In this chapter I will outline and discuss the role of organised civil movements that are part of 
Turkey’s media environment, with a focus on the trials and tribulations of trade unions and 
human rights organisations. The restraints imposed on various segments of civil society after 
the military coup in 1980 left these movements virtually without means to balance the 
growing influence of the new media owners. And without a third party to safeguard and 
promote the interests of media employees and the quality and content of media output offered 
to the public, the media owners have been left with a free hand to control most aspects of 
media production and distribution. As such the consequences of ownership concentration in 
Turkish media are arguably more serious and harmful – or at best have the potential to be so – 
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 For ethnic and religious minorities the explicit focus on Turkishness has had many negative effects. 
2
 Article 212 refers to the Act on Labour-Management Relations in the Press.  
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in Turkey than in countries where a free and vibrant civil society is part of the overall societal 
power equation. My underlying perspective is thus to a certain degree comparative. 
 
Civil society is a somewhat vague notion – a bag where it is tempting to place everything and 
everyone that doesn’t fit other more clearly defined categories. But I believe that trade unions 
and human rights organisations operate well within the boundaries of what most scholars 
would define as civil society. Most would probably also agree that such organisations are 
among its most institutionalised and visible expressions. I am aware of the ongoing discussion 
of civil society in the Middle East that has followed in the wake of Edward W. Said’s (1995) 
groundbreaking book “Orientalism”. A wide body of work has been produced that challenges 
the somewhat euro centric notion of what constitutes civil society. Many scholars have argued 
that the growth of various moderate Islamist political and welfare networks3 and informal 
neighbourhood coalitions4 can be viewed as civil movements on equal terms with trade 
unions and other more traditionally defined civil groups. Some argue that the growth of such 
groups is an example of a strengthening of civil society in the Middle East.5 This is a major 
discussion that I do not have room to finish here. But I will stress that the political expressions 
of Islam in Turkey are not directly comparable with the situation in most other Middle Eastern 
countries, where Islamists are kept out of the political loop by force. A democratically elected 
moderate Islamist party presently governs Turkey, and there are many other Islamic-oriented 
groups, like the Fethullah Gülen Movement presented in paragraph 3.5.4, that arguably now 
are part of Turkish civil society on more or less equal terms with other civil movements, and 
as such are imposers of or subjects to the same restraints. Prime Minister Erdoan's lawsuit 
against Cumhuriyet, discussed in paragraph 4.4.3, is evidence of this. 
 
I must stress that the following analysis of the media trade unions may have limited validity 
concerning trade unions in other sectors in Turkish society, although their historical roots and 
development, as outlined in the following paragraph, are more or less the same.6 The violence 
and troubles facing Turkish human rights defenders, analysed in part two of this chapter, 
provides a more general insight into how powerful elements within the state organise 
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 See White (2003) for an anthropological approach to Islamist groups in Turkey. Wickham’s (2002) study of 
Islamic networks and political groups in Egypt is also valuable.    
4
 See Singerman (1995) for an excellent study of informal networks in Cairo. Bayat (1997) and Denoeux (1993) 
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5
 Göle (1994) argues for such an approach in relation to Turkey.  
6
 lkay Sunar (2004) and Metin Heper (1994; 1994c) provide more general and comparative analyses and 
discussions of the formation and role of civil society in Turkey.  
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themselves in order to literally fight off perceived or real challenges from civil movements. 
The fate of these NGOs is not directly related to problems with ownership concentration in 
Turkish media. But there are three important factors that attribute importance to them in 
connection with my analysis: Firstly, one of the most important parameters prominent 
international human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch use when they measure 
the amount of political rights and civil liberties in a given society is how freely the media is 
allowed to operate. Secondly, there are no Chinese wall separating the human rights NGOs 
and the media. Brave reporters have risked their lives, and many have been killed, when they 
have investigated and uncovered human rights abuses, especially in the Southeast. These 
reporters have often worked together with members from human rights organisations. Thirdly, 
corporate media is in general quite supportive of the secular state and the army's protection of 
the exclusive Turkish character of the nation. Few mainstream outlets have showed any real 
interest in investigating human rights abuses committed by state agents against Kurds in the 
Southeast. This job has mostly been left to reporters from small independent outlets.  
 
6.1. The rise and decline of trade unions 
The first workers organisations comparable to trade unions appeared in Turkey in 1908. These 
were scattered organisations established mostly at state-owned enterprises, and they came into 
being during a short liberal interlude. After a big strike in 1909, all were banned. After World 
War I various professional organisations came into existence again, but after Atatürk 
promulgated the repressive Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu (Law on the Maintenance of Order) in 
1925 the door to political organising, as well as unionising, was practically shut once again 
(Zürcher 2004:171). This repressive climate would continue throughout the single-party 
regime of the CHP, with an explicit ban on class-based organisation from 1938. 
 
After the transition to a multi-party system in 1946, a relatively more liberal atmosphere led 
to the lifting of the ban on organisation following class-based differences. Soon afterwards 
numerous trade unions were established at the initiative of two new and short-lived socialist 
parties. To keep this movement under control, and to try to curb the growing popularity of the 
socialist political wing, the CHP organised the foundation of an umbrella organisation called 
the Türkiye çiler Dernei (Association of Workers of Turkey). However, the unions 
flourished very rapidly, and when their membership went up to thousands within a few 
months, the regime closed both the two socialist parties and the trade unions (Aslan & 
Baydar). But the events had demonstrated the inevitability of the establishment of trade 
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unions. Accordingly, the CHP government prepared a trade union act, which became effective 
in February 1947. Thus, for the first time in Turkey workers and employers were granted the 
right to establish unions, albeit with certain restrictions. A large number of unions were 
founded after the act came into force, and the already established associations of workers 
converted themselves into unions. In 1947 there were 49 unions organizing 33 000 workers. 
In 1952 the number had spiralled to 246, and their membership to 130 000 (Aslan & Baydar). 
This led to the founding of a central organisation called Türk-. By 1954 this organisation 
had a total of 117 487 members organised in 146 trade unions (Ibid). The new constitution 
prepared after the military intervention on 27 May 1960 recognised the rights of workers to 
collective bargaining and strike, while employers were in return legally entitled to declare 
lockouts. In the following years employers also started to organise themselves in unions. The 
new regime also allowed unions to exert political influence, though without establishing 
financial or organic relations with political parties. 
 
The trade union acts that were passed in 1963 formed a turning point in the history of the 
Turkish trade union movement. The total number of union members rose from 282 967 in 
1960 to 834 680 in 1967, and exceeded one million by 1971 (Ibid). The empowerment of the 
workers led to an increase in labour disputes and strikes. According to Mango (2004:77), 
“unionised workers, who represented the minority of the labour force, became a privileged 
class (dubbed ‘the worker aristocracy’) at a time of acute economic distress for the mass of 
the population”. A strike in late 1966 led to a split in the ranks of Türk-, and a more radical 
trade union confederation, Devrimci çi Sendikaları Konfederasonyu (DSK; Confederation 
of Revolutionary Trade Unions), was formed alongside Türk-. The split had an obvious 
political dimension. Türk- and its affiliates were mostly dominated by supporters of 
mainstream political parties like CHP and the Adalet Partisi (AP; Justice Party) – successor 
of the defunct Demokrat Parti, while DSK was dominated by supporters of smaller leftwing 
parties. The fact that the established political parties backed their own supporters in gaining 
control over Türk- was another example of the political elite’s attempt to keep the 
movement on a tight leash. From the foundation of DSK until the coup in 1980, the 
competition between the two confederations was the determining feature of the trade union 
movement in Turkey. But other confederations such as the radical rightwing Milliyetçi çi 
Sendikalan Konfederasonyu (MSK; Conferedation of Nationalist Trade Unions) – in reality 
more a political group than a confederation – also put their mark on the ongoing struggle. 
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Most trade unions and confederations, especially those with leftist sympathies, were cut down 
to size by the military junta between 1980 and 1983. The unions were accused of inciting and 
fuelling many of the violent confrontations in the 1960s and 1970s. Although the army had 
plenty of more or less sound evidence to point the finger at the two radical trade union 
confederations, the leftwing DSK and the rightwing and nationalist MSK, they seized the 
opportunity to restrict the power and social impact of all unions, thereby severely reducing the 
role of organised civil society in Turkey. The new labour laws enacted in July 1983 
terminated the cultural and educational role of the unions, and trade unions were redefined 
solely as organisations with economic and social functions (Aslan & Baydar). Unions were 
barred from involvement in politics and commerce, and organising meetings outside their 
stated aims was forbidden. Organisation on a national level became compulsory, and 
professional unions and federations and enterprise unions were prohibited. 
 
Strong unions with bargaining power didn’t fit the picture of Turgut Özal’s economic 
liberalisation either. The unions have thus gradually been sidelined in Turkey during the last 
25 years, and few elite politicians reacted when the journalist unions were forced out by the 
businessmen who entered the media sector in the 1980s (Çatalba 2005:11). According to 
Mango (2004:113), only about 6 per cent of the 8 million regular wage earners and 2 million 
casual labourers in Turkey were covered by collective wage agreements in 2000. 
 
Trade unions have come under attack from capital forces in the West as well. But there is one 
vital difference: In Turkey a liberal capitalistic economic system was implemented without 
strong organisations that could raise concerns and make demands on behalf of wage earners 
during the process. In other words, economic liberalism was implemented in an authoritarian 
political setting. In the West civil movements have been able to meet and to some degree fend 
off this attack. The Turkish case is comparable to the development in countries like Taiwan, 
Malaysia, China and South Korea, where the regimes have liberalised their economies before 
increased political and civil rights have been granted – if they have been at all.7 
 
6.2. Squeezed out 
Sitting behind his desk in a somewhat dark and old-fashioned office in TGS’ Istanbul branch 
in Caalolu, Ercan S. Ipekçi does not hesitate to mention people like Aydın Doan, Cem 
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 See Lee (2000), Park, Kim & Sohn (2000), Ma (2000) and Nain (2000). 
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Uzan and Dinç Bilgin when asked to name the organisation’s main enemies. It is no 
coincidence that TGS, founded in Istanbul in 1952, has remained loyal to Turkey’s own Fleet 
Street.8 Close by lies the headquarters of Cumhuriyet, the only Turkish newspaper where TGS 
can conduct negotiations of collective agreements. Turkish law requires that at least 50 per 
cent of the workers at a workplace and 10 per cent of workers within the relevant sector 
nationwide are organised in order to start such negotiations. According to Ipekçi, Aydın 
Doan agreed to buy Hürriyet in 1992 on condition that everybody resigned from the union. 
“It costs money to sign the papers correct when people resign from the union. Aydın Doan 
paid for all. 400-500 resigned from Milliyet and Hürriyet at that time”, he says.9 Since then 
TGS has not been able to sign collective agreements in Doan controlled media outlets. Union 
organisation has not been possible in outlets that began their publication and broadcasting 
lives later on, as is the case with all private broadcasters in Turkey, and there has never been 
union organisation in the other big media conglomerates, according to Ipekçi.10 In addition to 
Cumhuriyet, TGS can sign collective agreements with the semi-official news agency Anadolu 
Ajansı (Anatolia Agency) and the privately owned Ankara Haber Ajansı (ANKA; Ankara 
News Agency). Both ANKA and Cumhuriyet are currently experiencing serious financial 
problems, and the negotiated collective agreements can not be implemented. Thus, the only 
news organisation where a collective agreement can be signed in actual sense is Anadolu 
Ajansı. 15 years ago TGS could negotiate collective agreements with most of the major 
newspapers. In 2002 the number of reporters who had unfettered access to union rights was 
approximately 5 per cent of the total number of workers in the sector, according to statistics 
from the Turkish Ministry of Labour and Social Security (International Federation of 
Journalists 2002:4). 
 
6.2.1. Fire at will 
The sidelining of the unions has the left the media owners in a position where they can do 
pretty much as they like. Job security is almost non-existent, and salaries range from the 
astronomical for top-editors and columnists, to crumbs for many ordinary reporters. The 
massive layoffs that followed the meltdowns in 2000 and 2001 can serve as example of the 
conditions. Nobody seems to know exactly how many people got fired. Ipekçi claims the 
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number is approximately 5000.11 “Not all of them were reporters. Also other media staff, like 
printers, drivers etc. were fired. But only 50 of them sued. Most of them thought that they 
would have their old job back if they didn’t sue. But 80 per cent of the people that were fired 
will never come back to the business.”12 According to Ipekçi the lives of many of the fired 
media workers have been extremely difficult. To survive many have become street vendors. 
 
“The big amount of people who got fired, were people who didn’t have any social security. 
Many were illegally working there. Not as you understand freelance. The government didn’t 
know that they were working there, and these people didn’t earn any social security rights. 
The bosses have to pay the government a lot of money in order to secure social security rights 
for their employees. But they won’t do that. They have no written agreements with these 
employees.”13 
 
Ipekçi points out that the Turkish media in general was overpopulated in the late 1990s, and 
that the meltdown provided the owners with an opportunity to increase earnings by getting rid 
of employees. He claims that the dramatic personal consequences could have been less severe 
if more media workers had been part of a union. “It is expensive to be part of the union, so the 
bosses will not hire that many people. If it happened in a place were the workers were 
members of a union, the effects of the crisis would have been dealt with in an orderly fashion, 
like letting off the people who were close to their retiring age first”, he says.14 
 
Aslı Tunç (2004:315) provides another angle to the massive layoffs when she writes that it 
was “a perfect time to get rid of some journalists who had become long time opponents to 
corruption in Turkish politics and an obvious threat to their boss, media tycoon Aydın 
Doan”. Tunç (Ibid) also points out that a “high number of well-educated and liberal-minded 
female columnists” were among the first ones to be fired, and that they “unquestionably paid 
the price of creating an emancipated woman’s image in the press”. That the crisis was used as 
an excuse to get rid of outspoken reporters has been echoed by official spokespersons from 
journalist organisations in Turkey as well. “The layoffs are not economic but political”, 
claimed Ceylan Özerengin, spokeswoman for the Journalists Assembly Initiative.15 
                                               
11
 This corresponds well with other sources. International Federation of Journalists mentions 4800 (2002:4). 
12






 Collins, Catherine (2001): “Crisis Taking a Toll on Turkey’s Media”, in Chicago Tribune, 2 April 2001, p. 4. 
 85 
 
Both Ipekçi and Tunç argues that the massive dismissals had a profound effect on the 
profession because the subsequent fear of layoff caused a consistent reluctance to provide 
critical investigation and to follow up on corruption claims. One can also argue that the 
sensational nature of the Turkish media has indirectly worked to the detriment of the social 
security of reporters.16 According to Dilruba Çatalba, the negative public image of 
journalism as a profession means that there has been no public outcry after the dismissals. 
 
“Most of the public would not hear or appreciate why it is such a problem for any democratic 
public sphere if a journalist loses his or her job because of his or her professional integrity. 
This is a real problem. Journalists are not regarded very highly by the public. (…) Most of the 
journalistic production are somehow tabloid, sensational and for fun. So for many in the 
street it would not be a terrible disaster if a journalist loses his or her job.”17 
 
Çatalba points out that the mainstream media kept the coverage of their own crisis and the 
many personal tragedies that followed in its wake at a minimum. Most people thus didn’t 
appreciate the magnitude of the crisis. It is of course also important to keep in mind that other 
sectors were hit hard during the crisis. But as I argued in paragraph 3.3.1, sectors dependent 
upon advertising revenues are among the first to experience difficulties during recessions, and 
the development in Turkey at the time confirmed this pattern. 
 
TGS and other Turkish NGOs managed to use the crisis to raise international concern about 
the negative effects of concentration of media ownership on job security, diversity and 
coverage of sensitive issues. TGS received massive support when the issue was raised on the 
24th congress of the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) in Seoul in June 2001. This in 
turn led to an investigation of union rights and press freedom in Turkey instigated by the IFJ, 
the conclusions of which are presented in the report “Journalism and The Human Rights 
Challenge to Turkey: Putting Union Rights and Press Freedom on the Agenda”. IFJ has since 
published a number of statements and written a handful of letters to Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoan to support the journalist associations in Turkey through the Turkish IFJ 
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affiliates Çada Gazeteciler Dernei (ÇGD; Progressive Journalists Association)18 and 
TGS.19 IFJ has also lobbied the EU to put pressure on the Turkish government. Harsh 
criticism voiced in the annual reports prepared by the EU Commission on Turkey’s progress 
towards accession, shows the seriousness of the situation. The Commission has regularly 
criticised the Turkish Government for not accepting Article 5 and 6 of the European Social 
Charter on the right to organise, the right to bargain collectively and the right to strike. “In 
general, Turkey needs to strengthen social dialogue at all levels and develop a culture of 
social partnership”, the Commission concludes (2004:47), and argues that this is especially 
important in the private sector where bipartite social dialogue “remains virtually non-existent” 
(Ibid:111). But this in turn raises a troubling paradox: the erosion of job security and social 
rights of employees has accelerated in a period when Turkey has implemented legislation in 
accordance with EU demands. In principal speeches in Brussels in connection with accession 
of new members it has often been highlighted that integration into the EU will boost social 
dialogue and empower civil movements in the new member states. But when the banquet 
tables are cleaned and everyday life resumes, who will be the real winners of EU membership, 
capital owners or civil movements and ordinary wage earners, Ercan S. Ipekçi asks.  
 
6.2.2. Thoughts on EU membership 
“Capital is king in the EU. Big players in the European media look towards Turkey and the 
countries in the East European block. We’ve seen the experiences in the East European block. 
They bought media outlets and used cheap working force, and now they want to do the same 
in Turkey. We wonder: do the media bosses in Western Europe by buying media in Eastern 
Europe and Turkey try to escape from the high standards in Western Europe? We hope we 
will rise to the high standards by joining the EU, but we are uncertain of which standards we 
will reach: the East European or the West European?”20 
 
For Ipekçi the prospect of EU-membership is a double-edged sword. He fears that 
membership will empower Turkish capital owners at the expense of Turkish wage earners, 
and one cannot but agree that the developments are troubling from a trade union point of 
view. Trade unions and social security rights have come under attack in many European 
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countries because they are seen by many politicians and trendsetting economists as the main 
obstacle towards further economic growth, which is the leading mantra of the day. 
 
The question of EU membership divides the people I have interviewed for this thesis. Most 
seem to agree that the standards of transparency and control that EU legislation provides are 
necessary to fight the pandemic corruption in Turkey. This is the main reason why Aslı Tunç 
eagerly promotes Turkish membership. She believes it is the only way Turkey can become a 
truly democratic society. “Ok, it’s very market orientated, but it’s a fact of the world, so you 
can’t change that. But at least we will have some kind of ethic codes, some definitions of 
journalism and good reporting etc”, she argues.21 
 
Editor-in-chief Mehmet T. Sucu of Cumhuriyet has a different approach. He does not believe 
in a democratic miracle cure from the EU that will solve all economic and political problems 
in Turkey. Sucu advocates that true change can only come from within, and that Turks have to 
fight themselves for improved socio-economic conditions. “I do not accept the defeat. I want 
to take these benefits with my own power, not with anyone else’s help”, he says.22 
 
Mustafa Sönmez argues that it is the conglomerate nature of the Turkish media sector that is 
the real obstacle. As long as the media owners view their outlets as a political rather than a 
profit-generating investment, the rules that regulate a profit-driven free-market is not 
applicable to the Turkish media anyway, and there is little the EU can do about that. Sönmez 
argues that a restructuring of the business profile of the big conglomerates that operate in the 
media sector is the only way to create a climate where profit is the driving force behind media 
investments, not politics. “The revenue cannot sustain all the media outlets, so there must be 
a selection. Some should be closed. If external economies are narrowed, they will not be able 
to pay the loss, and all players wil play by the rule in a profit-oriented way”, he says.23 
 
Editor Arif Dizdarolu of the Doan owned Hürriyet believes that Turkish EU membership is 
a necessity to improve the quality and diversity of Turkish media. He argues that increased 
living standards in Turkey will lead to more money being spent on buying newspapers and 
magazines, and more money being poured into advertising. This will in turn create a more 
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professional and profit-oriented climate in the media sector.24 Another Doan employee, 
program director Baar Baarır of CNN Türk, is also pro-EU. He believes membership will 
lead to a decrease in the number of media outlets because all will be forced to be more profit-
oriented. This will in turn lead to an increase in quality, he argues.25 
    
Dilruba Çatalba reasons that EU membership will force Turkey to apply more transparent 
and democratic governance. But she is uncertain if integration into a highly developed and 
commercial free-market system like the EU will provide more public discussion of what I in 
paragraph 5.4.2 in this thesis called the “new taboos”, namely the workings and effects of the 
free-market economy. She argues that the commercial free-market mentality has already 
infiltrated into “each and every compartment” of most media outlets in Turkey.26 Çatalba 
has first-hand knowledge of the increasing commercialisation of the Turkish public sphere. 
She is associate professor in Journalism at the University of Galatasaray, beautifully located 
by the Bosporus in buildings that used to be part of the Çiragan Palace, built by the Ottoman 
Sultan Abdülaziz in 1874. One of the auditoriums at the university is named after Aydın 
Doan. "He sponsored some event here, and they named the auditorium after him. They didn’t 
ask us at the communications department first", she says. 
   
As these quotes show, EU membership is seen both as a cure and a disease. It depends on the 
perspective applied. Tunç and Çatalba are strong advocates of the implementation of 
regulatory regimes like the ones at work in most EU-countries. This will provide some basic 
ethical and legal ground rules that will help increase transparent democratic governance in the 
political and economic spheres, they argue. But my interviewees take different positions 
regarding the market orientated political implications of membership. The fault line here 
seems to be political. Sucu and Sönmez are outspoken in their belief in socialist values and 
social liberalism, and thus sceptical towards the capitalist free-for-all approach, while Baarır 
and Dizdarolu advocate the necessity of such an approach for raising the economic living 
standards in Turkey. The impression of the IFJ investigation team after meeting with top 
Doan-executives in 2002 could be a suiting punch line: “the delegation was left with the very 
strong impression that the company sees its future within the EU but without recognizing the 
European standards on social relations” (International Federation of Journalists 2002:9). But it 
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is more tempting to end with Ipekçi's open question to the EU: ...we are uncertain of which 
standards we will reach: the East European or the West European?27 
 
6.3. Human Rights 
Being a frontline soldier for human rights in Turkey is a risky business. 11 executives and 
members of the nsan Hakları Dernei (HD; Human Rights Association) have been 
murdered after the organisation was founded in 1986,28 and many more have been wounded, 
imprisoned, tortured and harassed, among them former chairman Akın Birdal, whose dramatic 
story was told in paragraph 5.3.3. The story behind the attempt on Birdal’s life shows that 
powerful forces in Turkey – in this case senior generals in the army were allegedly involved 
in the smear campaign that preceded the shooting of Birdal – are willing to use any means 
possible to silence critics. Birdal survived the attempt, but many of the human rights monitors 
of the HD and reporters from small independent outlets who exposed the cruelty carried out 
by Turkish security forces, the PKK and other armed groups during the fighting in south-
eastern Turkey in the 1990s, were not so lucky. During the period in question the HD has 
operated with legal authorisation to monitor human rights developments in Turkey. Here I 
will elaborate on a couple of cases to expose the gravity of the situation. These cases are 
however inseparable from another Turkish phenomenon, the so-called “deep state”. 
 
6.3.1. The deep state 
Although it is widely used, the term “deep state” is not a very well defined concept in its 
Turkish context. Descriptions like “a shadowy network involving the military and intelligence 
apparatus as well as the state bureaucracy” are common.29 Who actually controls this 
“shadowy network”, and how it is organised, is often left in obscurity. But the idea that there 
exists “two states” in Turkey is so imbedded that former president and prime minister 
Süleyman Demirel have referred to the existence of an organised “deep state” as a fact beyond 
doubt. In an interview in November 2005 Demirel is quoted as saying that “there is one deep 
state and one other state (…) The state that should be real is the spare one, the one that should 
be spare is the real one.”30 Only by analysing the most prominent cases involving players 
acting on behalf of the alleged “deep state” is it possible to somehow personify this abstract 
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construction. A rather complex web of more or less institutionalised ties between criminal 
gangs – mainly the armed ultra-nationalist groups and the powerful families of the Turkish 
and Kurdish mafias – and various groups representing the state – mainly various security 
organisations like the Jandarma stihbarat Tekilatı (JITEM; Gendarme Intelligence Agency) 
– comes to the fore.31 The ultra-nationalist groups, variably referred to as the ülkücüler 
(idealists) or the Grey Wolfs, have a long history of close links with the security apparatus. 
Turkish and international organisations have collected a large body of evidence which shows 
that these groups served the government in a dirty war against the Kurds and any Turk who 
supported the Kurds or raised criticism against the governments handling of the open conflict 
with PKK in the 1980s and 1990s.32 Many of their victims were reporters and human rights 
defenders. Both Semra Özal, the late Turgut Özal’s wife, and Tansu Çiller have been named 
in connection with these gangs (Zürcher 2004:322). 
 
The existence of close links between the state, the mafia and the ultra-nationalists seemed to 
be confirmed when a car was crushed in a road accident in the western town of Susurluk on 3 
November 1996. Four people were in the car: a senior police officer, a pro-government 
Kurdish chief, a former beauty queen and a former terrorist who had killed seven leftist 
students in the late seventies (Zürcher 2004:322-323). He was supposedly on the run, but 
turned out to be holding an official VIP passport. The quartet had just returned from a seaside 
resort, where Interior Minister Mehmet Ali Aar also had been staying. The public outcry that 
followed the incident forced the authorities to start an extensive investigation that eventually 
led to the sentencing of two officers from the security police to six years in prison. But many 
still believe that bigger fishes should have been fried, and that the low rank security officers 
were simply sacrificed to satisfy the public. 
 
On 9 November 2005 an incident in the south-eastern town of emdinli again made the “deep 
state” front-page news.33 Around lunchtime that day a white car stopped outside the bookstore 
Umut (Hope), run by Seferi Yılmaz. Yılmaz is widely thought to have been a sympathiser of 
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the PKK, and had served a long stint in gaol for alleged PKK membership. One of the 
occupants in the car threw a bomb into the bookstore. Yılmaz was killed and another man was 
seriously wounded in the following explosion. The bomber ran back to the car, but the crowd 
pursued him and surrounded the vehicle. A tussle then ensued, and the occupants of the car 
reportedly opened fire, killing another man and wounding four others seriously.34 When the 
police arrived they arrested the four occupants of the car, but by then people in the crowd had 
broken into the vehicle, reportedly discovering several AK-47 assault rifles, a JITEM ID-card 
and a “hit list” of other targets.35 When the police prepared to prosecute the four arrested men, 
they confirmed that three were sergeants in JITEM, while the person who allegedly carried 
out the bombing was a PKK informant.36 Two of the JITEM sergeants and the PKK informant 
have been indicted.37 The discovery that the bombing apparently had been an operation of 
JITEM—one of the most notorious of the undercover security services operating in Turkey—
sparked fury among the local, mainly ethnic Kurdish population. Rioting ensued for days, and 
spread to other Kurdish communities across the country. It was in connection with the 
emdinli bombing that Süleyman Demirel made his statement about Turkey’s “two states” 
referred to above. 
 
The handling of the affair by Turkish politicians is by many seen as confirming the view that 
elected politicians are not able to control state-sponsored groups who operate outside the 
law.38 The November 25 meeting at the prime ministry with military officials has been 
interpreted as a symbol of this state of affairs. When the emdinli affair hit the front pages, 
the AKP government and the opposition in parliament agreed to set up an official enquiry. 
After the November 25 meeting many politicians retreated from this enthusiasm for a full 
investigation. This happened after the military had criticised the politicians for linking the 
incident to the “deep state”, stressing instead that it was more likely a settling of accounts 
between various Kurdish groups. Commander of the Turkish Land Forces, General Yaar 
Büyükanıt, even publicly vouched for one of the sergeants, stating “Tanırım, iyi çocuktur” (“I 
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know him, he is a good kid”),39 indicating that the sergeant probably was innocent of any 
crime. Following the army's public relations campaign, the prominent newspaper columnist 
Gündüz Aktan argued that the bombing could have been staged by the PKK itself.40 But 
Aktan does not explain how the PKK could have managed to involve the JITEM. His article 
reflects the respect many Turkish reporters have for the army. 
 
One of the major stories in the Turkish media at the time of writing is the accusation against 
general Büyükanıt made by a public prosecutor in the city of Van in connection with the 
emdinli bombing. Prosecutor Ferhat Sarıkaya has claimed that the general and several of his 
subordinates set up a criminal organisation when Büyükanıt was a regional commander in the 
Southeast in the late 1990s.41 The accusation implies that the bombing in emdinli was 
carried out by elements of this criminal organisation.42 Some voices have even claimed that 
the real goal behind this and a number of other blasts in the region lately has been to create 
unrest and thus “wreck Turkey’s European Union entry talks”.43 What really happened in 
emdinli on 9 November is still not clear, but the ensuing dispute has made the affair and its 
alleged connections to the “deep state” top news for weeks on end.44 Some claim that the 
existence of a “deep state” is severely exaggerated, while others claim that incidents like the 
emdinli bombing proves that it is a powerful player. Jon Gorvett argues that the existence of 
the “deep state” is one of the most serious problems facing Turkey today. “Dealing with this 
second state will therefore likely be the biggest challenge facing the government in the years 
ahead, as its efforts to match European Union standards in particular oblige it to try and unify 
the mechanisms of power, bringing them under electoral control.”45 One could also add that 
dealing with the “deep state” implies dealing with the military's hold on democratic 
institutions, and the mainstream medias' reluctance to criticise the powerful generals. 
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6.3.2. Fighting human rights defenders 
When Vedat Aydın, one of the founders of the Diyarbakır branch of the HD and the 
chairman of the Halkın Emek Partisi (HEP; People’s Labour Party), was taken from his home 
on 5 July 1991 by several armed men who allegedly identified themselves as police officers, 
the Turkish public was still largely unaware of the seriousness of the dirty war conducted by 
elements of the “deep state”. Aydın’s body was found at a roadside outside of Diyarbakır 
three days later. His skull was fractured, his legs broken, and his body contained more than a 
dozen bullet wounds.46 Although many names have been mentioned over the years, his killers 
have never been identified and prosecuted by the authorities. The killing of Aydın was one of 
the first of the 1500 or so ‘murders by persons unknown’ that reached the headlines and raised 
suspicion that there was an organised dirty war going on in the Southeast. The suspicion that 
groups on state payrolls had taken part in the killing was further strengthened when Fewzi 
Veznedarolu, Aydın’s successor as chairman of the HD in Diyarbakır, was told on 25 
December 1992 by two plain clothes police officers in front of the HD building that he would 
end up like the others – referring in particular to Aydın – if he didn’t stop his activities.47 
 
The murder of Aydın was not the first politically motivated killing in Turkey. But for many it 
marks the beginning of a systematic regime of harassment of human rights defenders in the 
1990s. Seen in a broader context this bears evidence of the fragile state of Turkish civil 
society. That the Turkish state only has been able to find the killers of a handful of the at least 
1500 people representing civil society that have been murdered by “persons unknown”, can 
either indicate that people on the state’s payroll are involved, or that there exists powerful 
organised criminal networks that the state is powerless to fight. The implications of both these 
explanations are grave for the Turkish political system. It is also worrying that it takes 
scandals like the emdinli and Susurluk affairs for the mainstream media to raise a public 
debate about the issue. Many hope that the progress towards accession in the EU will improve 
the situation, and the amount of killings by “persons unknown” has decreased after the turn of 
the millennium. However, recent developments show that there exist other effective means to 
fight off challenges from civil society.  
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The Special Representative of the UN’s Secretary-General on human rights defenders argues 
that the continuing hostility between human rights groups and authorities is the result of “an 
extremely polarized environment” (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on 
Human Rights Defenders 2005:13). The seeds to this “polarized environment” were sown at 
the beginning of the open conflict in the southeast when organisations and some independent 
media outlets started to denounce abuses by the state and call for the state to respect the rights 
of the Kurdish population. The Kurdish armed groups had a similar political agenda, “and 
despite their peaceful activities, defenders were perceived by many as siding with the armed 
groups and thus heavily targeted (Ibid:14).” It is telling that the supervision of NGOs in 
Turkey until recently was the responsibility of the police and the security services. This is still 
the case with trade unions.   
 
The Special Representative in her report argues that recent constitutional amendments and 
legislative reforms in Turkey have “greatly strengthened the prospects for change in areas 
critical for the promotion and protection of human rights” (Ibid:4).48 But the report concludes 
that the reforms have relaxed but not removed restrictions (Ibid:9). There are a number of 
reasons for this. Firstly, the large number of recently established human rights boards and 
councils both at government, provincial and district levels are all controlled by the state. 
Independent human rights defenders have been reluctant to participate in these boards and 
questioned the principle of having a state body investigating violations committed by state 
agents. Most board members are representatives of the state or political parties in power, and 
the boards are dependent on governors to provide them with offices and secretarial support, as 
they have no budget of their own (Ibid:12). Secondly, although the personal safety of human 
rights defenders has improved, the number of court cases brought against them has increased. 
The HD has reported that while 300 cases were opened against their organisation from 1986 
to 2000, more than 450 cases had been opened during the first three years of the new 
millennium (Ibid:17). Some individuals have had more than 50 cases brought against them. 
Media outlets and reporters that have questioned the state's commitment to international 
human rights standards have also been targeted. Although the number of cases leading to 
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prison sentences has decreased, many result in heavy fines.49 Thirdly, many judges in lower 
level courts have been reluctant to implement the reforms, or simply used alternative legal 
provisions to prosecute human rights defenders. The Special Representative (2005:21) argues 
that the “existence of pockets of resistance within the State” is the main cause for this. 
“Overall, authorities continue to consider human rights defenders with great hostility”, and 
“all but one of the security chiefs, a number of governorship representatives and prosecutors, 
during their meeting with the Special Representative, linked human rights defenders to 
terrorist activities and organizations”. 
 
6.4. Concluding remarks 
Atatürk set out to create a strong state in Turkey. Nobody knows how much power he would 
have been willing to share with other forces in society, had he still been alive and in charge 
when the democratic winds first blew over Turkey in the late 1940s. But we do know that 
since his days there have been powerful elements within the state hierarchy that sees any 
criticism against the nature of the state and any challenge towards the exclusive Turkish 
character of the nation as an evil that must be fought at all costs. Such a starting point is in 
and of itself not compatible with the basic principles manifested in international human rights 
treaties. One can consequently argue that the troubles facing human rights defenders in 
Turkey is of a more fundamental nature than the troubles facing trade unions. While the 
former is concerned with liberating the overall cultural and political spheres, the later is 
mainly concerned with securing the individual rights of their members. But the bottom line is 
that they face the same fundamental obstacle: the authoritarian nature of leadership in Turkey. 
The Commission of the European Communities (2004:47) does not exaggerate when they 
point out that: “In general, Turkey needs to strengthen social dialogue at all levels and 
develop a culture of social partnership”. This is reflected in the media bosses reluctance to 
allow their employees to join a union, and in the state’s reluctance to let civil movements 
participate on an equal footing in the monitoring of human rights. The former and current 
Turkish governments may have had the best of intentions at mind when they decided to 
establish hundreds of human rights councils and boards across the country. But as long as 
these boards are controlled by the state, and they don’t yield any tangible positive results on 
the overall mentality towards respecting human rights, they appear as little more than window 
dressing. 
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Chapter VII: Conclusion 
“I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.”1 
 
“There are limits in every field, and freedom should be defined; otherwise, some groups 
infringe on the freedom of belief of other groups.”2 
 
Should there be limitations on freedom of speech? The question is still as relevant as it was 
when the French philosopher Voltaire (1694-1778) fought against the repressive hands of the 
Roman Catholic Church and the French government. A quarter of a millennium later Turkish 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan in connection with a row over caricatures of the 
Prophet Muhammad, argues that freedom of expression should indeed be defined and limited. 
However, there is one major difference between the contemporary situation and the situation 
in the era of the Enlightenment: It is no longer only governments and religious establishments 
that have the power to infringe on free speech and pluralism. In many modern societies the 
threat is as likely to come from major business interests that control the mainstream media. 
Censorship has increasingly been privatised. 
 
The Turkish state set up by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his fellow republicans was all 
embracing and authoritarian in character. The principles of separation of powers and the 
sovereignty of the people had no place in Atatürk's grand modernising and westernising 
project. Although democracy was introduced 60 years ago, the tradition of authoritarian 
leadership is still an important factor in Turkey. The major private enterprises that started to 
appear during the liberal 1950s and got a new boost during the 1980s have in many ways 
adopted this tradition. The founding families keep them on a tight leash, many of the largest 
ones – Sabancı, Koç and Doan – are known by the surname of the founding families, and 
few of them are traded publicly. Although these enterprises have grown into major 
conglomerates with interests in a long line of businesses, the owners still keep them under 
tight control by organising their portfolio in a holding company where all major decisions are 
taken and strategic plans decided. Such an ownership structure was ideal for Turgut Özal 
when he in the 1980s wanted to liberalise the economy without jeopardising his hold on 
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power. Özal nursed the relationship with a handful of government friendly big league 
business owners by handing out economic incentives and lucrative government deals, and 
managed to institutionalise an effective regime of trade-off. Three concurrent developments 
made this scheme particularly successful: the depoliticisation of the public sphere carried out 
by the military junta in the early 1980s, the continuing strong role of the state in the economy 
despite political rhetoric to the contrary, and the transfer of most major media outlets to big 
multiactivity conglomerates. The fact that the most popular newspapers ended up in the hands 
of businessmen with an economic interest in nursing their relations with the state, meant that 
Özal with his strong political base and personal authority could control the situation. 
 
But as I have argued in this thesis, not all governments have been in a position to enjoy the 
spoils of the trade-off regime. Only strong leaders supported by the army have had the upper 
hand over the media conglomerates. The political landscape in Turkey is dotted with political 
parties, and Turkish voters have a reputation for political unfaithfulness. Only Özal and 
Erdoan have enjoyed long uninterrupted stretches at the helm since the army returned 
Turkey to civilian rule in 1983. The 1990s saw a number of weak coalition governments, and 
no single politician stood out as the natural choice of leader. Neither Necmettin Erbakan nor 
Tansu Çiller was able to instigate successful trade-off regimes, and both had a hard time with 
the conglomerate media. In the case of Erbakan it could be argued that his political agenda 
was to destroy the trade-off arrangement altogether. The fluctuating political landscape is the 
major difference between Turkey and many of the other authoritarian states that have 
liberalised their economy in the same period, for instance Taiwan, Malaysia and South Korea. 
Studies of state-media relations in these countries show that trade-off regimes have been 
particularly successful because there have been political stability in the form of one political 
party that have enjoyed long and uninterrupted tenures in office. This has created stability in 
the economic sphere, but not improved the conditions for democracy and pluralism. 
 
Turkish political leaders that have been unable to instigate an effective trade-off regime, have 
either like Erbakan tried to break the arrangement altogether by challenging the power of the 
media owners, or like Mesut Yılmaz made greater concessions to them. This touches upon 
another characteristics of the Turkish media landscape: that it is not self-sustainable. The 
Turkish media market is very small compared to Western markets, and Turks spend less of 
their money on media consumption than Western consumers. But this is not the whole story. 
Most Turkish media outlets are owned by major conglomerates, which can finance the losses 
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by transferring money from their other businesses. This means that there are more money 
spent on media production than media consumption, and the Turkish media sector can 
consequently not be analysed solely as profit-oriented business. The natural selection that 
would occur in a competition regulated and driven market has not materialised, and we have 
to look for competing motives to why Turkish businessmen invest in the media business. I 
argue in this thesis that the political dimension is an important factor to explain this 
discrepancy. From a critical political economy perspective this is not a problem in and of 
itself. Media ownership in the hands of political parties or pressure groups can strengthen 
pluralism in society as long as there are sufficient checks and balances in place. But in Turkey 
there are no effective mechanisms to secure diversity and curb undue influence from powerful 
media owners. They have an almost all-mighty position within the hierarchy in their own 
business operations, they can do business with the state on equal terms with other business 
owners who do not have interests in the media sector, and it is almost an accepted fact of life 
that they use their outlets to secure benefits for their business operations. The fact that most of 
these business owners also share the same political vision for Turkey, a vision that is eagerly 
promoted through the Türk Sanayicileri ve Iadamları Dernei (Tüsiad; Turkish Industrialists 
and Businessmen’s Association), makes it even more untenable. To recapitulate a quotation 
from Mustafa Sönmez: 
 
“They all believe that the liberal economy is the right one, globalisation is the right way and 
making agreements with the IMF is the right preference. They have a consensus about these 
macro principles. This is in politics too, not only in economics. They are secular, and they 
have a pro-EU view.”3 
 
If we on top of all this add that Turkey have a weak civil society, no generally accepted 
professional codes of ethics, no effective legislation to curb cross-media ownership, and no 
editorial agreements to secure the independence of the editorial staff, the conclusion is that the 
better part of the media market is controlled by a handful of private individuals with a vested 
interest in a certain political development. The existence of diversity and pluralism in Turkey 
are thus dependent upon the goodwill of a few powerful owners who, at least on paper, are 
accountable to none but themselves. If we take into account the many cases of media owners 
who have interfered in the democratic process, the totality of the situation appears worrying.  
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The media system in place in Turkey today is a highly commercial one, and is as such in 
many ways a replica of the systems in place in most free-market societies. The major problem 
is that the regulatory regimes that have followed the development of such a media system in 
most Western countries have not been adopted. Private television initially developed in a legal 
limbo in terms of the business side, while freedom of expression was controlled on many 
sides. Business legislation thus had to follow in the footsteps of investors and businessmen, 
and not in dialogue between authorities and private interests. Civil society was never invited 
to the party in the first place. Seen in light of this, the implementation of EU legislation is a 
step in the right direction. It is also possible to discern signs of a development towards a more 
specialised business climate. Due to the meltdowns in 2000 and 2001 many media groups 
either sold or lost their banks, and Aydın Doan recently sold his bank to a Benelux based 
company. The connection between banks and media groups has arguably been the most 
corrupting part of the Turkish media sector. Owning a bank could provide almost unlimited 
cash flow in the laxly regulated banking days of the 1990s, and good relations with the 
government would ease things greatly if one wanted to buy one of the smaller state banks 
about to be privatised. The media groups thus had funds easily available to cover their losses 
in the media sector. The triangle of finance, politics and the media constituted the corrupting 
nursery for the emerging Turkish private broadcasters in the 1990s. In the absence of a media 
policy, the interplay of these three factors to a large degree determined how the sector would 
structure itself and operate. The connection between finance and media is now about to be 
broken, and the media owners have lost their most important economic lifeline. One element 
in the corrupted triangle will thus be eliminated. If and when effective checks and balances to 
limit undue political interference from media owners are implemented, this dark chapter in the 
history of the Turkish media might finally be closed. 
 
But there are still many tripwires. The chronic troubles of the Turkish economy and the as yet 
unsolved ethnic and religious conflicts that have plagued the young republic have the 
potential to wreck havoc again. The extent to which Turkey is able to solve or learn to live 
peacefully with these conflicts is closely tied to the future prospects of freedom of speech and 
pluralism. As long as there are powerful interests in Turkey – the army, the “deep state” and 
various militant ethnic and religious groups – that are not willing to make compromises on 
such issues as the role of religion in society, the cultural rights of minorities and the sanctity 
of the state, it is hard to see how the ideal of a truly vibrant, pluralistic and free media can be 
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accomplished any time soon. The fragile state of Turkish civil society is also troubling. If 
employees are left out of the process of forming the Turkish media landscape, it is a danger 
that this landscape exclusively will cater to the needs and interests of owners and politicians. 
What I find particularly worrying is the fact that the attack on trade unions continues with 
unabated force despite the recent political reforms demanded by the EU. My research does not 
allow me to make substantial conclusions to the effect that the EU does not take the well-
being of Turkish civil society as seriously as the well-being of the Turkish free market and 
major business interests. But for the many Turks who believe that membership in the EU will 
solve all the political ills in Turkish society, it should clearly be a cause for concern and 
inspire academics and journalists to investigate the field more thoroughly.  
 
I have in this thesis presented many arguments to support my initial claim that the 
consequences of concentrated media ownership are more serious in Turkey than in most 
Western countries. What lessons can media theorists learn from the Turkish case? The first 
thing that springs to mind, is that theoretical perspectives on media ownership has to take into 
account the dilemma of economic liberalisation vs. political liberalisation. Many political 
scientists has pointed out that a well-functioning democracy seems to be dependent upon a 
certain level of prosperity. This argument echoes Turgut Özal's (1991:308) claim that 
economic reforms must precede cultural and political reforms for a country to prosper. My 
own findings indicate that market size indeed is an important determinant for media diversity. 
The problems with such an approach seen in light of the Turkish case is that NGOs and the 
public in general will have few means for active participation in the development, and that the 
business climate and thus the privately owned media to a large degree will be shaped and 
controlled by a political and economic elite. This becomes especially untenable when major 
multiactivity conglomerates with organic financial links with the state control the media. Such 
a climate leaves the door wide open for clientelism and outright corruption, exemplified by 
the informal networks between politicians and big business owners documented in this thesis. 
Neither the liberal nor the critical political economy perspective provides a sufficient frame 
for analysis of such a media environment. A new perspective that conceives of the media as 
being a check both on public and private power, and highlights the convergence of interests 
between these groups as witnessed in many late-industrialising countries, will be a major step 
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